Lecture 10 Flashcards
Traditional global governance (via formal intergovernmentalism)
Assumption; problem-solving depends on cooperation among states
Goal; to constrain behaviour of states by making, monitoring, adjudicating and enforcing rules
Instruments; inter-governmental treaties and formal IGO’s
Organizing principle; multilateralism
* “insert quote” Ruggie 1992
* Complex part; how many states do what?
Limits of formal intergovernmentalism
Inflexibility; power shifts and new problems emerge faster than treaties and formal IGO’s can be reformed
Irrelevance; many global problems involve activities of private actors, so aren’t easily addressed by inter-governmental solutions
Illegitimacy; public opinion is increasingly mistrustful of IGO’s and other stakeholders (NGO’s, firms) aren’t included
Solution?
Kaul 2020
Int. cooperation is more needed than ever, but world lacks willing and capable leadership to build support for…
… a new practice of multilateralism, in which forms of multilateral cooperation and exercise of national sovereignty are mutually compatible
Old model says it will only work if states sacrifice something
Kindleberger moment?
Big question; why did international cooperation collapse in 1930s?
Kindleberger’s answer; lack of hegemonic leadership
* UK was willing but no longer able
* US was able but not yet willing
Kindleberger 1973 (World in depression)
New forms of global governance
Informal intergovernmentalism, new roles for IGO’s, collaboration, orchestration, ad hoc coalitions
informal intergovernmentalism
Snidal and vabulas 2013 article
Cooperation via informal IGO’s without legal status or delegated authority
New roles for IGO’s
IGO’s have ambitious governance goals, to provide public goods and regulate behaviour of state and non state actors, but they often lack material resources and authority needed to achieve their goals
Gap between IGO goals and capabilities -> innovation (new roles for IGO’s)
Collaboration and orchestration
Collaboration
** IGO’s work directly with target actors to promote policy change and self-regulation
** Illustration; UN collaborates with states to promote certain policy priorities
* Sustainable development goals. 17 goals, 169 target, 232 indicators negotiated and approved by states. Achievement is voluntarily, not binding. States are responsible for achieving goals, mostly individually but also with support from others (#17)
Orchestration
Abbott and Snidal 2010
IGO’s work indirectly through intermediaries to address target actors in pursuit of governance goals
Orchestrator – IGO
Intermediaries – other IGO’s, states, firms, NGO’s and public private partnerships
Targets – behaviour of states, firms or persons
See also Abbott, Genschel, Snidal and Zangl 2015
Ad hoc coalitions
Reykers et al 2023
Global governance increasingly involves ad hoc coalitions; “autonomous arrangements with task specific mandate established at short notice for limited period of time”
Other variables
* Operate outside of existing IO’s but may cooperate with them
* May involve only states or a mix of states, IO’s and non-state actors
Disadvantages ad hoc coalitions
- Powerful states can easily block or manipulate this
- No accumulation of expertise
- Not well suited to promoting structural change over time (ending poverty etc)
- Not well suited to promoting rule compliance over time
Advantages ad hoc coalitions
- Functional option when national solutions and existing IO’s cant solve the problem
- Less costly – not creating permanent bureaucracy
- Less constraining – no ongoing commitments
3 key characteristics ad hoc coalitions
- Task specific mandate, to achieve specific goal not structural change
- Created on short notice
- Intended to function for a limited period of time