Lecture 6

Question 1

Decentralized cooperation

Answer 1

cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement. Can be made possible by
Weak security dilemma
* Absolute gains
* Reciprocity
* Incentives
* Reassurance
* Shared identities

Question 2

Weak security dilemma

Answer 2

linked to decentralized cooperation.
Jervis 1978
The strength of the security dilemma depends on:
1. Offense-defense balance: does current military technology
favour offense or defense?
2. Transparency of offensive vs defensive posture: Can states
observe and distinguish each other’s military posture?
Strong dilemma: offense dominant, low transparency
Weak dilemma: defense dominant, high transparency

Question 3

States may focus on absolute gains

Answer 3

Snidal 1991
Anarchy does not force states to focus on relative gains when considering
cooperation. They are more likely to focus on absolute gains when:
1. Many states are involved in the cooperation.
* If few states, then more incentive to focus on relative gains.
* If more states, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains.
2. The consequences of cheating are not threatening.
* If cheating by Other is likely to be threatening, then more incentive to
focus on relative gains.
* If cheating by Other isn’t likely to be threatening, then more incentive
to focus on absolute gains.
linked to decentralized cooperation

Question 4

Power of reciprocity

Answer 4

linked to decentralized cooperation.
Keohane 1986.
Reciprocity = an int’l norm that compromises by one state should be
balanced by compromises by others.
* Specific reciprocity: A and B make simultaneous compromises to
enable an agreement.
* Not dependent on trust, so there’s no credible commitment problem.
* General reciprocity: A makes a compromise to enable an agreement
with B on the understanding that B will make an equivalent
compromise later.
* Heavily dependent on trust, so requires shared identity or expectation
of an on-going relationship (distant shadow of the future).
Significance: Reciprocity enables cooperation without hierarchal
authority or centralized enforcement.

Question 5

Incentives may promote cooperation

Answer 5

Linked to decentralized cooperation.
Positive incentives:
Benefits for those who cooperate or support cooperation.
Via:
* ‘Log rolling’: a deal with off-setting benefits for all
participants.
* Part of the deal benefits A, another part benefits B, etc.
* ‘Side payments’: compensation for any actor (domestic or
int’l) that doesn’t benefit from cooperation and could block it.
* Cooperation benefits A & B but C can block it, so A & B offer some
other ‘goodies’ to C so that it doesn’t block the cooperation.
Negative incentives:
Sanctions against non-cooperators
to reduce free-riding and credible commitment problems.
But it isn’t easy:
– no states want to be monitored & punished by others
– non-cooperation can sometimes be hidden
– few states want to do the punishing (it annoys partners)

Question 6

Reassurance may overcome fear

Answer 6

Gross Stein 1991. Linked to decentralized cooperation.
Logic: If fear feeds the security dilemma, which makes
cooperation difficult, then reassuring words and actions can
promote positive identification and cooperation.
Strategy: Use words and actions (including self-restraint and deescalation) to make Other less fearful & allow focus on shared
interests. If reciprocated, it can create a positive spiral.

Question 7

Shared identities facilitate cooperation

Answer 7

Risse-Kappen 1995
Linked to decentralized cooperation.
The ease of cooperation depends on the extent of shared
values and norms among states.
During the Cold War, cooperation between Canada, Europe
and the US was facilitated by shared values – problem-solving
through dialogue and openness to civil society – that
outweighed other interests.

Question 8

Institutionalized cooperation

Answer 8

cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions
How international institutions promote cooperation:
* Reduce transaction costs.
* Shape expectations.
* Make commitments more credible.
* Facilitate reciprocity.
* Extend shadow of the future.
* Enable interlinkage of issues.

Question 9

Reducing transaction costs

Answer 9

Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Information: consolidate expertise, identify opportunities for
mutually-beneficial cooperation.
* Decision-making: promote regular contacts, set agendas, establish
decision-making procedures, encourage compromise.
* Sovereignty: ensure input into cooperation.
* Enforcement: centralize & de-politicize monitoring and sanctions.

Question 10

Shaping expectations

Answer 10

Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions shape actors’ expectations by establishing:
* rules that define acceptable & unacceptable behavior
* procedures for sanctioning unacceptable behavior

Question 11

How do institutions make commitments more credible?

Answer 11

Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions make states’ commitments more credible
by:
* monitoring: increasing transparency of (non-)compliance
* sanctioning: shaming & punishing non-compliance

Question 12

Facilitate reciprocity

Answer 12

Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions promote dynamics of reciprocity by:
* reminding states of shared identities & shared interests
in cooperation
* arranging complementary compromises (see specific
reciprocity)
* promoting on-going relationships (see general
reciprocity)

Question 13

Extend shadow of the future

Answer 13

Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions promote on-going relationships, which
encourages states to prioritize long-term gains from
cooperation over short-term gains from non-cooperation

Question 14

Enable interlinkage of issues

Answer 14

Linked to institutionalized cooperation. Int’l institutions promote cooperation via multi-issue
‘package deals’ in which all actors compromise on some
issue(s) to achieve gains on other issue(s).

Question 15

Hegemonic cooperation

Answer 15

Take advantage of hierarchy!
Hegemons and great powers have more resources and are
expected to lead, so they can promote cooperation.
Requirements for hegemonic leadership – some combination of:
* Capability: resources to promote negotiation, monitor
compliance, punish violators
* Willingness: political interest in promoting cooperation
* Legitimacy : acceptance by others of leader’s role and plans

Question 16

3 forms of int. cooperation

Answer 16

Jahn & Graefrath (2023).
Minimal cooperation: States implicitly coordinate policies to
achieve mutual benefits.
– via mutual observation & policy adjustment over time.
– ex. US & USSR on non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons
* Thin cooperation: States explicitly coordinate policies to achieve
mutual benefits.
– via negotiation & agreement on policy adjustments.
– ex. US & USSR on anti-ballistic missile treaty
* Thick cooperation: States engage in joint pursuit of a shared goal.
– via shared commitment to joint activity and mutual support.
– ex. UK, US, USSR to defeat Nazi Germany

Question 17

What motivates states to cooperate?

Answer 17

Several possible motives, alone or in combination:
1. Shared threats
2. Shared material interests
3. Shared identities

Question 18

Shared sense of threat

Answer 18

Anarchy and interdependence make states vulnerable to threats
that can be reduced through cooperation.
* External military threat
– ex. Vietnam & US
* Internal political threat
– ex. Belarus & Russia
* Global threat
– ex. cooperation on climate change

Question 19

Shared material interest

Answer 19

World economy creates opportunities for material gain
through cooperation.
* Gains from trade
– Cooperation improves economic efficiency,
so it benefits both state A and state B overall.
* Interdependence
– Policies adopted in state A affect conditions in state B,
and vice-versa, so cooperation benefits both by reducing
their vulnerability to external shocks.
* Class interests
– Certain types of cooperation reinforce capitalism and
thus benefit the transnational capitalist class.

Question 20

Shared identities

Answer 20

Common history, culture or values makes cooperation natural.
* Political values, form of government
– ex. Community of Democracies
* Moral values, religion
– ex. Organization of Islamic Cooperation
* History
– ex. British Commonwealth of Nations
* Culture, language

Question 21

What makes cooperation difficult?

Answer 21

It is costly.
Security dilemma.
Credible commitment problem.
Relative gains problem.
Free rider problem.
Pressure of 2 level games

Question 22

Costly cooperation

Answer 22

Williamson 1990.
Information costs
– Identifying opportunities for mutual gain
* Decision-making costs
– Negotiating the terms of cooperation
* Sovereignty costs
– Compromises on autonomy to achieve cooperation
* Enforcement costs
– Monitoring behavior, punishing violators

Question 23

Security dilemma

Answer 23

Jervis 1978.
Anarchy  fear & insecurity  defensive actions  more fear
& insecurity  difficulty of cooperation.

Question 24

Credible commitment problem

Answer 24

Cooperation often requires that all focus on long-term interests (rather than
maximizing short-term gains), but states may not believe others’ promises to
cooperate.
 mis-fit between short-term and long-term incentives
Why?
* States lack good information on others’ intentions and future actions.
– Other may be lying, trying to cheat or exploit me.
– Other may change its mind.
– Other may change its government.
* Today’s gains are more certain than future gains.

Question 25

Relative gains problem

Answer 25

When facing possible cooperation, states may focus on…
* absolute gains – how much do I gain?
* relative gains – how does my gain compare to other’s gain?
Question: Will State A & State B want to cooperate?

Question 26

Free rider problem

Answer 26

Olson 1965.
Self-interested actors seek to benefit from public goods and common
resources without contributing to their provision.
Public goods:
* non-excludable: accessible to all
* non-rival: use by A doesn’t limit use by B
* free riding  under-provision of public goods
Common resources:
* non-excludable: accessible to all
* rival: use by A reduces use by B
* free riding  loss of common resources

Question 27

Pressure of 2 level games

Answer 27

Putnam 1988.
Preferences of domestic actors and their government may differ.
Governments are caught between domestic and int’l pressures.
Result: To maintain support at home, govts sometimes make
unrealistic demands abroad, which makes cooperation difficult.