Lecture 13 Flashcards

1
Q

Global environmental problems

A

Climate change (global warming)
* Atmospheric damage (ozone depletion)
* Ocean pollution (chemicals, micro-plastics)
* Desertification (loss of fertile lands)
* Loss of biodiversity (species & habitats)
… are ‘wicked problems’

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2
Q

Multiple stakeholders,
with diverse values & interests

A

All large-scale human activity affects the environment, so many
‘stakeholders’ are affected, positively and negatively, by any action
to protect the environment.
* Many types of stakeholders:
– Governments, Voters / Consumers, Corporations, NGO’s, Agriculturalists, Natural resource extractors, Transporters, Indigenous peoples
* Each stakeholder has its own values and interests.

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3
Q

Issue linkages and value complexity

A

Environmental issues involve complex issue-linkages:
* Different actors, institutions, cultures place different values on
issues… and thus on tradeoffs between issues.

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4
Q

Multi level

A
  • Environmental problems and solutions involve actions at local,
    national, regional and global levels.
  • Each level involves different political actors, institutions,
    cultures, and interests.
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5
Q

Interdependencies

A
  • Interdependence of jurisdictions
    – Actions taken (or not taken) in A affect conditions in B, and viceversa… but actors in A and B may not have influence over each
    other’s decisions.
  • Interdependence of levels
    – Actions taken (or not taken) at one level affect conditions at
    other levels… but decision-making may be uncoordinated.
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6
Q

Causal complexity

A

On the problems
* What’s causing what?
* How?
* How quickly?
On potential solutions
* Will they be effective?
* With what unintended effects?
* With what unforeseen effects?
* made worse by poor education, misinformation, anti-science

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7
Q

Invisibilty

A

Many types of environmental damage are not clearly visible, or
not yet visible, or not visible to many people.

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8
Q

Causal complexity + invisibility =
Imperfect information

A

Scientific information is often incomplete, contradictory, and/or
controversial.
So it’s difficult to reach consensus on…
* … the need for action (what problem?)
* … responsibility (who caused this mess?)
* … solutions (what should be done?)

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9
Q

II. Obstacles to international cooperation
on environmental problems

A

Why is it so difficult to achieve international solutions to
environmental problems?

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10
Q

Short term interests

A
  • Environmental protection may reduce general economic growth
    and/or certain actors’ income, at least in the short-term.
  • Various incentives lead actors to prioritise short-term gains over
    sustainable, long-term solutions.
    – Corporations: maximise quarterly profits
    – Governments: win the next election
    – Voters: insecurity -> protect current income
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11
Q

Shortage of state capacity

A

Some governments lack the capacities needed to address
environmental problems:
* Administrative control
* Financial resources
* Technical know-how

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12
Q

Rational choices

A

Even if the science is clear and key actors are capable, which
often is not the case…
… the absence of world government creates incentives for
rational, self-interested actors to damage the environment!
Why?

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13
Q

Commons

A

Commons: resources that nobody owns but everybody uses
Common Pool Resources: natural or man-made resources that
are zero-sum (use by A reduces use by B) and non-excludable
(difficult or impossible to prevent use by others)
Examples of CPRs:
* Oceans, Air, Atmosphere, Broadcast spectrum, Space (satellite orbits)

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14
Q

Tragedy of the commons (form of pd)

A

Individual rationality -> over-use of common resources -> collectively
irrational outcome.
* Multiple farmers share a common space for grazing their sheep.
* If too many sheep on the commons, all farmers lose income.
* But each farmer gets full profit from each extra sheep.
* Each farmer faces a choice:
* Q: Should I bring more sheep to the commons?
Gain = 1 per extra sheep
Loss = 1/5 per extra sheep
Profit = 4/5 per extra sheep
* A: Yes, bring extra sheep
* Result: over-use of commons!

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15
Q

In summary, the challenge of global environmentalism

A
  • Overcoming the resistance of powerful interests.
  • Improving scientific understanding, supporting consensus.
  • Improving the capacity of states.
  • Avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’.
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16
Q

Epistemic communities

A

Epistemic community: Transnational network of scientists with
shared knowledge and methods of problem-solving.
* Build knowledge via research
* Raise public awareness of problems
* Propose solutions
* Pressure governments and int’l organizations to make
commitments & to implement their commitments

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17
Q

Social movements

A

Social movements & mass mobilisation help convert scientific
consensus into political pressure… change the ‘two-level game,’
creating domestic incentives for governments to cooperate.

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18
Q

Protection of endangered species

A
  • Human population growth, urbanization, modern agriculture,
    destruction of forests -> loss of biodiversity.
  • Global network of scientists & environmental NGOs,
    International Union for the Conservation of Nature, raises
    public awareness, pressures governments for action.
  • 1974: govts sign Convention on International Trade in
    Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
    Significant limits on trade in endangered species… but
    inconsistent implementation at national level.
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19
Q

Pollution mediterranean - chemical pollution phase 1

A
  • 1970s: Major chemical pollution of Mediterranean
  • 17 coastal states had different levels of understanding &
    commitment (ES, FR, IT, MA, YU, AL, GR, CY, TK, SY, LB, IS, EG, LI,
    TU, AL, MO)
  • But… a transnational network of marine biologists
    reached agreement on the problem, then
    convinced all 17 governments to accept
    rules to cut pollution.
    successful ‘Mediterranean Action Plan’
    Phase 2 (plastics pollution) is unresolved.
20
Q

Privatizing commons

A
  • Having exclusive access to a piece of the global commons
    gives individual states a strong incentive to manage it
    responsibly.
  • Some global commons can be (partly) divided this way, but
    not all.
  • Yes: oceans, fisheries, radio spectrum
  • No: space
21
Q

Exploitation ocean resources

A
  • Problems:
    – How to stop over-fishing?
    – How to control the search for oil, gas, seabed minerals?
  • 1982 UN conference (UNCLOS III) gave each country an
    ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ of 200 nm: no other state may
    extract economic resources in the EEZ.
    It works!
    But EEZs only protect coastal seas, not the ‘high seas’!
22
Q

International institutions

A

International institutions help states overcome cooperation
problems (including tragedy of the commons):
* Expectation of repeated interaction  more incentive to
compromise & cooperate.
* Negotiations  rules that everybody can accept.
* Technical & financial assistance  increase state capacity
to comply with rules.

23
Q

Depletion of atmospheric ozone

A
  • Ozone in upper-atmosphere protects Earth from solar radiation
  • 1970s: early evidence that human use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
    thinner ozone layer… but industry resists change
  • 1985: scientists find a growing “hole” in ozone layer
  • 1986: govts sign Vienna Convention to cut CFCs
  • 1987: govts sign Montreal Protocol (today 197 parties)
    – with aid to help developing countries make transition
    CFCs levels have dropped, ozone layer is recovering
24
Q

Loss of biodiversity

A
  • CITES focus on trade in endangered species wasn’t enough to stop loss of
    species & habitats.
  • 1988: UN Environment Programme -> Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts
    on Biological Diversity
  • 1992: Convention on Biological Diversity
    – biodiversity is “a common concern of humankind”
    – links conservation to sustainable use
    – Today: 196 states-party
  • 2022: COP 15 Montreal
    – New targets to stop biodiversity loss – 30% of earth by 2030
     Questions remain about treaty enforcement.
25
Q

Protection of oceans

A

High Seas Treaty agreed 4 march 2023.
Now open for signature.
What?
* Requires environmental impact assessments to be completed before any new
exploitation of marine resources (deep sea mining, etc.)
* Establishes rules to ensure fair distribution of knowledge, technologies and
benefits from ‘marine genetic resources’ (for new drugs, etc.)
So what? Adresses ‘governance vacuum’ at sea.
* Legal protection of 2/3 of world’s oceans (beyond territ. waters & EEZs).
* Critical to ‘30% by 2030’ commitment on preventing biodiversity loss.
* Critical to natural capture of CO2 (stopping global warming).
How?
* Almost 20 years of negotiation at UN.
* High Ambition Coalition (EU, US, UK, China) brokered agreement.
* Global South govts + NGOs (High Seas Alliance) insisted on fairness

26
Q

Conclusion

A

International cooperation for environmental
protection is difficult… but it can succeed.

27
Q

Elinor Ostrom and the commons

A

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(1990) and other works.
Rational actors under anarchy can develop rules and institutions that
govern their behaviour and enable them to manage common
resources.
* Rules must be clear and legitimate (as seen by stakeholders).
* Institutions may be multi-level, but must be complementary.
* Actors must share understanding of appropriate behavior.

28
Q

1992 UNFCC framework convention on climate change

A
  • Acknowledged human sources of climate change
  • Made advanced industrial states responsible for solution
  • Set goal: limit global warming to 2° C
29
Q

1997 kyoto protocol

A
  • Legally-binding treaty, obligates certain states to cut greenhouse gases
    (GHGs)
  • No obligations on China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Korea…
  • US signed but never ratified
30
Q

2009 copenhagen COP 15

A
  • No new commitments on GHG cuts
  • Rich states agree to provide funds to help developing states reduce GHG
    emissions & deal with effects of climate change
31
Q

2013 Warsaw COP 19 and 2014 Lima COP 20

A
  • New approach: instead of Kyoto’s negotiated targets, all states should
    prepare Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
32
Q

2015 Paris COP 21 -> Paris Accord

A
  • 195 states-party, plus EU
  • Target: limit warming to below 2°C by 2030
  • Goal 1: Legally-binding GHG cuts for all states, based on NDCs
  • Goal 2: NDCs will be increased every 5 years
33
Q

October 2018 IPCC report

A
  • Global warming must be limited to 1.5°C (+2.0°C is too warm).
  • Governments must take big steps quickly on energy, agriculture,
    transport, industry.
34
Q

COP 27 november 2022

A
  • Creation of new fund for ‘loss and damage.’
  • Little new ambition on national contributions (NDCs).
  • No commitment to phase-out fossil fuels.
35
Q

COP 28 december 2023

A
  • Very limited contributions to ‘loss and damage’ fund.
  • Deep disagreement on phase-out of fossil fuels.
  • Much discussion of carbon capture technology.
36
Q

Climate change puzzle & 4 answers

A

General expectation: Interdependence  incentive to
cooperate, to build effective international institutions.
Puzzle: slow & ineffective negotiations for many years
 Question: Why has global cooperation on climate
change been so slow and ineffective?

37
Q

Answer 1, interdependence affects states differently

A

Interdependence sensitivity: how much a state is exposed to decisions &
developments beyond its borders.
* States vary in sensitivity to climate change.
Interdependence vulnerability: a state’s sensitivity adjusted for its ability to
adapt.
* States vary greatly in vulnerability to climate change.
* Rich states can adapt.
Uneven exposure to climate change  uneven incentives for addressing
climate change.

38
Q

Sensitivity

A

exposure to effects

39
Q

Vulnerability

A

exposure + ability to adapt

40
Q

Answer 2, 2 level games

A

Theory: progress of international negotiations depends on the
domestic interests and constituencies of participating governments
Application:
* Despite clear science, many governments face powerful domestic
interests that oppose the reforms needed to fight climate change
(in energy, transport, housing, industry, agriculture…).
* Global North has strong interests that gain from the status quo.
* Global South has growing population, ready for ‘development.’
 Question: What could change the two-level game of climate
change?

41
Q

Answer 3, weak incentives

A

Cooperation on climate change is a classic collective action problem: there’s no
incentive to cooperate unless all cooperate.
So far: reducing emissions is a Prisoner’s Dilemma
 Each country benefits when all reduce GHGs significantly, but…
 Each country has little incentive to reduce its own emissions
 equilibrium outcome is non-cooperation.
To change the outcome, we need to change the incentives.
Goal: Convince governments it’s a Coordination game with 2 possible
outcomes
 Outcome 1: world avoids danger zone (stays below +2 degrees)
 Outcome 2: world enters danger zone (go above +2 degrees)
How to achieve cooperation on outcome 1?
 Ensure scientific certainty. If danger threshold is clear and accepted, and
every country’s cooperation is needed, then both national promises and
multilateral threat of punishment are more credible.
 Ensure credible punishment. Treaty must allow N-1 countries to punish any
defector… and still benefit from continued cooperation. For example, by
prohibiting trade with the defector state.
 Ensure minimum participation. Treaty must be conditional on minimum
number of participants needed to avoid danger zone.

42
Q

Answer 4, capitalism

A

States and international institutions promote the global capitalist system,
which values profits over environmental protection.
Climate diplomacy, green finance, etc. are just public relations.
So it’s not surprising that negotiations fail to stop climate change.

43
Q

Mitigation

A
  • Mitigation: reducing production and release of GHGs
    – Raises difficult issues of collection action and political will.
44
Q

Adaptation

A
  • Adaptation: preparing societies to withstand the consequences of CC
    – Doesn’t address the source(s) of the problem.
    – Localizes/nationalizes what is really a global problem.
45
Q

Geo engineering

A
  • Geo-engineering: direct air capture of GHGs; solar radiation management
    – Some technologies are unproven and potentially risky.
    – Requires widespread implementation but depends on powerful states with
    technical capacity.
    – Authorized by whom? By what institution?
    – In the absence of mitigation, is this just a short-term solution?
    – Would be catastrophic if suddenly discontinued (due to war, etc.).