L4 Attachment, mentalization, epistemic

Question 1

obligate collaborative foraging

Answer 1

➢ Humans have developed very strong skills for collaborating with each other
➢ Crucial in this is the strong tendency of already very young children towards joint intentionality. Humans have a great capacity for shared goals and shared mental states (intersubjectivity).
➢ Within this context shared meanings and shared stories can come into existence.
➢ Humans are from birth particularly attuned to sharing mental states with other humans.

Question 2

intentionality (aboutness)

Answer 2

Introduced into psychology by Franz Brentano (1874) as the mark of mental phenomena. That is: mental phenomena are about something, i.e. intended at something.

Question 3

Interpersonal model of personality dynamics

Answer 3

This model does NOT primarily view personality as directly reflecting stable individual traits. Rather, it assumes that those who meet criteria for PDs are characterized by pervasive and persistent recurring intra-personal and inter-personal themes and dynamics

Question 4

interpersonal field=

Answer 4

A schematic depiction of the interactive field of two self-regulation individuals (e.g. client and therapist).

Question 5

intentional stance

Answer 5

A term from the philosopher Daniel Dennett. The assumption that intentionality is present in something (e.g. yourself, another human, an animal, the sun, etc.)

Question 6

triadics: reasons

Answer 6

action stimulus - intention meaning - reaction/response

lijnen tussen a-i en r-i
dotted lijn tussen a-r

Question 7

mentalization is an umbrella concept referring to….

Answer 7

• the movement from dualism to triadic
• the introduction of the intentional stance
• the process of learning and applying a theory of mind

Question 8

psychologists are professional mentalizers

Answer 8

oke

Question 9

basic model of attachment & mentalizing

Answer 9

zie schrift

Question 10

hoe ga je van attachment naar mentalizing

Answer 10

1. In mammals and avians offspring strongly attach to caregivers.
2. Human babies are particularly sensitive and attuned to the forms of vitaly they can share with others
3. In secure attachment parents use ‘parental reflective functioning’ (i.e. mentalizing capacity) to interact with their child giving rise to joint intentionality.
4. Via this process the child learns to distinguish the (joint) intention from the particular acts of the participants. And from the distinction between self and other (marking) it learns about difference in intentions between self and other.

Question 11

natural pedagogy

Answer 11

➢ Humans possess a species-specific capacity for the fast intergenerational transmission of cultural knowledge.
➢ Instead of having to work out cultural knowledge oneself, one can rely on the authority and perceived trustworthiness of the person communicating that information.
➢ Epistemic trust thus enables a particular kind of species-specific learning

Importantly: this also goes for information about the self and the ‘me’, which we don’t invent ourselves but receive from others. Not passively, but by actively identifying with some others.

Question 12

epistemic trust

Answer 12

➢ It is simply ‘trust’, but then in particular the trust we need to learn from others and to give them a certain authority.
➢ We are not inclined to just trust anyone to provide us with valid information.
➢ A situation of epistemic trust enables a particular kind of species-specific learning.
➢ Thus the absence of epistemic trust makes learning (about the world, the self, etc.) really problematic

Question 13

epistemic (hyper)vigilance

Answer 13

➢ As such vigilance is an important default trait in many contexts: do not trust anyone.
➢ Hypervigilance becomes likely if we have repeatedly experienced the untrustworthiness of trusted authorities – e.g. parents.
➢ In this situation we tend to dismiss information about the world and ourselves from these sources.
➢ If this becomes a central trait it impedes development

Question 14

hoe gaan we van attachment naar epistemic trust & vigilance

Answer 14

attachment -> attunement -> joint intentionality -> mentalizing capacities -> epistemic trust and vigilance

Question 15

intentionality =

Answer 15

Introduced into psychology by Brentano as the term for ‘aboutness’ as the mark of mental phenomena. That is: mental phenomena are about something, i.e. intended at something.

Question 16

intentional stance =

Answer 16

A term from the philosopher Daniel Dennett. The assumption that intentionality is present in something (e.g. yourself, another human, an animal, the sun, etc.)

Question 17

mentalization=

Answer 17

The movement from a dualistic to a triadic perspective, i.e. from a cause-effect or stimulus-response understanding of the world, to the introduction of the assumption that others and oneself have a mental live with intentions that give reasons for actions. This movement is complex and hence mentalization is an umbrella term (see the article by Luyten).
The kernel of the possibility for mentalization is genetically coded, but the full skill is not present at birth.

Question 18

attachment=

Answer 18

In the lecture I refer directly to the PANIC/GRIEF neuro-affective system described by Panksepp – which is basically the same as the attachment system of Bowlby. I will explain that safe attachment, well-regulated attunement and repairs provide the basis for learning to mentalize (see article by Luyten)