FCTM non Normal Operations Flashcards
Troubleshooting
Troubleshooting can be defined as:
- taking steps beyond a published NNC in an effort to improve or correct a non-normal condition
- initiating an annunciated checklist without a light, alert, or other indication to improve or correct a perceived non-normal condition
- initiating diagnostic actions.
Troubleshooting beyond checklist directed actions is rarely helpful and has caused further loss of system function or failure. In some cases, accidents and incidents have resulted.
Crew distraction, caused by preoccupation with troubleshooting, has been a key factor in several fuel starvation and CFIT accidents. Boeing recommends completion of the NNC as published whenever possible, in particular for flight control malfunctions that are addressed by a NNC.
Approach and Landing
When a non-normal situation occurs, a rushed approach can often complicate the situation. Unless circumstances require an immediate landing, complete all corrective actions before beginning the final approach.
Note: The use of autobrakes is recommended because maximum autobraking may be more effective than maximum manual braking due to timely application upon touchdown and symmetrical braking. However, the Advisory Information in the PI chapter of the QRH includes Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance data specific to the use of maximum manual braking. When used properly, maximum manual braking provides the shortest stopping distance.
Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport
A suitable airport is defined by the operating authority for the operator based on guidance material but, in general, must have adequate facilities and meet certain minimum weather and field conditions.
If required to divert to the nearest suitable airport, the guidance material typically specifies that the pilot should select the nearest suitable airport “in point of time” or “in terms of time.” In selecting the nearest suitable airport, the pilot-in-command should consider the suitability of nearby airports in terms of facilities and weather and their proximity to the airplane position.
The pilot-in-command may determine, based on the nature of the situation and an examination of the relevant factors, that the safest course of action is to divert to a more distant airport than the nearest airport. For example, there is not necessarily a requirement to spiral down to the airport nearest the airplane’s present position if, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it would require equal or less time to continue to another nearby airport.
For persistent smoke or a fire which cannot positively be confirmed to be completely extinguished, the safest course of action typically requires the earliest possible descent, landing and evacuation. This may dictate landing at the nearest airport appropriate for the airplane type, rather than at the nearest suitable airport normally used for the route segment where the incident occurs.
Engine Oil System Indications Engine
Oil System Indications Oil pressure is considered as the most significant of several oil system indicators.
Oil temperature, oil quantity and oil pressure indications enable the flight crew to recognize a deteriorating oil system. While engine operation is governed by both oil pressure and oil temperature limits, there is no minimum oil quantity limit.
Therefore, there is no low oil quantity NNC in the QRH.
If abnormal oil quantity indications are observed, check oil pressure and oil temperature. If oil pressure and oil temperature indications are normal, operate the engine normally. Accomplish the appropriate NNC for any non-normal oil pressure or oil temperature indications.
Engine Failure versus Engine Fire After Takeoff
The NNC for an engine failure is normally accomplished after the flaps have been retracted and conditions permit.
In case of an engine fire, when the airplane is under control, the gear has been retracted, and a safe altitude has been attained (minimum 400 feet AGL) accomplish the NNC memory items.
Engine Tailpipe Fire
Engine tailpipe fires can occur due to the following:
- engine control malfunction
- excess fuel in the combustor, turbine or exhaust nozzle
- oil accumulation in the hot section flow path or exhaust system.
If a tailpipe fire is reported, the crew should accomplish the NNC without delay. Flight crews should consider the following when dealing with this situation:
- motoring the engine is the primary means of extinguishing the fire
- to prevent an inappropriate evacuation, flight attendants should be notified without significant delay
- communications with ramp personnel and the tower are important to determine the status of the tailpipe fire and to request fire extinguishing assistance
- the engine fire checklist is inappropriate because the engine fire extinguishing agent is not effective against a fire inside the tailpipe.
Loss of Engine Thrust Control
Loss of Engine Thrust Control All turbo fan engines are susceptible to this malfunction whether engine control is hydro-mechanical, hydro-mechanical with supervisory electronics (e.g. PMC) or Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). Engine response to a loss of control varies from engine to engine. Malfunctions have occurred in-flight and on the ground.
The major challenge the flight crew faces when responding to this malfunction is recognizing the condition and determining which engine has malfunctioned.
The Engine Limit or Surge or Stall NNC is written to include this malfunction.This condition can occur during any phase of flight.
Loss of Thrust on Both Engines
Dual engine failure is a situation that demands prompt action regardless of altitude or airspeed. Accomplish memory items and establish the appropriate airspeed to immediately attempt a windmill restart.
There is a higher probability that a windmill start will succeed if the restart attempt is made as soon as possible (or immediately after recognizing an engine failure) to take advantage of high engine RPM.
Initiate the memory portion of the LOSS OF THRUST ON BOTH ENGINES NNC before attempting an APU start for the reasons identified above.
If the windmill restart is not successful, an APU start should be initiated as soon as practical to provide electrical power and starter assist during follow-on engine start attempts.
During in-flight restart attempts use the lower of the EGT redline and the EGT start limit redline, if displayed. A hung or stalled in-flight start is normally indicated by stagnant RPM and increasing EGT. During start, engines may accelerate to idle slowly but action should not be taken if RPM is increasing and EGT is not near or rapidly approaching the limit.
Airframe Vibration Due to Engine Severe Damage or Separation
Certain engine failures, such as fan blade separation can cause high levels of airframe vibration. Although the airframe vibration may seem severe to the flight crew, it is extremely unlikely that the vibration will damage the airplane structure or critical systems. However, the vibration should be reduced as soon as possible by reducing airspeed and descending.
In general, as airspeed decreases vibration levels decrease. As airspeed or altitude change the airplane can transition through various levels of vibration. It should be noted that the vibration may not completely stop.
Once airframe vibration has been reduced to acceptable levels, the crew must evaluate the situation and determine a new course of action based on weather, fuel remaining, and available airports.
Recommended Technique for an In-Flight Engine Shutdown
Any time an engine shutdown is needed in flight, good crew coordination is essential. Airplane incidents have turned into airplane accidents as a result of the flight crew shutting down the incorrect engine.
When the flight path is under complete control, the crew should proceed with a deliberate, systematic process that identifies the affected engine and ensures that the operating engine is not shut down. Do not rush through the shutdown checklist, even for a fire indication.
The following technique is an example that could be used:
When an engine shutdown is needed, the PF disconnects the A/T. The PF then verbally coordinates confirmation of the affected engine with the PM and then slowly retards the thrust lever of the engine that will be shutdown.
Coordinate activation of the start lever as follows:
- PM places a hand on and verbally identifies the start lever for the engine that will be shutdown
- PF verbally confirms that the PM has identified the correct start lever
- PM moves the start lever to cutoff.
If the NNC requires activation of the engine fire switch, coordinate as follows:
- PM places a hand on and verbally identifies the engine fire switch for the engine that is shutdown
- PF verbally confirms that the PM has identified the correct engine fire switch
- PM pulls the engine fire switch.
Discharging Fire Bottles during an Evacuation
The evacuation NNC specifies discharge of the engine or APU fire bottles if an engine or APU fire warning light is illuminated. However, evacuation situations can present possibilities regarding the potential for fire that are beyond the scope of the NNC and may not activate an engine or APU fire warning.
The crew should consider the following when deciding whether to discharge one or more fire bottles into the engines and/or APU:
- if an engine fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near an engine, discharge both available fire bottles into the affected engine
- if the APU fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near the APU, discharge the APU bottle
- the discharged halon agent is designed to extinguish a fire and has very little or no fire prevention capability in the engine nacelles. Halon dissipates quickly into the atmosphere
- there is no reason to discharge the engine or APU fire bottles for evacuations not involving fire indications existing or reported in or near an engine or APU, e.g., cargo fire, security or bomb threat, etc.
Flight Controls Leading Edge or Trailing Edge Device Malfunctions
Leading Edge Flaps Transit - Landing
If an asymmetrical or skewed leading edge device condition occurs, use the LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT NNC to determine the flap setting and VREF for approach. VREF provides 15° bank angle maneuver capability and allows for 15° overshoot protection in all cases.
Do not hold the airplane off during landing flare. Floating just above the runway surface to deplete the additional threshold speed wastes available runway and increases the possibility of a tail strike.
Note: If the gear is retracted during a go-around and flap position is greater than 25, a landing gear configuration warning occurs.
Flight Controls Leading Edge or Trailing Edge Device Malfunctions
Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry - Landing
If a trailing edge flap asymmetry occurs, full maneuver capability exists even if the asymmetry occurred at flaps just out of the full up position.
Burn off fuel to reduce landing weight and lower approach speed. Fly accurate airspeeds in the landing pattern.
At lesser flap settings, excess airspeed is difficult to dissipate, especially when descending on final approach. Pitch attitude and rate of descent on final is higher than for a normal landing.
During flare, airspeed does not bleed off as rapidly as normal.
Fly the airplane onto the runway at the recommended touchdown point. Flare only enough to achieve an acceptable reduction in the rate of descent. Do not allow the airplane to float. Floating just above the runway surface to deplete additional speed wastes available runway and increases the possibility of a tail strike.
Do not risk touchdown beyond the normal touchdown zone in an effort to achieve a smooth landing.
Note: If the gear is retracted during a go-around and flap position is greater than 25, a landing gear configuration warning occurs.
Runaway Stabilizer
A runaway stabilizer condition can be recognized by continuous uncommanded movement of stabilizer trim, or if stabilizer trim is occurring in a manner that is not appropriate for current flight conditions. During manual flight or flight with the autopilot engaged, automatic stabilizer trim can be commanded by the Speed Trim System or autopilot trim. Since commanded stabilizer trim can occur automatically, the pilot needs to consider the existing flight conditions to determine if a runaway stabilizer condition exists. For example, some stabilizer trim movement can be expected to occur during speed, altitude, or configuration changes.
During a runaway stabilizer condition the crew should maintain airplane pitch control through the use of the control column, main electric stabilizer trim, and thrust levers. The control column must be held firmly before the autopilot (if engaged) is disengaged to maintain airplane pitch control and retain any elevator commands from the autopilot. After the autopilot and autothrottle are disengaged, use the control column and thrust levers to establish appropriate pitch attitude and airspeed. If uncommanded trim motion continues, it may stop when the control column is displaced in the opposite direction and the control column cutout is activated.
Use main electric stabilizer trim to reverse any stabilizer trim movement and to reduce control column forces. Sustained use of main electric stabilizer trim may be needed. It is important to note that even though the steps in the Runaway Stabilizer checklist are sequential, these steps can be accomplished simultaneously.
If uncommanded stabilizer trim movement continues, place both STAB TRIM cutout switches to the CUTOUT position. Manual stabilizer trim should then be used for the remainder of the flight.
Standby Rudder On
The STANDBY RUDDER ON light illuminates any time the standby rudder PCU is operating.
If this light illuminates independent of crew action or a hydraulic system malfunction, either of two conditions may have occurred.
The most probable cause is a force fight monitor malfunction inadvertently activating the standby pump and powering the standby PCU.
In this case, three PCU control valves power the rudder and full rudder inputs should be avoided to prevent applying excessive loads on the rudder. The NNC is written for this condition. The second cause may be because of a pressure difference between the two main PCU control valves indicating a jammed condition. This condition does not require a NNC because satisfactory rudder operation is available using the standby rudder PCU.