.AR SG-Main Steam (Welch's Highlighted Notes) Flashcards

1
Q

Steam Generators:

  • Transfer ~ ? MWt from…
  • ?
  • Feedwater ring
    • ?
  • Economizer: Located?
A

Steam Generators:

  • Transfer ~ 4013 MWt from RCS to the secondary. Design: 575°F / 1270 psia
  • No load: ~1170 psia, 100%: ~1040 psia
  • 18.0 x 106 lbm/hr of 1030 psia saturated steam when feedwater is 450°F. Moisture content limited to 0.1%
  • Outlet nozzle flow orifice - limits steam flow in the event of a SLR (steam line rupture) (↓ peak CTMT pressure, ↓ CDR, ↓ + reactivity addition rate)
  • Feedwater ring:
    • Distributes feedwater from the downcomer feedwater nozzle. Supplies water into the downcomer region.
    • Used during emergency conditions to prevent thermally shocking the U-tubes.
  • Economizer: Located just above the tube sheet on the cold leg side. Increases efficiency by preheating incoming feedwater before it enters the evaporator section. (Normal feed line)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

MSIVs (SG1 – 170/180, SG2 – 171/181):

  • ?

Rapid positioning:

  • ?

Slow positioning:

  • ?

Power supplies (125Vdc):

  • ?

Controls:

  • ?
A

MSIVs (SG1 – 170/180, SG2 – 171/181):

  • 140’ MSSS. Hydraulic-actuated, double-disc, wedge valves.
    • Do not open > 100 psid

Rapid positioning:

  • Uses accumulator pressure to close
  • < 4.6 seconds on MSIS

Slow positioning:

  • Used to open, close, and “exercise the valves (close to 90%)
  • ~ 5 minutes to open
  • Uses air operated hydraulic pump

Power supplies (125Vdc):

  • Normal: directly from the battery (PKA or PKB).
  • Back-up: from the bus (PKA or PKB).
  • Selected by closing breakers on the PK bus.

Controls:

  • Each valve has two slow positioning HSs (Train A and B)
  • Each SG has two fast close PBs (Train A and B)
    • Closes BOTH valves from a SG
    • Pushing both (on one SG) will discharge both train accumulators & render them inoperable.
  • Loss of power: fails closed.
  • Loss of IA only: does not change position, remains capable of Fast Closing with air reservoir.
  • Loss of IA and air reservoir: fails as is, cannot fast close
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

MSIVs (SG1 – 170/180, SG2 – 171/181):

MSIV’s hydraulic supply system:

  • Purpose/Design?
  • Accumulators (2):
    • ?
  • Air reservoirs (2):
    • ?

Single MSIV Closure (40AL-9RK6A):

  • ?
A

MSIVs (SG1 – 170/180, SG2 – 171/181):

MSIV’s hydraulic supply system:

  • Each MSIV has independent, self-contained hydraulic actuator and two redundant hydraulic supply systems.
    • Pump: Only common component to both hydraulic systems. Pneumatic (air) operated PDP.
  • Accumulators (2):
    • Stores pressurized hydraulic fluid for quick closing.
    • Pre-charged with nitrogen, then filled to the desired level and pressure (5200 psig) using the hydraulic pump.
      • 5000 psig – minimum Tech Spec pressure
      • 5400 psig – upper limit to protect seals
    • Pressure indicated in MCR / ERFDADS
    • Relief valve kept isolated.
    • Manually bleed off pressure if needed.
  • Air reservoirs (2):
    • Backup control air supply for positioning the hydraulic fluid control valves.
    • Ensures MSIV’s can be closed following the loss of off-site power and air.
    • SEIS alarm on low pressure (74 psig).

Single MSIV Closure (40AL-9RK6A):

  • Reduce power to < 65%.
  • Place DFWCS in 1E.
  • Re-open with 40OP-9SG01 (Slow Open).
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Economizer Isolation Valves (SG1 132/174, SG2 137/177):

  • ?
A

Economizer Isolation Valves (SG1 132/174, SG2 137/177):

  • Electro-hydraulically operated.
  • 2 valves in series on each feed line.
  • MSIS auto closure (Closes associated train valves)
  • Similar to MSIVs except the actuator only has a single hydraulic control system train with two accumulators.
  • Each FWIVs only closes on associated train MSIS signal.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Exercise/Test switches (MSIVs/FWIVs):

  • Exercise: ?
  • ACC CH TEST: ?
A

Exercise/Test switches (MSIVs/FWIVs):

  • Exercise: valve will slow close using hydraulic pump discharge. At 90%, limit switch causes it to slow open.
  • ACC CH TEST: actuator system is lined up to discharge the associated accumulator to the hydraulic reservoir so that the accumulator N2 pre-charge pressure can be checked without causing valve movement.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

MSIV Bypass Valves (1 per SG):

  • ?
A

MSIV Bypass Valves (1 per SG):

  • Close in < 4.6 seconds against 1400 psid.
  • MSIS auto closure (either train will close both bypass)
  • Train A and B SOVs in series in its air supply. Both energized to open the MSIV bypass.
  • AOVs: Fail closed (loss of air / PK power).
    • Closed by spring pressure.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Main Steam Safety Valves:

  • 5 per steam line (setpoint A/L 1%, A/F 3% per Tech Spec bases)
    • 1st – # psig ?
    • 2nd – # psig ?
    • 3-5th – # psig ?
  • ?
A

Main Steam Safety Valves:

  • 5 per steam line (setpoint A/L 1%, A/F 3% per Tech Spec bases)
    • 1st – 1250 psig
    • 2nd – 1290 psig
    • 3-5th – 1315 psig
    • 1% accumulation and 3% blowdown
  • MCR Indications (acoustics, powered from NNN-D11):
    • 1 green light (valve closed) / 1 red light (9% open) / 1 red light (100% open)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Atmospheric Dump Valves (SG1 178/184, SG2 179/185):

  • Operated from …?
  • Operated with:
    • ?
    • ?
    • ?
  • ADVs fail…?
  • N2 accumulators for ADVs:
    • ?
A

Atmospheric Dump Valves (SG1 178/184, SG2 179/185):

  • Operated from MCR, RSP or locally:
    • MCR Controllers powered from PNA/PNB (120Vac)
      • Loss of PNA or PNB – two ADVs failed closed
    • CR” push-button at RSP must be depressed for MCR control.
      • MCR alarm if not in “CR
    • ADV permissive hand switches - both in OPEN PERMISSIVE to allow remote operations.
    • Permissive circuits powered from PKA, PKB, PKC or PKD.
      • Each power supply supplies two switches, impacting two ADVs. (loss of any PK – two ADVs failed closed)
    • Loss and restoration of 120Vac, the LOCAL/CR output module will be forced into “CR”
    • Blown fuse causes green lights to be dimly lit.
  • Operated with:
    • Instrument Air
    • N2 from Service Gas (HP N2)
    • N2 accumulators
  • ADVs fail closed (loss of air and N2 OR loss of power)
  • N2 accumulators for ADVs:
    • Automatically aligned if instrument air is < 100 psig
      • SOV energized to open and align N2
    • N2 < 615 psig: ADV is inoperable (TSR 3.7.200.1)
    • 184 & 185 – each supplied by a pair of 28 ft3 accumulators
    • 178 & 179 – each supplied by one 56 ft3 accumulator
    • Design: ADV operation (assuming N2 > 615 psig) for either:
      • 16 hour SBO coping time
      • 4 hours in M3 and 9.3 hours to align SDC (LCO bases)
  • 30% controller output required to start opening the ADV (overcomes bonnet pressure)
  • Closing ADV Inlet Isolation Valve with the ADV partially open will damage the Inlet Isolation Valve
  • ADVs can be locally operated with a hand wheel (isolate IA/N2, open equalizing valve, engage the clevis)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Downcomer Isolation Valves (SG1 130/172, SG2 135/175):

  • MSIS…?
  • Pneumatically-operated by …?
  • Back-up N2 accumulator:?
  • Loss of power (PK): ?

Loss of all pneumatic pressure (air, N2, & accumulator): ?

A

Downcomer Isolation Valves (SG1 130/172, SG2 135/175):

  • MSIS auto closure (Closes associated train valves)
  • Pneumatically-operated by N2
  • IA repositions the pneumatic servo to align for opening or closing.
    • N2 is also the back-up supply to servos
  • Back-up N2 accumulator: provides 8 hours of valve operation if air is lost
    • 1 tank for all 4 valves
    • N2 accumulator automatically aligned by energized to open SOV if HP N2 pressure is low
    • Low N2 pressure (550 psig) – MCR alarm
      • Analyzed to operate at 235 psig.
      • Valves drifts closed at 150 psig.
    • Allows AFN pump to supply the SGs.
  • Loss of power (PK): fail OPEN (allows AFN to feed SGs)
  • Loss of all pneumatic pressure (air, N2, & accumulator): fail closed
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS):

  • ?

Isolates:

  • ?
A

Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS):

  • Low SG pressure (< 960 psia – variable)
  • High CTMT pressure (> 3 psig NR)
  • High SGWL (> 91% NR level)

Isolates:

  • Downcomer FWIVs
  • Economizer FWIVs
  • MSIVs (MSIVs close on either train of MSIS)
  • MSIV Bypasses (Closes on either train MSIS)
  • Upstream Steam Trap Isolation Valves
  • SGBD CIVs (AOVs) and SG sample CIVs (SOVs)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Steam Traps:

Upstream MSIV Traps (6)

  • ?

Downstream MSIV traps:

  • ?

Each isolation valve has a steam trap in parallel with it.

  • ?
A

Steam Traps:

Upstream MSIV Traps (6):

  • MSIS auto isolation
  • AOVs Fail closed (loss of air or power)
  • 1 per MSIV / 1 per AFA supply

Downstream MSIV traps:

  • Eight traps (2-inch drain lines)
  • MOV isolations
  • No auto closure

Each isolation valve has a steam trap in parallel with it.

  • Normally open during turbine synch and closed at power.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

RU-142A-D MS Line N-16 Monitors:

  • ?
A

Instrumentation:

RU-142A-D MS Line N-16 Monitors:

  • Ch 1&2 – SG1 / Ch 3&4 – SG2
  • One per steam line. (140’ Turb Bldg / next to each other)
  • Alarm: detects 30 GPD leak in area of highest susceptibility (upper hot side tube bundle)
  • Tube leak: all ↑ due to proximity of RUs
    • affected SG RUs ↑ higher
  • Indication will ↓ with reactor power (N-16↓)
  • Alarm on change in leak rate (“Urgent” alarm)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

TRM TLCO 3.3.101 Rad Monitoring

  • ?
A

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

TRM TLCO 3.3.101 Rad Monitoring

  • MSL RMs functional in Modes 1-4.
  • 1 channel (A or B) required per SG.
  • RU-139 A & B / RU-140 A & B.
  • Setpoint: 3 x background
  • If not met, restore or establish alternate monitoring in 72 hours (alternate is per the REP)
  • Located next to steam lines upstream of ADVs and safeties in the MSSS. Monitors effluent doses.
  • Used for SGTR diagnosis.
  • May only detect > 10-15 gpm tube leak under normal failed fuel conditions at 100% power.
  • Response is proportional to reactor power (N-16 detectors)
  • Post trip, may not see the leak unless major fuel damage.
  • Manually isolate associated SGBD if in High alarm (ARP)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

S/G Levels

  • 2 NR LTs per SG
    • ?
  • 4 WR LTs per SG (class)
    • ?
  • 4 NR LTs per SG (class)
    • ?
  • Normal operating level: ?
  • Post trip (mode 3): ?
  • 60% WR correlates to 0% NR.
    • ?
  • Top of U-tubes (~?% NR) [per EOP Set point calcs]
A

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

S/G Levels:

  • 2 NR LTs per SG
    • SG1: LT-1111, 1112, SG2: LT-1121, 1122
    • FWCS, ERFDADS, Plant Computer, indication and annunciators.
  • 4 WR LTs per SG (class)
    • SG1: LT-1113A-D, SG2: LT-1123A-D
    • PPS, Plant Computer, QSPDS (A & B), indication & RSPs (A & B trains).
  • 4 NR LTs per SG (class)
    • SG1: LT-1114A-D, SG2: LT-1124A-D
    • PPS, Plant Computer, ERFDADS and indication.
  • Normal operating level: 80% WR (~ 47% NR).
  • Post trip (mode 3): 45-55% NR
  • 60% WR correlates to 0% NR.
    • NR (150” span, 0% is 369” above tube sheet)
    • WR (376.25” span, 0% is 143” above tube sheet)
    • Share upper tap at 55.5” above moisture separator support plate.
  • Top of U-tubes (~24% NR) [per EOP Set point calcs]
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

Steam Pressures:

  • ?

PAM (LCO 3.3.10) and RSP (LCO 3.3.11) – Modes 1-3:

  • ?
A

Instrumentation (SG-Main Steam System):

Steam Pressures:

  • SG ∆P (between SG1 and SG2 for AFAS ∆P lockout) (A,B,C,D)
  • SG1 Pressure and SG1 VSP (variable setpoint) (A,B,C,D)
  • SG2 Pressure and SG2 VSP (variable setpoint) (A,B,C,D)
  • Main Steam Common Header Pressure (PT-1024/1027, 900-1300 psia) (SBCS/COLSS)
  • 2 SFs per SG, 1 per steam line (DFWCS/SBCS/COLSS)

PAM (LCO 3.3.10) and RSP (LCO 3.3.11) – Modes 1-3:

  • 2 WR LT (0-100%) per SG
  • 2 WR PT (0-1524 psia) per SG
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

LCO 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) [Modes 1-3]:

  • ?
A

LCO 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) [Modes 1-3]:

  • Mode 1 & 2: 10 per SG required
    • Up to 4 on any SG can be inoperable (↓ power per table within 4 hrs / ↓ VOPT setpoint within 36 hrs)
    • If 5-8 inoperable on any SG, Mode 3 in 6 hours
  • Mode 3: 2 per SG required
  • Operable: open within setpoint band, relieves overpressure, and re-seats.
  • As-found ± 3% setpoint. As-left ± 1% setpoint.
  • Limit secondary pressure to ­≤ 110% of design when passing 100% of design steam flow.
  • Secondary pressure limiting event: Full power Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV).
    • Determines the max allowed thermal power with inoperable MSSVs
  • Primary pressure limiting event: Full power FWLB in CTMT, with failure of the backflow check valve in the FW line.
  • MODE 3: one MSSV per SG (two total) has sufficient relieving capacity to dissipate core decay heat and RCP heat to limit secondary system pressure to ≤ 110% of design pressure. (2 per SG required for redundancy)
17
Q

LCO 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs):

  • ?
A

LCO 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs):

  • Four MSIVs and associated actuator trains required to be operable.
  • Modes 1-4 except when all MSIVs are closed and deactivated.
  • One MSIV with 1 act train INOP - restore actuator in 7 days OR declare MSIV inoperable.
  • Two MSIVs with 1 act train (different trains) INOP - restore one in 72 hours OR declare MSIVs inoperable
  • Two MSIVs with 1 act train (same train) INOP - restore one in 48 hours OR declare MSIVs inoperable
  • Two actuators on 1 MSIV INOP - immediately declare the MSIV inoperable
  • ≥ 3 actuators inoperable - immediately declare affected MSIVs inoperable
  • One MSIV inoperable in Mode 1 - restore in 4 hours or RICT. Be in Mode 2 within 6 hours if not met.
  • > 1 MSIV inoperable in Mode 1 – restore in 1 hour or RICT. Be in Mode 2 within 6 hours if not met. (cannot voluntarily enter RICT)
  • ≥ 1 MSIV inoperable in Modes 2-4 - close the MSIV in 4 hours, verify closed every 7 days OR go to Mode 5.
  • Isolation times (3.8 sec per ST) are within limits and auto close on MSIS.
  • Actuator train operability: capable of fast-closing on demand and within time limit. > 5000 psig in accumulator.
  • Adequate air pressure to support fast-closure (SEIS alarm ≤ 74 psig on air reservoir).
18
Q

LCO 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs):

  • ?
A

LCO 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs):

  • Four economizer and four downcomer MFIVs operable
  • Modes 1-4 except when MFIV is closed and deactivated or isolated by a closed and deactivated power operated valve.
  • Any FWIV inoperable: close/isolate in 72 hours or RICT. Verify every 7 days
  • Two FWIVs inoperable on same flow path: isolate path in 8 hours or RICT. Verify every 7 days.
  • Isolation times within limits and auto close on MSIS.
  • Isolates feed water to the SGs (FWLB/SLB/SG overfill)
    • Limits RCS cooldown
    • Limits mass added to CTMT (break in CTMT)
    • Isolates non-safety related portions of MFW system
    • Prevent water from entering steam lines (overfill)
19
Q

LCO 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs):

  • ?
A

LCO 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs):

  • Four ADVs operable in Modes 1-4 when SG is being relied upon for DHR.
  • One ADV inop on one or both SGs – 7 days or RICT
  • Two ADVs inop on one or both SGs – 24 hours or RICT (all 4 could be inoperable, cannot voluntarily enter when intentionally making the last ADV inoperable)
    • Operable: capable of providing a controlled relief of steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand.
    • Local hand wheel not credited/not required
    • Required to have a nitrogen supply that supports ADV operation for 13.3 hours (≥ 615 psig per TRM).
    • Capable of cooling the unit to SDC entry conditions.
    • Primary success path for RCS cooldown during a SGTR to minimize off-site dose.
20
Q

TRM TLCO 3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs):

  • ?
A

TRM TLCO 3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs):

  • N2 accumulator tank ≥ 615 psig. If not met, immediately declare ADV inoperable
  • Sufficient N2 to operate ADVs for 4 hours at hot standby plus 9.3 hours of operation to reach M5 on natural circulation and loss of normal control air system fails.
21
Q

LCO 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity:

  • ?
A

LCO 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity:

  • ≤­ 0.10 μCi/gm DE I-131. Modes 1 – 4.
  • If not met, M3 in 6 hours, M5 in 36 hours.
  • Assumption in MSLB analysis (LOOP, use of ADV). Small fraction of dose limits.
22
Q

TRM TLCO 3.7.100 SG P/T Limits:

  • ?
A

TRM TLCO 3.7.100 SG P/T Limits:

  • SG temp > 70°F if SG pressure is > 650 psig.
  • If not met, ↓ pressure to ≤ 650 psig in 30 min and perform engineering evaluation.