Week 9.2 - Crisis States and Violent Conflicts Flashcards
1
Q
What followed radical neoliberal reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the 1990s?
A
Many internecine violent conflicts broke out across the region
2
Q
What global political shift followed the collapse of the socialist bloc and Western-led globalisation?
A
It led to the rise of religious fundamentalism and identity-based politics worldwide
3
Q
What are recent examples of asymmetric global power being exercised?
A
The US and allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya; Russia in Ukraine; Israel in Palestine
4
Q
What has been the impact of asymmetric global power being exercised on global order?
A
They have undermined international law and increased global insecurity
5
Q
What trend has been observed in the arms industry?
A
Massive growth in arms trade and military aid with little international oversight
6
Q
What are some current major ongoing conflicts?
A
South Sudan, Eastern DRC, Sahelian coups with Russian involvement, and Syria
7
Q
How did the concept of ‘state fragility’ emerge in development discourse?
A
It evolved from ideas of “failed” and “rogue” states in the 1990s and gained prominence after 9/11
8
Q
How did institutions like the World Bank and DFID classify fragile states?
A
As LICUS (Low-Income Countries Under Stress) and “problematic partners,” later renamed “fragile states”
9
Q
What percentage of ODA went to fragile contexts by 2016?
A
67% according to the OECD
10
Q
What did the World Bank estimate for 2030 regarding poverty and fragility?
A
Over 50% of the extreme poor would reside in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)
11
Q
What positive shifts occurred due to focus on fragile states?
A
Aid moved beyond “good performers,” with greater focus on state capacity, legitimacy, and service delivery
12
Q
What negative developments accompanied the shift of focus on fragile states?
A
Aid became securitised, distinctions between development and military aid were blurred, and neoliberal prescriptions remained dominant
13
Q
What was problematic about the DAC 2016 update to ODA?
A
It marked a reversal by allowing more military-linked aid to count as official development assistance
14
Q
What is the OECD’s 2007 definition of a fragile state?
A
A state lacking the political will and/or capacity to provide essential services for development, security, and rights
15
Q
How did the World Bank define fragile states in 2007?
A
As states with weak institutions, poor governance, instability, and ongoing or past severe conflict
16
Q
How does the World Bank operationalise fragility?
A
Using the CPIA score, with countries scoring below 3.2 considered fragile
17
Q
What is the mismatch in how the World Bank defines vs measures fragility?
A
Definitions focus on governance and violence, while operationalisation uses CPIA’s focus on neoliberal reform indicators
18
Q
What does the CPIA measure under economic management?
A
Macroeconomic management, fiscal policy, and debt policy
19
Q
What does the CPIA measure under structural policies?
A
Trade openness, financial sector strength, and business regulation
20
Q
What is covered under social inclusion policies in CPIA?
A
Gender equity, public resource equity, human development, and social protection
21
Q
What does the CPIA assess under public sector management?
A
Property rights, financial management, tax efficiency, public administration, transparency, and anti-corruption
22
Q
What was CPIA originally designed for?
A
To allocate IDA grants, not to measure state fragility
23
Q
How is CPIA used for fragility assessments today?
A
Countries scoring below 3.2 or having no score are deemed fragile, and this forms the basis for the Bank’s harmonised list
24
Q
What example shows the CPIA’s limitations?
A
Mali scored above 3.2 until its sudden collapse into violence in 2012
25
How is farmer-herder conflict often mischaracterised?
It is often labelled as jihadist when it is rooted in pastoralist grievances
26
What is the core of the farmer-herder conflict?
Tensions between sedentary crop farming and pastoral livestock grazing
27
How did decentralisation exacerbate state fragility in this context?
It was implemented without addressing local conflicts and institutional multiplicity
28
What is the OECD’s new approach to defining fragility?
Based on risks and capacities rather than only governance or conflict
29
What are political risk vulnerabilities in this model? (OECD’s new approach to defining fragility)
Lack of inclusiveness, transparency, or political legitimacy, and inability to accommodate change
30
What are societal risk vulnerabilities? (OECD’s new approach to defining fragility)
Weak social cohesion and horizontal/vertical inequalities
31
What are economic risk vulnerabilities? (OECD’s new approach to defining fragility)
Weak economic foundations and limited human capital
32
What are environmental risk vulnerabilities?(OECD’s new approach to defining fragility)
Risks linked to climate, environment, and public health
33
What are security risk vulnerabilities?(OECD’s new approach to defining fragility)
Prevalence of violence, political instability, and crime
34
What does FCV stand for?
Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
35
What three conflict types are included under FCV?
Governance and institutional fragility, active conflict, and interpersonal or gang violence
36
What are the four pillars of the FCV strategy?
Preventing violence, staying engaged during conflict, supporting transitions out of fragility, and mitigating spillovers
37
What are the six high-priority issues in the FCV strategy?
Human capital, macroeconomic stability, job creation, community resilience (esp. climate), justice and rule of law, and the security sector
38
What additional cross-cutting priorities are included in the FCV strategy?
Gender and promotion of the private sector
39
What do critics argue about how the OECD and World Bank assess 'state fragility'?
They equate it too closely with low levels of development and fail to distinguish between poor states that experience violence and those that remain peaceful
40
Why is the OECD and World Bank approach criticised for failing to differentiate between fragile and resilient states?
Because it does not account for countries like Tanzania that are peaceful despite poverty, unlike violent yet equally poor states like the DRC
41
How do persistent neoliberal views shape the OECD and World Bank’s conception of the state?
The state is seen as a necessary evil, defined only through formal institutions, and is valued mainly for creating market-friendly conditions
42
How do Putzel and Di John propose assessing states instead of typologising them?
They suggest placing states on a spectrum from fragility to resilience
43
What conditions indicate state fragility in the spectrum model by Putzel and Di John?
Armed challenges to power, limited territorial reach, identity-based spending, non-state taxation, and institutional multiplicity
44
What conditions signal state resilience according to Putzel and Di John?
Monopoly on legitimate violence, broad territorial control, nondiscriminatory taxation, and institutional hegemony
45
Why is 'state fragility' considered a temporal condition in this model?
Because states can move along the spectrum, becoming more fragile or more resilient over time
46
How does Frances Stewart distinguish 'horizontal' from 'vertical' inequalities in conflict analysis?
Horizontal inequalities are between identity-based groups and are more likely to lead to zero-sum conflict than vertical, class-based inequalities
47
What policy solution does Frances Stewart suggest for mitigating horizontal inequalities?
To reduce group-based inequalities and reframe indivisible conflicts as negotiable and divisible
48
How does Douglass North define the 'natural state'?
A condition where elites control wealth and authority to limit violence and maintain order
49
What is a 'limited access order' in Douglass North’s theory?
A system where access to political and economic power is restricted to elites, which helps maintain peace
50
What is a key limitation of Douglass North’s theory of limited access orders?
It cannot explain the stability of peaceful poor states or the success of non-democratic developmental states
51
How do Khan, Putzel, and Di John define the state in their political settlement model?
As institutions and organisations—both formal and informal—that implement rules within any regime type
52
What is a 'political settlement' according to Khan, Putzel, and Di John?
A historically rooted configuration of power in society that underpins and shapes state institutions and organisations
53
Why do Khan, Putzel, and Di John avoid using the term ‘peace agreement’ to describe political settlements?
Because political settlements are enduring power arrangements settled through coercion, persuasion, or both—not just single conflict-ending agreements
54
According to Michael Mann, what makes the state necessary in society?
Its ability to make binding rules for internal order, defense, communication, and redistribution over a defined territory
55
What does Putzel argue happens when a state ceases to function?
Society creates or re-creates state structures, as seen in Eastern DRC and Somaliland
56
What are the four sources of social power in Mann’s framework?
Military, economic, ideological, and political power
57
Which of Mann’s sources of power is unique to the state?
Political power, as it comes from the centralised and territorial regulation of society
58
How can we observe political settlements and their change over time?
By examining what powers the state and society exchange and how these powers are distributed within society
59
Why is ideological power crucial to the state’s legitimacy?
It helps legitimise state institutions and actions and shapes how people understand the state’s role
60
What makes ideology powerful in times of uncertainty?
It provides belief systems that offer meaning and certainty even if not scientifically testable
61
Which actors often hold ideological power in society?
Religious, identity-based, and political organisations
62
How do political organisations use ideological power?
By invoking nationalism, justice, or development narratives to gain or challenge state power
63
How do those in control of the state use ideological power?
They try to marginalise rival ideologies and promote the dominant ideology of the state, such as capitalism, socialism, or theocracy
64
What concern does Matshanda raise drawing on Mamdani?
That dominant ideologies falsely promote the idea of a homogenised “nation-state”
65
How does economic power affect the political settlement?
Through the extent to which economic elites cede power to the state and the state's control over power distribution among them
66
What forms can economic power take in society?
Control of wealth, access to rents, command over livelihoods, influence over local and foreign markets, and informal or shadow economy dominance
67
Why are economic actors significant to state power and function?
Because they influence revenue collection, aid distribution, employment, and market structures within and beyond state oversight
68
How does military power shape political settlements?
It determines whether the state can enforce rules and remain stable or if authority is contested by armed groups
69
What determines the durability of a political settlement in terms of military power?
Whether those who control violence transfer that authority to the state or retain it independently
70
What do people seek when the state fails to provide security?
They turn to non-state armed groups for protection and order
71
What are political organisations and what is their purpose?
Political organisations are formed by individuals and groups to influence or control state power at local, regional, or central levels
72
What forms can political organisations take?
Political organisations can be political parties, clan alliances, populist movements, or military or religious groups
73
Why are political organisations important to state power?
They determine how state power is managed, reinforced, and changed
74
How do political organisations shape the nature of the state?
They are built around different values and seek to implement institutions, rules, and organisational designs based on their vision of the state
75
Why is understanding political settlements important for analysing violent conflict?
Because it helps explain the root causes of violence and informs peacebuilding strategies
76
Why must peace negotiations and state-building consider political settlements?
Because the durability of peace depends on the underlying political configuration that supports the state
77
What does using the political settlements lens offer to policy?
It provides a diagnostic framework to guide effective policy interventions
78
What are key security priorities when building a political settlement?
Ensuring a unified command, ending military abuse, paying security forces well, providing protection, and offering viable livelihoods before demobilisation
79
What economic measures should accompany a political settlement?
Gradual formalisation of the economy, strategic distribution of rents, and reducing horizontal inequalities through public spending
80
How should states deal with rival ideological systems in a political settlement?
By incorporating or subordinating them to shape the effectiveness of reforms and service delivery mechanisms
81
Why do military interventions rarely succeed in building lasting states?
Because external actors cannot create political settlements, which emerge through internal conflict and bargaining
82
What must state organisations show to sustain a political settlement?
A credible commitment to enforcing rules and the capacity to punish non-compliance
83
Why are external actors limited in forging settlements?
Because international influence cannot substitute for internally negotiated power arrangements, as seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Palestine
84
What triggered the state collapse in Afghanistan post-2001?
The US-led invasion led to the Taliban’s flight but failed to establish a stable political settlement
85
Why did the Western-backed Afghan state fail to consolidate power?
The early exclusion of the Taliban undermined legitimacy and political cohesion
86
How was military power structured in post-2001 Afghanistan?
It was fragmented across society and reliant on foreign funding
87
What was the nature of economic power in Afghanistan between 2002–2021?
It was dominated by the poppy economy, illegal trade, and a rentier economy based on foreign aid
88
Who held ideological power in Afghanistan post-2001?
The Taliban, tribal, and local religious authorities retained influence, undermining the state
89
What were the conditions leading to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003?
A decade of sanctions and the pretext of weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda links
90
What was a major political error post-invasion in Iraq?
The exclusion of Ba’athist officials who held essential state expertise
91
How was military power distributed in post-2003 Iraq?
It became fragmented and fuelled the rise of ISIS and militia polarisation
92
How was economic power structured in Iraq post-2003?
A fractured rentier system with competing elites tied to foreign corporations
93
What defined ideological power in Iraq after 2003?
It was highly divided along sectarian and regional lines
94
How is political power currently characterised in Iraq?
As fractured and persistently contested
95
What was the basis of Gaddafi’s rise to power in Libya?
A 1969 coup that overthrew the monarchy and established a socialist, oil-funded state
96
How was economic power structured under Gaddafi?
It was rent-based, tribal, and supported public welfare through oil distribution
97
What was Libya’s human development status by 2009 under Gaddafi?
It ranked 55th out of 175 countries in the Human Development Report
98
How did Libya achieve security under Gaddafi?
Through a tightly controlled military that suppressed dissent
99
What ideology dominated Libya during Gaddafi’s rule?
A mix of Arab nationalism and third-world socialism under the “State of the Masses”
100
What sparked the 2011 Libyan uprising?
The Arab Spring protests, beginning in Benghazi, which led to hundreds of deaths by February
101
What followed the international intervention in Libya in March 2011?
NATO-led attacks that dismantled state structures and led to Gaddafi’s death in October
102
What has characterised Libya since Gaddafi’s fall?
Fragmented political authority, ongoing conflict, and the dispersal of ideological, economic, and military power
103
What regional impact did Libya’s collapse have?
It destabilised the Sahel and contributed to regional insecurity
104
How is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 characterised?
As a war of aggression and extreme asymmetric power, violating international law
105
What was Russia’s goal in invading Ukraine?
To install a regime more favourable to its interests
106
What effect did the invasion have on Ukraine’s internal politics?
It unified the population in defence of the state under Zelensky
107
Why has Ukraine’s state survived the invasion?
Due to strong public resistance and substantial Western military support
108
Why is addressing fragility, conflict, and violence important for the World Bank Group?
Because it is essential to achieving the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity
109
What does the World Bank Group predict about extreme poverty and FCV by 2030?
Over half of the world’s extreme poor will live in FCV-affected countries
110
What regions are most affected by fragility, conflict, and violence today?
Fragility, conflict, and violence are affecting both low- and middle-income countries, with violent conflicts at their highest levels in 30 years
111
What is one humanitarian consequence of FCV?
FCV has caused forced displacement affecting 71 million people
112
What socio-political conditions are driving instability in FCV settings?
Rising inequality, discrimination, and exclusion are fuelling grievances
113
What external pressures contribute to instability in fragile states?
Climate change, migration, technological changes, and illicit financial flows
114
What could happen if FCV is not addressed urgently?
It could reverse development progress and cause long-term damage
115
How has the World Bank Group’s approach to FCV evolved?
It shifted from post-conflict reconstruction to addressing the full spectrum of FCV challenges
116
What was the significance of the 2011 World Development Report?
It highlighted the importance of linking security, justice, and development
117
What did the 2018 UN-WBG report "Pathways for Peace" call for?
A shift toward conflict prevention rather than reaction
118
What does the World Bank Group’s current FCV strategy include?
Engaging during conflict, supporting post-conflict transitions, and preventing regional spillovers
119
How much did the World Bank allocate to FCV settings under IDA18?
$14 billion, double the previous allocation
120
What financial instruments support fragile settings under IDA?
The IDA FCV Envelope and the Private Sector Window
121
What are IFC and MIGA doing in fragile and conflict-affected situations?
They are increasing their commitments and investments in fragile states
122
What is IFC’s investment goal for fragile countries by 2030?
To increase investment by 40%
123
How much was MIGA’s portfolio in fragile settings in 2019?
It reached $2 billion
124
What is the objective of engaging the private sector in fragile settings?
To create jobs and promote economic stability
125
What is the principle of differentiation in WBG’s FCV strategy?
Tailoring approaches based on specific fragility drivers like state fragility, local conflict, or external stressors
126
What does inclusion mean in the WBG FCV context?
Focusing on marginalised groups to foster social cohesion
127
Why are legitimacy, transparency, and accountability important in FCV?
To strengthen core institutions for governance, justice, and public services
128
What is the role of private sector solutions in WBG FCV work?
To enhance economic resilience through private investment
129
What is the first pillar of WBG engagement in FCV?
Preventing violent conflict and interpersonal violence by addressing root causes and investing in peacebuilding
130
What is the second pillar of WBG engagement in FCV?
Remaining engaged during crises to support essential services and conflict-sensitive development
131
What is the third pillar of WBG engagement in FCV?
Helping countries transition out of fragility by restoring governance, stability, and inclusive systems
132
What is the fourth pillar of WBG engagement in FCV?
Mitigating spillovers from FCV by addressing cross-border crises and supporting host communities
133
How is the WBG adapting policies to manage FCV?
By updating frameworks for humanitarian crises and improving risk assessments like RRAs
134
How is WBG programming adapted for FCV settings?
By making Country Partnership Frameworks more FCV-sensitive and addressing regional cross-border issues
135
How is the WBG strengthening partnerships for FCV?
By working with peacebuilding actors, regional organisations, NGOs, and institutions like the UN and IMF
136
How is the WBG improving staff capacity for FCV?
By deploying more staff to fragile settings, providing FCV training, and supporting their well-being
137
What financing tools support FCV settings?
The IDA FCV Envelope, Private Sector Window (PSW), and Global Risk Financing Facility (GRiF)
138
How does the WBG manage risk in FCV settings?
Through conflict-sensitive investments and stronger risk management against corruption, instability, and ESG threats
139
What is the expected country-level impact of the FCV strategy?
Reduced conflict risk, improved institutions, economic resilience, job creation, and better crisis preparedness
140
How will the WBG monitor progress in FCV settings?
Through annual reports to the WBG Board, a mid-term review in 2022, and a full evaluation in 2024
141
How is the WBG investing in human capital in FCV settings?
By strengthening education, healthcare, and nutrition programs
142
What macroeconomic goals does the WBG support in fragile economies?
Ensuring debt sustainability and strong fiscal management
143
How is the WBG creating jobs and economic opportunities in FCV contexts?
By supporting entrepreneurship, MSMEs, and digital solutions
144
How does the WBG build community resilience in FCV areas?
By enhancing climate adaptation, disaster preparedness, and environmental sustainability
145
What is the WBG doing to improve justice in FCV regions?
By strengthening legal institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms
146
How is the WBG addressing security sector challenges in FCV states?
By working with law enforcement to ensure peace and stability
147
What peace agreement led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018?
The Bangsamoro Organic Law was enacted following a 2014 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
148
What did the Bangsamoro Organic Law establish?
It created the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), replacing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
149
What long-standing conflict did the Bangsamoro Organic Law aim to resolve?
It aimed to end 50 years of armed conflict between the Philippine government and Bangsamoro rebel groups
150
What historical roots contributed to the Bangsamoro conflict?
The conflict traces back to Spanish colonisation in the 16th century and was reignited by the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972
151
Why did the MILF take over leadership of the autonomy struggle from the MNLF?
The 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF failed to consolidate governance in ARMM, prompting the MILF to assume leadership
152
What does political settlement theory introduced by Khan (1995) examine?
It examines the power configurations that underpin formal institutions and organisations of the state
153
What are formal institutions and organisations in political settlement theory?
Formal institutions are rules defining rights, while organisations are state branches enforcing those rules
154
What is Michael Mann’s theory of state power?
Michael Mann argues that societies require monopolistic rule-making authorities for governance, defense, and economic functions
155
What characterises the historical political settlement of the Philippine state?
It is built around elite families, economic liberalism, and democratic ideals, excluding Muslim Mindanao
156
What factors contributed to the Bangsamoro conflict?
Historical marginalisation, internal colonisation, Christian settlement programs, and economic displacement
157
How was the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) established?
It was established through referenda in 2019, replacing the ARMM
158
What system of governance does BARMM use?
BARMM operates under a parliamentary-democratic system, distinct from the Philippine unitary presidential system
159
How is the Bangsamoro Parliament structured?
It has 80 members: 50% elected by proportional representation, 40% district representatives, and 10% reserved for special groups
160
Who leads the executive branch in BARMM?
The Chief Minister, elected by Parliament, who also appoints cabinet ministers
161
What judicial system is in place in BARMM?
It includes judicial autonomy for Muslims through Shari’ah courts
162
What fiscal powers does BARMM have?
BARMM receives 75% of taxes collected in the region, an annual block grant, and a Special Development Fund
163
What limitations exist on BARMM’s autonomy?
The Philippine president retains oversight powers, including the ability to suspend the Chief Minister, and the national government controls police and military forces
164
What military element was key to the Bangsamoro peace agreement?
The decommissioning of the MILF’s Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)
165
What were the phases of BIAF decommissioning?
Phase 1: 145 combatants (symbolic), Phase 2: 12,000 (2019), Phase 3: 14,000 targeted (2021–2022)
166
What security challenges remain in BARMM?
Many MILF fighters retain personal weapons, private armed groups persist, and MILF integration into the Philippine National Police is slow
167
What is the economic status of BARMM in the Philippines?
It contributes only 1.4% to GDP despite having 5% of the population and has a 61.8% poverty rate
168
What economic challenges does BARMM face?
Dominance of elite families, 80% informal economy, illicit arms/drug trade, and weak tax enforcement
169
What economic opportunities are available to BARMM?
Fiscal powers to impose capital gains taxes, promote Islamic finance, and invest in agriculture reforms
170
How did MILF and MNLF legitimise their struggle?
Through Islam and Bangsamoro nationalism
171
How does the Bangsamoro Organic Law reinforce ideological power?
It strengthens Islamic education, Shari’ah courts, and recognises indigenous rights like those of Lumad communities
172
What are ideological challenges in BARMM?
Radical groups such as ISIS-linked factions oppose BARMM, and Catholic Church influence remains strong nationally
173
What political organisation did the MILF form after the peace agreement?
The United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP)
174
How did the 2022 elections test MILF's political power?
The UBJP won Cotabato City but lost Maguindanao, and MILF opposed President Marcos Jr., who won in the region
175
What risks are associated with delaying BARMM parliamentary elections to 2025?
It allows MILF time to consolidate power but risks losing political legitimacy
176
What factors threaten political unity in BARMM?
Political clan alliances, untested MILF leadership, and national government oversight
177
What security threats persist in the Bangsamoro region?
Incomplete demobilisation of armed groups, ISIS-linked factions, and risk of renewed violence
178
What economic development risks exist in BARMM?
Continued dependence on subsidies, weak institutions, security concerns, and a large informal economy
179
What conditions could help BARMM succeed as an autonomous region?
MILF’s successful political transition, ASEAN trade integration, and international donor support
180
What is military power in Mann’s theory?
The capacity for organised violence, held by state or non-state actors
181
What is economic power in Mann’s theory?
Control over resources and production, enabling political influence
182
What is ideological power in Mann’s theory?
The ability to shape beliefs and legitimise authority via religion, nationalism, or media
183
What is political power in Mann’s theory?
Centralised, territorial governance exercised solely by the state
184
Why is institutional change difficult according to political settlement theory?
Because major changes require shifts in the political settlement, which depend on conflict and bargaining
185
How has the MILF transitioned under the Bangsamoro political settlement?
It became a political party—the United Bangsamoro Justice Party
186
How do clan-based elites affect governance in BARMM?
They maintain influence and may undermine reform and MILF leadership
187
What role do religious organisations play in Bangsamoro politics?
Ulama networks hold ideological power that can affect the legitimacy of the state
188
What is internal colonisation in the Bangsamoro context?
State-led Christian resettlement programs in Mindanao that displaced Muslim and indigenous communities
189
How did internal displacement affect Muslim-majority status in Mindanao?
Christian settlers reduced Muslim dominance, fuelling resistance and demands for autonomy
190
What are horizontal inequalities and how do they relate to conflict in Bangsamoro?
Economic, political, and social exclusion based on ethnicity or religion that fuel violent conflict
191
Which groups are most affected by horizontal inequalities in BARMM?
Muslim and Lumad communities face systemic economic and political disadvantages
192
What are rents in political economy?
Surpluses beyond what is needed for a factor of production, often generated by state policies or monopolies
193
What is the central argument of Bizhan (2018) regarding aid and state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq?
In neo-patrimonial and weak states like Afghanistan and Iraq, aid and state-building strategies significantly undermined effective state-building
194
What are the main factors that undermined state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq?
These include institutional discontinuity, creation of parallel institutions via off-budget aid, short-term priorities, and the persistence of patronage politics
195
What are the three schools of thought on aid effectiveness discussed by Bizhan (2018)?
The donor school stresses informed donors, the recipient school focuses on recipient institutions, and the transaction cost school advocates reducing fragmented projects by integrating with recipient governments
196
Are the three schools of thought on aid effectiveness compatible?
Yes, Bizhan argues that the donor, recipient, and transaction cost schools are compatible and not mutually exclusive
197
How does Bizhan (2018) define state-building and state capacity?
State-building is creating and strengthening government institutions, while state capacity is the state's ability to implement various policies
198
What characterizes a neo-patrimonial state according to Bizhan (2018)?
It is marked by uncertainty and conflicting formal and informal rules
199
How is aid-dependency defined in Bizhan (2018)?
Aid-dependency occurs when aid exceeds 10% of a country’s GNP
200
What is the difference between budget support and off-budget aid?
Budget support is aid delivered through the government’s budget or pooled funds; off-budget aid bypasses government systems and institutions
201
What were Afghanistan’s institutional conditions post-2001?
Afghanistan had limited military and administrative continuity, ethnic divisions, violent leadership removals, and a heavy reliance on foreign aid
202
How did Afghanistan’s weak institutional foundation develop over time?
Long-term instability, reliance on external support, prolonged conflict, and the Taliban’s rule left Afghanistan with minimal capacity and continuity in state structures
203
How did foreign aid affect Afghanistan’s state capacity post-2001?
Despite $52 billion in aid, mostly spent on security, high off-budget aid weakened coordination and created a parallel public sector larger than the government
204
How much aid in Afghanistan was off-budget versus on-budget in 2002?
Only $20 million was used to pay civil servants through the ARTF, while $1.8 billion went to UN agencies and NGOs via off-budget mechanisms
205
What challenges did aid coordination face in Afghanistan?
Multiple international actors and the dominance of off-budget aid created major coordination problems and undermined government systems
206
What was the impact of US-led intervention on Iraq’s state institutions?
US-led direct rule (2003–2004), de-Baathification, and army dismantling severely disrupted Iraq’s institutions and deepened sectarian divisions
207
What was Iraq’s institutional legacy before and after 2003?
Even before the invasion, Iraq had weak institutions stemming from British colonial reliance on state coercion without infrastructure development, and US intervention worsened this
208
What were the effects of de-Baathification on Iraq’s bureaucracy?
It led to the mass firing of employees, including many in the Finance Ministry, weakening the state's administrative capacity
209
How did US intervention in Iraq contribute to instability?
It removed key institutions, supported tribal militias and private contractors, and lacked a coherent strategy for transitioning the government
210
Why didn’t Iraq face a fiscal collapse like Afghanistan?
Iraq’s oil and gas revenues provided financial stability, but its low tax revenue (1% of GDP) limited state capacity
211
What was Iraq’s experience with off-budget aid before and after 2003?
Iraq had off-budget aid even before 2003, which persisted and contributed to fragmented governance and weak institutional integration
212
What does Bizhan (2018) conclude about state-building strategies in both cases?
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, externally driven aid strategies failed to strengthen institutions, often reinforcing fragmentation and dependency
213
What is the central role of offshore companies in post-war DR Congo according to Marriage (2018)?
Offshore companies are central to Congo’s post-war political economy, enabling elite enrichment through secretive mineral trading in tax havens, yet they are largely ignored in donor frameworks
214
How did the Panama Papers expose the role of offshore firms in Congo?
They revealed direct links between these offshore companies and Congolese elites, especially President Kabila and his inner circle, highlighting their role in wealth extraction without transparency or taxation
215
How do secrecy jurisdictions affect democratic accountability in DR Congo?
They allow elites to extract national wealth free of oversight, regulation, or tax obligations, thereby undermining democratic accountability and state legitimacy
216
How was liberalisation introduced in DR Congo and what were its consequences?
Pushed by the IMF and World Bank post-conflict without local consultation, liberalisation opened the economy to foreign investors, devalued national assets, and enriched offshore entities like those linked to Dan Gertler
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How was aid used in relation to Congo’s economic liberalisation?
Aid was used to support liberalisation by promoting a business-friendly environment, but in practice, it facilitated elite capture and foreign domination of key sectors
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How did elections function in post-war DR Congo according to Marriage (2018)?
Though donors treated elections as markers of democratisation, they became tools for legitimising authoritarianism, especially through repeated delays (glissement) and suppression of dissent
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What is “glissement” and how did it help extend Kabila’s power?
“Glissement” refers to the repeated postponement of elections, allowing President Kabila to remain in power beyond constitutional limits
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How was violence used in DR Congo’s post-war political system?
Violence took both direct forms, such as repression and killings of protestors, and structural forms like exclusion from decision-making and economic marginalisation by elites
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What argument does Marriage make about the purpose of elections in DR Congo?
Elections were not meant to open political space but to contain unrest and legitimize the state for foreign investors while maintaining elite control
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What is the “political marketplace” and how does it apply to DR Congo?
Based on Alex de Waal’s concept, it describes Congo’s political system as one where loyalty and positions are traded like commodities, with offshore funds fuelling this transactional politics
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How do offshore networks sustain elite stability in Congo?
They provide capital that supports the political marketplace, allowing elites to buy loyalty and maintain control despite widespread popular discontent
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How did aid contribute to autocracy in Congo according to Marriage (2018)?
Donors like the UK and USA supported flawed elections and ignored elite use of offshore structures, thereby co-producing illiberal outcomes
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Why were initiatives like EITI and Dodd-Frank Act ineffective in Congo?
These focused narrowly on the origins of minerals in conflict zones, ignoring how profits are hidden in offshore markets, making them ineffective at curbing elite looting
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What is Marriage’s critique of the “conflict minerals” narrative?
She argues it obscures the global political economy and offshore structures enabling elite looting, shifting blame away from international systems
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What does Marriage (2018) argue reforms must focus on in DR Congo?
Reforms must address global trade architecture, offshore finance, and donor complicity — not just local transparency or governance at mining sites
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What are the key takeaways from Marriage’s analysis of DR Congo?
Liberalisation does not equal democratisation, offshore networks are central to elite control, aid shaped authoritarian outcomes, and real reform must confront international systems of finance and accountability
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What are horizontal inequalities (HIs) and how do they differ from vertical inequalities?
HIs are inequalities between culturally defined groups (ethnic, religious, racial, regional) and are multidimensional—economic, social, and political—whereas vertical inequalities are between individuals or households, measured by metrics like poverty rates or Gini coefficients
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Why are horizontal inequalities important to development?
HIs affect well-being by shaping group identity and opportunities, reduce national output by wasting talent, and are a major driver of social instability, riots, and civil war
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What are primordial and instrumental group identities in the context of HIs?
Primordial identities are based on birth and tradition (e.g. ethnicity, language), while instrumental identities are constructed or mobilised for political/economic purposes, but both become real through shared experience and perceived injustice
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How do horizontal inequalities affect individual well-being?
People derive self-esteem from group status, so if their group is humiliated or underprivileged—as shown in Akerlof and Kranton’s work—individuals suffer emotional distress and lower utility
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How do HIs impact development outcomes and social stability?
They reduce efficiency by excluding talent, undermine cohesion, and lead to rebellion or civil war from deprived groups or repression by dominant ones fearing loss
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When and how are group identities mobilised politically?
Mobilisation occurs when there’s shared injustice, symbols, history, and leaders who exploit identity; fixed boundaries (e.g. in Uganda) make conflict more likely than fluid ones (e.g. Brazil)
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What conditions exacerbate the negative effects of HIs?
HIs are more dangerous when they are widening, cross multiple dimensions, intra-group inequality is low, group boundaries are rigid, and discrimination is prevalent—leading to grievances or violence
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How did HIs lead to conflict in Chiapas, Mexico?
Long-term deprivation of the Indigenous Maya in income, education, and land rights sparked the EZLN armed rebellion in 1994, though its national impact was limited due to small population size
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What role did HIs play in Fiji's repeated coups?
Ethnic divides led to affirmative action favouring Indigenous Fijians and blocking Indo-Fijian political wins, reinforcing group tensions and triggering constitutional changes and coups
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What were the consequences of North–South HIs in Uganda?
Northern dominance under Amin/Obote followed by Southern wealth and education caused state violence, rebellion, and, despite some political balance under Museveni, northern unrest persists
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How did Malaysia address HIs and what were the results?
After 1969 riots, the NEP used quotas and affirmative action for Bumiputera, successfully reducing poverty and narrowing education/income gaps, with reduced violence and strong outcomes
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What happened in Sri Lanka when HIs were corrected poorly?
Efforts to reduce Tamil overrepresentation via language laws and quotas created new inequalities, fuelling exclusion and civil war—showing that correction must be balanced and sensitive
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What was South Africa’s experience with HIs post-apartheid?
Despite political inclusion since 1994, economic and social inequalities from apartheid persist, with high crime possibly reflecting unresolved horizontal inequalities
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How were HIs addressed in Northern Ireland?
Deep Catholic–Protestant divides in jobs, housing, and policing led to decades of violence; peace came through active HI-reducing policies like the Fair Employment Act
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What is the status of HIs in the United States?
Black/White disparities persist despite Civil Rights and affirmative action laws; continued income, education, and representation gaps contribute to race riots and high crime
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What distinguishes Brazil's experience with racial HIs?
While Afro-Brazilians face large inequalities, racial identities are more fluid due to intermarriage, resulting in limited political mobilisation and modest affirmative action
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What comparative lessons does Stewart draw from global case studies on HIs and conflict?
Conflict is likely when HIs span economic, social, and political dimensions; both deprived and dominant-but-insecure groups may spark unrest; affirmative action works if balanced and tailored
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What does Stewart argue about the economic impact of affirmative action?
There is no clear evidence of economic harm from affirmative action; instead, it often supports growth while reducing HIs
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How does the fluidity of group boundaries affect HIs and policymaking?
Clear group boundaries aid measurement and policy design, while fluid identities, like in Brazil, make HIs less politically explosive but harder to address systematically
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What is missing in current global development practice regarding HIs?
Institutions like the World Bank and IMF focus only on vertical inequality and discourage state intervention, making it hard to implement policies that reduce HIs
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What are Stewart’s key policy recommendations for addressing HIs?
She proposes monitoring HIs via disaggregated data, affirmative action in education and jobs, anti-discrimination laws, targeted investment, inclusive political frameworks, and context-sensitive approaches
