unit 3 part 4

Question 1

Governance

Answer 1

• Processes through which decision rules are made (e.g.
  policies, norms, laws)
• Who is involved?
• State actors
• Non-state actors (e.g. NGOs, businesses, communities

Question 2

what are the commons

Answer 2

• Common-pool resources (CPR)
• A valued natural or human-made resource or facility
  that is available to more than one person and
  subject to degradation as a result of overuse

Question 3

characteristic of the commons

Answer 3

• non-excludable:Controlling access by potential users is very costly
  difficult or virtually impossible
• rival(subtractable):Exploitation by one user reduces the quantity or quality available for other users

Question 4

example of commons

Answer 4

• the ocean(hard to control acess)
• biodiversity
• forests

Question 5

what is the tragedy of the commons ?

Answer 5

when individuals,acting independly and rationally(maximize economic interests),will deplate a shared resource,even when doing so is not in their long-term interest

ex:i have to or someone else will

Question 6

key ideas

Answer 6

• benefit is individual
• cost will be collective
• incentives to maximize individual benefit
• free-riders
  -Individuals that overuse the resource without concern for others
  -Little to no contribution for maintaining the commons

Question 7

example

Answer 7

-blue fish
collepsed in the 90’s
-fishermen maximized their profit

Question 8

the tragedy

Answer 8

is that the incetive is to overconsume because the cost will be to high otherwize or just for an individual benefit

Question 9

what assumptions the author had

Answer 9

• All individuals are selfish, norm-free and maximize short term returns
• Absence of organization and lack of cooperation amongst users
• No rules or norms regulate the commons
• Privatization (i.e. private property) or centralized government (i.e. state property are the only
  solutions for avoiding the tragedy

Question 10

Re-examining the Tragedy

Answer 10

• Individuals do not always act in selfish and short-sighted ways
• Types of users:
  -Self-interested
  -Unwilling to cooperate unless they are
  assured they will not be exploited
  -Willing to cooperate hoping others do the same
  -Genuine altruists

Question 11

Re-examining the Tragedy

Answer 11

• Hardin’s theory works when no ownership exists
• More solutions exist than those advocated by Hardin
• Property rights regimes
  -Open access
  -Private property
  -State property
  -Communal property*-something he forgot/ignored

Question 12

open access

Answer 12

• Absence of well-defined
  property rights
• Access is unregulated and
  open to everyone

ex:ocean

Question 13

PRIVATE PROPERTY

Answer 13

• Regulation of resource use is
  vested on an individual or firm
• Right to exclude others from
  using the resource

Question 14

STATE PROPERTY

Answer 14

• Rights exclusively vested in
  government
• Government regulates
  access and use

Question 15

COMMUNITY

Answer 15

• Rights held by an identifiable
  community of users
• Use by community members is
  regulated
• Right to exclude outsiders

Question 16

does it leaves a good outcome?

Answer 16

• open acess: no because it makes easier to others to abuse it
• individual property: it could but it depends on the individual
• Government property:it could but it depends of the goverment
• communal property: it can be but can benefits some but not the ones outside of the community

any regime is likely to perform better than an open access regime, anyth

Question 17

Ostrom’s rebuttal to Hardin

Answer 17

• Assumptions are valid, but not generalizable
• Hardin = open access regime
• Humans are norm-using and learn from mistakes
• Rules can change the commons dilemma
• Empirical evidence against the tragedy
• Hundreds of cases: water & irrigation; forests; fisheries
  -Local resource users can create norms for managing
  the commons

Question 18

key points

Answer 18

• The tragedy occurs when ‘independent’ and ‘rational‘
  individuals deplete a shared resource, even when doing
  so is not in their long-term interest.
• “[…] tragedies of the commons are real, but not
  inevitable”
• Hardin’s ideas assume lack of cooperation and local norms
• Hardin sees privatization or state property as the solutions for the tragedy, ignoring community property