Understanding and changing people's behaviour Flashcards
Describe resource users are central place foragers
- trade off costs against benefits (time spent vs kg offtake)
- select species (e.g. bigger, tastier, portability)
- often assumed to be
maximising profitability
If a resource is being unsustainably harvested, the options are:
- attempt to stop resource use entirely
- try to regulate legal resource use
- attempt to contain illegal resource use through law enforcement
The economic theory of law re harvesting
- max[pH - cE - thetaF]
- p is the price per unit of output, H;
- E is all the inputs to production, not just effort;
- c is the cost per unit input;
- theta is the probability of receiving the fine F
To reduce illegal exploitation we could…
- increase perceived probability of punishment (theta)
- increase perceived penalty (F)
- reduce revenues (p)
- increase costs, e.g. opportunity costs (c)
Describe Rhino poaching in the Luangwa valley, 1985
- gangs poached for elephants & rhinos
- professionals, hired by middlemen.
- very few rhinos left.
- model with a simple 2-species harvesting model
- rhino horns 1.7x as valuable as tusks per kill
- hunting for rhinos alone is not worthwhile because population size is so low
- lucrative ivory trade, not because of the rhino horn trade
- controlling the ivory trade was the way to control rhino poaching
- concern about ivory & horn trafficking led to mandatory 5-15 year sentences being legislated for in 1982
- sentences did increase but were mostly still very short: maximum sentence in 1982-5 was 36 months
- cost to the management authority of high penalties (e.g.court appearances)
- in neighbouring countries (e.g. Zimbabwe) shoot-to-kill was introduced and rhinos continued to be killed
Costs of hunting
- wages of gang members (opportunity costs of time)
- equipment (guns & ammo)
- law enforcement (fines if caught)
Give the projected cost of hunting
Expected cost = [Fine x No. caught + Confiscations] x Prob of capture
Describe risk neutral people
weighing up the expected gains and the chances of getting them
Describe risk averse people
preferring security to a gamble with a higher expected gain
Describe risk prone people
preferring a lower-yielding gamble to a guaranteed gain
Most people are
risk-averse.
Describe The Prisoner’s dilemma
anecdote for understanding how rational decision-making can lead inevitably to disaster rather than to the best outcome for all
The Prisoner’s dilemma works for any set of values where:
- payouts are symmetrical between players
- value of payouts follow CD < DD < CC < DC
- values follow 2(CC) > (DC + CD)
Describe the strengths of Tit-for-Tat
- Swift retaliation
- Swift forgiveness
- Starts by cooperating
How to win the Prisoner’s Dilemma
- iteration
- communication
- few people involved
- creation of a win-win outcome
Why are open access resources (fisheries, the atmosphere, grazing land) over-exploited?
- the Tragedy of the Commons
- no property rights, no future, externalities imposed
- individually rational solution = profits dissipated
Game theory shows that cooperation can develop and be stable when:
- few people involved, deals can easily be struck and compliance monitored.
- communication between individuals
- “game” between the same individuals is iterated over time
Outside influences
- immigration
- human population growth
- changes in social circumstances
Individual motivations for compliance
- instrumental
- normative
- legitimacy-based
Instrumental
- probability of detection
- probability of sanction
Normative
- feeling of guilt
- colleagues disapproval
Legitimacy-based
- legitimacy of authorities
- appropriateness of rules
- equity of rules
We can think of people as
- rational users of natural resources
- trade off costs and benefits just like animals
- instead of fitness they maximise utility (can be proxied by money
Simple models assume
risk-neutrality, but people’s psychology is more complex than this.
Increasing the … is the most effective method of deterring poaching.
probability of capture
People act strategically - this can be modelled using game theory.
The “tragedy of the commons” and the “prisoner’s dilemma” both explain why people may act against the community interest and over-exploit.
Whether or not people abide by rules promoting sustainable harvesting depends on how these rules are seen by the community (legitimacy, trust, norms).
Agreements to use resources sustainably are not very robust to disruption of social structures.