Understanding and changing people's behaviour

Question 1

Describe resource users are central place foragers

Answer 1

• trade off costs against benefits (time spent vs kg offtake)
• select species (e.g. bigger, tastier, portability)
• often assumed to be
  maximising profitability

Question 2

If a resource is being unsustainably harvested, the options are:

Answer 2

• attempt to stop resource use entirely
• try to regulate legal resource use
• attempt to contain illegal resource use through law enforcement

Question 3

The economic theory of law re harvesting

Answer 3

• max[pH - cE - thetaF]
• p is the price per unit of output, H;
• E is all the inputs to production, not just effort;
• c is the cost per unit input;
• theta is the probability of receiving the fine F

Question 4

To reduce illegal exploitation we could…

Answer 4

• increase perceived probability of punishment (theta)
• increase perceived penalty (F)
• reduce revenues (p)
• increase costs, e.g. opportunity costs (c)

Question 5

Describe Rhino poaching in the Luangwa valley, 1985

Answer 5

• gangs poached for elephants & rhinos
• professionals, hired by middlemen.
• very few rhinos left.
• model with a simple 2-species harvesting model
• rhino horns 1.7x as valuable as tusks per kill
• hunting for rhinos alone is not worthwhile because population size is so low
• lucrative ivory trade, not because of the rhino horn trade
• controlling the ivory trade was the way to control rhino poaching
• concern about ivory & horn trafficking led to mandatory 5-15 year sentences being legislated for in 1982
• sentences did increase but were mostly still very short: maximum sentence in 1982-5 was 36 months
• cost to the management authority of high penalties (e.g.court appearances)
• in neighbouring countries (e.g. Zimbabwe) shoot-to-kill was introduced and rhinos continued to be killed

Question 6

Costs of hunting

Answer 6

• wages of gang members (opportunity costs of time)
• equipment (guns & ammo)
• law enforcement (fines if caught)

Question 7

Give the projected cost of hunting

Answer 7

Expected cost = [Fine x No. caught + Confiscations] x Prob of capture

Question 8

Describe risk neutral people

Answer 8

weighing up the expected gains and the chances of getting them

Question 9

Describe risk averse people

Answer 9

preferring security to a gamble with a higher expected gain

Question 10

Describe risk prone people

Answer 10

preferring a lower-yielding gamble to a guaranteed gain

Question 11

Most people are

Answer 11

risk-averse.

Question 12

Describe The Prisoner’s dilemma

Answer 12

anecdote for understanding how rational decision-making can lead inevitably to disaster rather than to the best outcome for all

Question 13

The Prisoner’s dilemma works for any set of values where:

Answer 13

• payouts are symmetrical between players
• value of payouts follow CD < DD < CC < DC
• values follow 2(CC) > (DC + CD)

Question 14

Describe the strengths of Tit-for-Tat

Answer 14

• Swift retaliation
• Swift forgiveness
• Starts by cooperating

Question 15

How to win the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Answer 15

• iteration
• communication
• few people involved
• creation of a win-win outcome

Question 16

Why are open access resources (fisheries, the atmosphere, grazing land) over-exploited?

Answer 16

• the Tragedy of the Commons
• no property rights, no future, externalities imposed
• individually rational solution = profits dissipated

Question 17

Game theory shows that cooperation can develop and be stable when:

Answer 17

• few people involved, deals can easily be struck and compliance monitored.
• communication between individuals
• “game” between the same individuals is iterated over time

Question 18

Outside influences

Answer 18

• immigration
• human population growth
• changes in social circumstances

Question 19

Individual motivations for compliance

Answer 19

• instrumental
• normative
• legitimacy-based

Question 20

Instrumental

Answer 20

• probability of detection
• probability of sanction

Question 21

Normative

Answer 21

• feeling of guilt
• colleagues disapproval

Question 22

Legitimacy-based

Answer 22

• legitimacy of authorities
• appropriateness of rules
• equity of rules

Question 23

We can think of people as

Answer 23

• rational users of natural resources
• trade off costs and benefits just like animals
• instead of fitness they maximise utility (can be proxied by money

Question 24

Simple models assume

Answer 24

risk-neutrality, but people’s psychology is more complex than this.

Question 25

Increasing the … is the most effective method of deterring poaching.

Answer 25

probability of capture

Question 26

People act strategically - this can be modelled using game theory.
The “tragedy of the commons” and the “prisoner’s dilemma” both explain why people may act against the community interest and over-exploit.
Whether or not people abide by rules promoting sustainable harvesting depends on how these rules are seen by the community (legitimacy, trust, norms).
Agreements to use resources sustainably are not very robust to disruption of social structures.