tort Flashcards

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1
Q

Intent for battery exists when the defendant

A

(1) intends to cause contact with the plaintiff’s person,
(2) intends to cause contact with a third party but instead causes contact with the plaintiff, or
(3) intends to commit an assault but instead commits a battery.

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1
Q

Apparent consent is a defense to battery when

A

consent can be reasonably implied from the plaintiff’s conduct or from custom.

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2
Q

consent is only a defense where

A

the defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of the plaintiff’s consent.

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3
Q

A defendant who has permission to use the plaintiff’s chattel commits conversion when he/she

A

(1) intentionally uses the chattel in a way that exceeds the scope of permission and
(2) seriously violates the plaintiff’s right to control the chattel.

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4
Q

The defendant is liable for the fair market value of the chattel at the time of

A

the conversion.

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5
Q

For intentional infliction of emotional distress, conduct is considered extreme and outrageous if

A

it exceeds the possible limits of human decency, so as to be entirely intolerable in a civilized society.

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6
Q

In most jurisdictions, an innkeeper owes a duty to

A

use ordinary care to protect its guests while they are on the premises.

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7
Q

Evidence that the innkeeper complied with (or deviated from) community or industry custom is

A

relevant to—but not conclusive on—the issue of negligence.

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8
Q

Under the common-law approach to common-carrier liability, common carriers owe

A

the highest duty of care to their passengers and can be liable for slight negligence.

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9
Q

Under the modern approach, common carriers only owe a duty to use

A

reasonable care to protect passengers from harm that arises within the scope of that relationship.

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10
Q

In traditional contributory negligence jurisdictions, a plaintiff’s failure to use reasonable care for his/her own safety is

A

a complete defense to negligence.

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11
Q

The defendant can establish the plaintiff’s negligence under the doctrine of negligence per se, but still must prove that

A

the plaintiff’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm.

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12
Q

A land possessor owes a duty to known or anticipated trespassers to

A

(1) warn them about hidden, artificial dangers that are known to the land possessor but unlikely to be discovered by trespassers and
(2) use reasonable care in active operations.

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13
Q

Under the traditional standard for res ipsa loquitur, negligence is inferred if

A

(1) the plaintiff’s harm would not normally occur unless someone was negligent,
2) the defendant had exclusive control over the thing that caused the harm, and
(3) the plaintiff did nothing to cause the harm.

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14
Q

Where multiple forces combined to cause the plaintiff’s harm and any one alone would have been sufficient to cause the harm, the test for actual causation is

A

whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.

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15
Q

Strict products liability claims can be brought against

A

commercial suppliers or sellers—i.e., those in the business of manufacturing, selling, or otherwise distributing products of the type that harmed the plaintiff.

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16
Q

service providers are not subject to

A

strict products liability.

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17
Q

Strict products liability is imposed on any commercial seller in the chain of distribution if

A

(1) the commercial seller’s product contained a defect when it left the commercial seller’s control and
(2) that defect caused the plaintiff harm.

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18
Q

The owner of a wild animal is strictly liable for harm that is caused by

A

a plaintiff’s fearful reaction to the sight of an unrestrained wild animal or directly results from the wild animal’s abnormally dangerous characteristics.

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19
Q

Under pure comparative negligence, a negligent plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by

A

his/her proportionate share of fault.

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20
Q

Under pure comparative negligence, if multiple defendants cause the plaintiff indivisible harm:

A

several liability limits the plaintiff to recovering from each defendant the portion of damages that corresponds to his/her proportionate share of fault.

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21
Q

Under modified (or partial) comparative negligence, recovery is reduced by

A

the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and barred if it exceeds 50%.

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22
Q

A plaintiff who is public figure or official can recover for defamation only if

A

the plaintiff proves that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff with actual malice—i.e., with knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement’s falsity.

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23
Q

A commercial seller owes a duty of reasonable care to

A

any foreseeable plaintiff (i.e., purchaser, user, bystander).

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24
Q

a commercial seller’s duty of reasonable care to any foreseeable plaintiff is breached when:

A

the commercial seller fails to exercise reasonable care in the inspection or sale of the product and the defect would have been discovered had such care been used.

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25
Q

Assumption of the risk is a defense that applies when

A

the plaintiff knew of a risk yet voluntarily exposed him/herself to it.

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26
Q

A plaintiff must be in privity with the defendant to have standing in

A

a products liability action based on breach of warranty

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27
Q

Exclusive control is an element of res ipsa loquitur, which allows

A

the defendant’s negligent conduct to be inferred when the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of such negligence.

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28
Q

manufacturer can rebut an inference of negligence by showing that

A

it exercised reasonable care

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29
Q

A defendant is liable for conversion if

A

he intentionally commits an act depriving the plaintiff of possession of his chattel or interfering with the plaintiff’s chattel in a manner so serious as to deprive the plaintiff of the use of the chattel.

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30
Q

Accidentally damaging the plaintiff’s chattel is not conversion if

A

the defendant had permission to be using the property

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31
Q

The defendant must only intend to commit the act that interferes; intent to cause damage is

A

not necessary

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32
Q

A defendant is subject to liability to the plaintiff for the intentional infliction of emotional distress if

A

the defendant by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.

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33
Q

Under a negligence theory, failure to exercise reasonable care in the inspection or sale of a product constitutes

A

breach of duty.

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34
Q

plaintiff must establish not only that the defect exists, but that had the defendant exercised reasonable care in the inspection or sale of the product

A

the defect would have been discovered, and the plaintiff would not have been harmed.

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35
Q

A foreseeable intervening cause, such as the negligence of a rescuer,

A

will not cut off a defendant’s liability

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36
Q

As a general guideline, negligent intervening acts are usually regarded as

A

foreseeable and do not prevent the original defendant from being held liable to the plaintiff.

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37
Q

Negligence per se occurs when

A

a defendant violates a criminal or regulatory statute that imposes a specific duty on the defendant, and the act proximately caused the kind of harm the statute was designed to prevent.

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38
Q

Negligence per se plaintiff must be

A

in the class of people intended to be protected by the statute.

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39
Q

A failure-to-warn defect exists if

A

there were foreseeable risks of harm not obvious to an ordinary user of the product, and those risks could have been reduced or avoided by providing reasonable instructions or warnings.

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40
Q

The failure to include the instructions or warnings must render the product

A

not reasonably safe

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41
Q

Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a land possessor may be liable for injuries to children trespassing on the land if:

A

: i) an artificial condition exists in a place the land possessor knows or has reason to know children are likely to trespass;
ii) the owner knows or has reason to know that the condition poses an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury to children;
iii) the children, because of their youth, do not discover or cannot appreciate the danger presented by the condition;
iv) the utility to the landowner of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared to the risk of harm presented to children; and
v) the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to protect children from the harm.

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42
Q

To prevail on a claim for strict products liability based on a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff must prove that:

A

(i) the product was defective,
(ii) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant’s control, and
(iii) the defect caused the plaintiff’s injury when the product was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way.

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43
Q

While misuse of a product is not an automatic bar to recovery, the particular misuse must be

A

foreseeable.

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44
Q

In most jurisdictions, a minor child can be held liable for an intentional tort if the child acts with the requisite mental state—i.e.,

A

(i) with the purpose of causing the consequences of the child’s act or
(ii) knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.

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45
Q

A defendant is subject to liability to the plaintiff for battery if

A

the defendant intended to cause contact with the plaintiff’s person and the defendant’s affirmative conduct caused contact that was harmful or offensive to the plaintiff.

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46
Q

The commercial supplier of a component, such as sand used in manufacturing cement, is subject to liability if

A

the component itself is defective, but not when the component is incorporated into a product that is defective for another reason.

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47
Q

the commercial supplier of a component may be liable if that supplier substantially participates in

A

the process of integrating the component into the design of the assembled product and that product is defective due to the integration.

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48
Q

A private nuisance is

A

a thing or activity that substantially and unreasonably interferes with another individual’s use and enjoyment of his land.

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49
Q

for private nuisance claim, a person with special sensitivities can recover only if

A

the average person would be offended, inconvenienced, or annoyed.

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50
Q

In order to recover under a strict products liability theory, a plaintiff must prove that

A

the product was defective (in manufacture, design, or failure to warn), the defect existed when it left the defendant’s control, and the defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries when the product was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way.

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51
Q

The misuse, alteration, or modification of a product by the user in a manner that is neither intended by nor reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer

A

typically negates liability.

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52
Q

To recover under a theory of the public disclosure of private facts about someone, the plaintiff must show that

A

(i) the defendant gave publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another, and
(ii) the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the public.

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53
Q

A plaintiff can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress from a defendant whose tortious conduct placed the plaintiff in harm’s way if the plaintiff demonstrates that:

A

(i) he was within the “zone of danger” of the threatened physical impact—that he feared for his own safety because of the defendant’s negligence; and
(ii) the threat of physical impact caused emotional distress.

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54
Q

duty to avoid infliction of emotional distress exists without any threat of physical impact in cases in which there is

A

a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

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55
Q

possible for a defendant to inflict severe emotional distress that results in physical symptoms without the threat of physical impact, such as when

A

a physician negligently misdiagnoses a patient with a terminal illness that the patient does not have, and the patient goes into shock as a result

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56
Q

Generally, a plaintiff can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if

A

the defendant’s action causes a threat of physical impact that results in some kind of bodily harm (e.g., a heart attack).

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57
Q

exception to the physical-injury requirement in cases of

A

misinforming someone that a family member has died

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58
Q

In most jurisdictions, a private actor (i.e., an individual who is not an on-duty law enforcement officer) is privileged to use force (e.g., commit a battery or false imprisonment) to make an arrest in the case of a felony if

A

the felony has in fact been committed and the arresting party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person being arrested committed it.

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59
Q

“citizen’s arrest,” is recognized if

A

the private actor makes a reasonable mistake as to the identity of the felon but not as to the commission of the felony.

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60
Q

A wild animal is an animal that is

A

not by custom devoted to the service of humankind in the place where it is being kept

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61
Q

The possessor of a wild animal is

A

strictly liable for harm done by that animal, in spite of any precautions the possessor has taken to confine the animal or prevent the harm, as long as the plaintiff did not knowingly do anything to bring about the injury and the harm arises from a dangerous propensity that is characteristic of such wild animals or of which the owner has reason to know.

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62
Q

A defendant is liable for

A

the reasonably foreseeable consequences resulting from his conduct

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63
Q

The type of harm must be foreseeable, and a defendant’s liability is limited to

A

those harms that result from the risks that made the defendant’s conduct tortious.

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64
Q

Traditionally, a plaintiff’s voluntarily encountering a known, specific risk is an

A

affirmative defense to negligence that affects recovery

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65
Q

Most courts hold that the voluntary encountering must also be

A

unreasonable

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66
Q

Examples of unforeseeable superseding causes include

A

extraordinary acts of nature (“act of God”), criminal acts, and intentional torts of third parties.

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67
Q

normal forces of nature, including rain, are considered

A

foreseeable intervening causes, and will not limit the defendant’s liability

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68
Q

A defendant may use deadly force for the purpose of defending himself against the plaintiff only if the defendant reasonably believes that

A

i) the plaintiff is intentionally inflicting or about to intentionally inflict unprivileged force upon the defendant,
(ii) the defendant is thereby put in peril of either death, serious bodily harm, or rape by the use or threat of physical force or restraint, and
(iii) the defendant can safely prevent the peril only by the immediate use of deadly force.

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69
Q

In general, a duty of care is owed to

A

all foreseeable persons who may foreseeably be injured by the defendant’s failure to act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.

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70
Q

Unlike actions for intentional torts, nominal damages are not recoverable in

A

negligence actions

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71
Q

a plaintiff who suffers only economic loss without any related personal injury or property damage

A

cannot recover such loss through a negligence action because a defendant does not have a general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of economic loss on a plaintiff.

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72
Q

A person is an employer if

A

the person has the right to control the means and methods by which another performs a task or achieves a result.

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73
Q

An employer is liable for the tortious conduct of an employee that is

A

within the scope of employment

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74
Q

If the plaintiff in a defamation action is either a public official or a public figure, then the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice; that is,

A

he either had knowledge that the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statement

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75
Q

a defamatory opinion is actionable if

A

the defendant implies that there is a factual basis for that opinion.

76
Q

A plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of an intentional tort by showing proof of

A

the tortious conduct, the requisite mental state (i.e., the defendant acts intentionally), and causation.

77
Q

Transferred intent exists when

A

a defendant intends to commit an battery, assault, or false imprisonment against one person, but instead commits the intended tort or a different tort against a different person

78
Q

A plaintiff may even recover nominal damages in a battery action, even though

A

the plaintiff did not suffer actual harm.

79
Q

Trespass to land occurs when

A

the defendant’s intentional act causes a physical invasion of the land of another.

80
Q

defendant need only have the intent to enter the land, not the intent to

A

commit a wrongful trespass.

81
Q

for trespass to land

A

No proof of actual damages is required; nominal damages may be awarded

82
Q

privilege of necessity is available to a person who

A

enters or remains on the land of another (or interferes with another’s personal property) to prevent serious harm, which typically is substantially more serious than the invasion or interference itself.

83
Q

Private necessity is a qualified privilege to protect an interest of the defendant or a limited number of other persons from

A

serious harm when the interference is reasonably necessary to prevent such harm.

84
Q

Despite this privilege, the property owner is entitled to recover actual damages, but cannot recover

A

nominal or punitive damages nor use force to eject the defendant.

85
Q

An activity is abnormally dangerous if that activity

A

(i) creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised, and (ii) the activity is not commonly engaged in.

86
Q

Strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity is available if

A

the harm that actually occurs results from the risk that made the activity abnormally dangerous in the first place

87
Q

Proximate cause exists when

A

the defendant’s actions are a direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

88
Q

if an intervening force occurs between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s injury, the defendant still may be liable if

A

the intervening force was foreseeable.

89
Q

Medical malpractice is a foreseeable

A

intervening force

90
Q

A mentally impaired individual may be liable for an intentional tort if the individual acts

A

(i) with the purpose of causing the consequences of the act or (ii) knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result. This is true regardless of whether the individual comprehends the wrongfulness of the act.

91
Q

Under the “single-intent” rule, which is the majority rule, a defendant may be liable if the defendant intends merely

A

to cause contact with the plaintiff’s person.

92
Q

a retailer may be strictly liable for a defective product, even one that is

A

defective due to a manufacturing defect.

93
Q

the seller is subject to strict liability for a defective product, even if

A

the revenue from sales of the product is not a significant portion of the seller’s business.

94
Q

A person who comes to the aid of another is

A

a foreseeable plaintiff

95
Q

If the defendant negligently puts either the rescued party or the rescuer in danger, then

A

he is liable for the rescuer’s injuries

96
Q

. Otherwise, at common law, the owner of a domestic animal is generally liable only for

A

negligence.

97
Q

Actual consent given by a plaintiff due to a substantial mistake regarding the nature of the invasion of the plaintiff’s interests, the extent of the expected harm, or the defendant’s purpose in engaging in the conduct is nevertheless valid consent unless

A

the defendant caused the mistake by affirmative misrepresentation or fraud or knew of the mistake.

98
Q

Consent to an egregious intentional tort can be valid if

A

other party does not exceed the scope of the consent.

99
Q

As a general rule, an employer is vicariously liable for the employee’s torts if

A

the employer has the right to control the activities of the employee.

100
Q

An employer is liable for the tortious conduct of an employee that is

A

within the scope of employment.

101
Q

Conduct within the scope of employment includes

A

1) acts that the employee is employed to perform or
2) acts that are intended to profit or benefit the employer.

102
Q

An employee that completes a personal errand may still be within the scope of employment if

A

the detour is a minor and permissible deviation.

103
Q

an employee that completes a personal errand that involves a significant deviation from the path that would otherwise be taken for the purposes of employment has begun a

A

frolic and is not acting within the scope of employment.

104
Q

An employer is not vicariously liable for

A

an employee’s frolic.

105
Q

Conversion is the wrongful assumption or exercise of

A

the right of ownership over goods or other tangible personal property belonging to another in denial of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.

106
Q

An action for conversion can be maintained only by

A

the person having a property interest in and entitled to the immediate possession of the item alleged to have been wrongfully converted.

107
Q

Damages for conversion are based on

A

the value of the property converted at the time and place of conversion.

108
Q

An action for conversion, which typically applies to tangible personal property, may extend to

A

intangible personal property rights that arise from or are merged with a document such as a stock certificate, promissory note, bond.

109
Q

As with most other civil causes of action, the plaintiff established conversion by

A

a preponderance of the evidence.

110
Q

Generally, the plaintiff must demand that the defendant return the property when

A

the defendant’s initial acquisition of the property was not wrongful.

111
Q

doctrine of respondent superior holds that

A

an employee can be liable for the tortious conduct of its employee if: the employee was acting within the scope of his/her employment when the damage/injury occurred

112
Q

Based on the type of conduct by the employee, it can either be classified as

A

a frolic or a detour

113
Q

A frolic which serves to

A

generally sever liability of the employer, as the conduct was not within the scope of the employment; compared to a detour which is still within the scope

114
Q

To establish a negligence claim, the claimant must prove that

A

the defendant owed the claimant a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the claimant suffered actual harm that was both the actual and proximate cause of the claim.

115
Q

A land possessor owes an invitee the duty of

A

reasonable care, including the duty to use reasonable care to inspect the property, discover unreasonably dangerous conditions, and protect the invitee from them.

116
Q

An invitee includes

A

a business visitor, who is someone invited to enter or remain on the land for a purpose connected to business dealings with the land possessor.

117
Q

The land possessor’s duty to invitees is

A

non-delegable.

118
Q

Even when the land possessor engages an independent contractor to clean the premises of the business, the land possessor remains

A

vicariously liable for the independent contractor’s failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.

119
Q

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

A

infers the existence of the defendant’s negligent conduct in the absence of direct evidence of such negligence

120
Q

Virginia continues to require the instrumentality causing the damage to be

A

in the exclusive possession of or under the exclusive management of the defendant for res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply.

121
Q

A defendant is not required to foresee the extent of

A

a claimant’s damages to be liable for them (e.g., the “eggshell-plaintiff” rule)

122
Q

a defendant is not liable for a plaintiff’s

A

preexisting physical condition, such as degenerative disc disease

123
Q

Although a claimant establishes the defendant’s negligence, the defendant can escape liability completely in Virginia if

A

the claimant was contributorily negligent.

124
Q

In general, a duty of care is owed to

A

all foreseeable persons who may foreseeably be injured by the defendant’s failure to act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.

125
Q

a landowner generally does not owe a duty to a person

A

not on the premises, such as a passerby, who is harmed by a natural condition on the landowner’s premises.

126
Q

landowner liability for those not on premises exception:

A

trees in urban areas

127
Q

With respect to an artificial condition, the landowner generally owes a duty to

A

prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to persons who are not on the premises.

128
Q

with respect to an activity conducted on the premises by the owner or by someone subject to the owner’s control, the landowner generally owes a duty of

A

reasonable care to persons who are not on the premises.

129
Q

n addition to proving actual causation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s tortious conduct was a

A

proximate cause of her harm.

130
Q

Proximate cause is a legal limitation on

A

actual cause, focusing on foreseeability.

131
Q

In Virginia, an action will be the proximate cause of an injury if

A

the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the act, and was foreseeable.

132
Q

Most courts hold that an unforeseeable intervening cause is a superseding cause that

A

breaks the chain of causation between the defendant and the plaintiff.

133
Q

In Virginia, to be superseding, an intervening cause must completely

A

supersede the defendant’s actions so that the intervening cause alone produced the injury, without the defendant’s contributing negligence.

134
Q

In general, there is no affirmative duty

A

to act.

135
Q

a person who voluntarily aids or rescues another has a duty to act with

A

reasonable ordinary care in the performance of that aid or rescue.

135
Q

Virginia’s Good Samaritan law protects

A

people rendering emergency care, in good faith, without compensation, even if they are negligent in rendering that care.

136
Q

Contributory fault occurs when

A

a plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable care for her own safety and thereby contributes to her own injury.

137
Q

Under the traditional rule, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a

A

complete bar to recovery, regardless of the percentage that the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the harm.

138
Q

Although Virginia follows the doctrine of traditional contributory negligence, the plaintiff’s negligence must be

A

a substantial cause of the injury.

139
Q

An invitee is a person who

A

enters onto the premises in response to an express or implied invitation of the landowner

140
Q

In a negligence action, under premises liability, a business owner owes a general duty to use

A

reasonable and ordinary care in keeping the property reasonably safe for the benefit of the invitee.

141
Q

a business owners duty to an invitee includes

A

1) the duty to warn or to make safe nonobvious, dangerous conditions known to the owner and to use ordinary care in active operation on the property,
2) as well as a duty to make reasonable inspections to discover dangerous conditions and then make them safe.

142
Q

Under this duty to make safe dangerous conditions

A

a reasonable warning given to a patron about dangerous conditions typically is sufficient.

143
Q

the duty to warn usually does not exist when

A

the dangerous condition is so obvious that the invitee should reasonably have been aware of it; the obviousness is determined by all of the surrounding circumstances.

144
Q

In a negligence action, where a plaintiff can prove the applicability of criminal statute to the facts of their case, the specific duty imposed by the statute will

A

replace the more general duty imposed under common law

145
Q

In order to prove the applicability of the statute the Plaintiff must show that

A

(1) they are in the class of persons that the statute is intended to protect, and
(2) that the statute was designed to prevent the type of harm the plaintiff suffered.

146
Q

most courts adhere to the rule that violation of the statute is negligence per se, which

A

establishes a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of that duty.

147
Q

under negligence per se when established, the plaintiff must still prove

A

causation and damages

148
Q

The plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in a conversion action is

A

a preponderance of the evidence.

149
Q

plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in a fraud action is

A

clear and convincing evidence.

150
Q

plaintiff’s burden of persuasion in an intentional infliction of emotional distress action is

A

clear and convincing evidence

151
Q

plaintiff’s burden of persuasion to establish punitive damages is

A

clear and convincing evidence

152
Q

statute of limitations for a slander action is

A

one year

153
Q

In Virginia, an employer can be liable for

A

negligent hiring or retaining an employee that results in harm to the plaintiff.

154
Q

for negligent hiring or retaining an employee The plaintiff must establish the four basic elements

A

duty, breach of duty, causation of the plaintiff’s harm, and actual damages.

155
Q

Generally, the employee’s conduct that directly causes the plaintiff’s harm must have occurred within

A

the employee’s scope of employment.

156
Q

employer’s conduct must be the

A

proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.

157
Q

an employer can also be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for

A

a tort committed by an employee within the scope of employment.

158
Q

As a rule, a person is an employer if

A

the person has the right to control the means and methods by which another performs a task or achieves a result.

159
Q

Conduct within the scope of employment includes

A

acts that the employee is employed to perform or that are intended to benefit the employer.

160
Q

Usually, an employer is not liable for

A

an intentional tort committed by an employee.

161
Q

when force is inherent in the employee’s work, the employer may be responsible for

A

injuries the employee inflicts in the course of his work.

162
Q

In Virginia, a business visitor is

A

someone invited to enter or remain on real property for a purpose connected to business dealings with the possessor of the property—is an invitee.

163
Q

duty owed to an invitee by a possessor

A

duty of reasonable care

164
Q

a possessor has no duty to protect an invitee from

A

open and obvious dangers.

165
Q

a possessor of real property is generally not liable for a tort committed by

A

an independent contractor performing an isolated repair or improvement.

166
Q

an independent contractor is

A

one engaged to accomplish a task or achieve a result but who is not subject to another’s right to control the method and means by which the task is performed, or the result reached

167
Q

Apart from abnormally hazardous activities, Virginia generally does not recognize a cause of action based on

A

strict liability for property owners

168
Q

Virginia has not adopted any dram shop law that imposes

A

vicarious liability on the seller of intoxicating beverages when a third party is subsequently injured due to the buyer’s intoxication.

169
Q

In most jurisdictions, including Virginia, the violation of a statute establishes

A

negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.

170
Q

To establish negligence per se, a plaintiff must prove that

A

(i) the defendant violated a statute that was enacted for public safety,
(ii) he belongs to the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted, and
(iii) the statutory violation was a proximate cause of his injury.

171
Q

In Virginia, a violation of statutory provisions that prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated individuals does not trigger negligence per se because

A

the violation is not the proximate cause of an injury inflicted by the intoxicated individual.

172
Q

The standard of care imposed on a child is that of

A

a reasonable child of similar age, intelligence, and experience.

173
Q

Children engaged in adult activities are held to

A

the same standard as an adult

174
Q

In Virginia, there is an irrebuttable presumption that a child under the age of seven is

A

incapable of negligence.

175
Q

While Virginia continues to adhere to the doctrine of contributory negligence, which generally bars recovery by a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent, Virginia, as a contributory negligence jurisdiction, does recognize

A

the last clear chance doctrine

176
Q

the last clear chance doctrine

A

the plaintiff may mitigate the legal consequences of her own contributory negligence if she proves that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid injuring the plaintiff but failed to do so.

177
Q

Virginia has not adopted

A

a modified comparative negligence scheme

178
Q

Virginia has not adopted

A

a pure comparative negligence scheme.

179
Q

Generally, every action for personal injuries must be brought within

A

two years after the cause of action accrues.

180
Q

For a personal injury action, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the injury is received, regardless of

A

when it is discovered

181
Q

Virginia courts recognize an exception for medical malpractice claims known as

A

the continuous treatment rule

182
Q

the continuous treatment rule

A

when medical malpractice occurs during a continuous, ongoing treatment during which a specific illness or condition should have been diagnosed and was not, the cause of action accrues when the improper course of examination terminates.

183
Q

If an unemancipated minor has a medical malpractice claim against a health care provider, the claim generally must be brought within two years of

A

the last act or omission giving rise to the cause of action; However, if the minor was less than eight years of age at the time of the act of malpractice, the minor has until his tenth birthday to bring the action.

184
Q

the continuing treatment rule likely does apply to prevent the start of the running of the statute of limitation until

A

Defendant stopped treating Plaintiff

185
Q

Under Virginia law, total damages in medical malpractice actions occurring from July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017 may not exceed

A

$2.25 million

186
Q

For acts of negligence occurring on or after July 1, 2017, the total damages limit

A

will increase by $50,000 each year until it equals $3 million in 2031

187
Q
A