The Nature and Concept of God Flashcards
How does the concept of God differ from other concepts studied?
- Social and historical importance of God. There have been armies bearing what are taken to be the sign or words of God, and it is all too common for blood to spilt in the name of God,
- The concept of God can also seem highly abstract, detached, and perhaps even incoherent,
What are the two traditional ways in which theologians have characterised possible sources of knowledge of God?
- Revealed theology based on faith,
- Natural theology based on reasons.
What is revealed theology?
A source of knowledge of God based on spiritual experiences and texts.
What is natural theology?
A source of knowledge of God involving the demonstration and justification of religious claims based on reason, experiment, and observation.
What is negative theology?
Negative theology maintains that we cannot coherently state any positive fact about God; rather, all we can do is say what God is not.
What work by St. Thomas Aquinas is studied?
The Summa Theologica
What is Aquinas first, of four, objection to the view that God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (1:2:3). If God cannot move or be acted upon, then there is something He cannot do. Therefore, He is not omnipotent.
What is Aquinas second, of four, objection to the view that God is omnipotent?
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor ‘deny Himself’ as it is said in 2 Timothy 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.
‘If we are faithless, he remains faithful, for he cannot deny himself.’
Aquinas’ response to objection 1?
God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
Active power = the ability to act or cause things to happen,
Passive power = the ability to be acted upon or changed by something else.
Aquinas’ response to objection 2?
- Sin is a failure or defect in action - it is falling short of perfection,
- Omnipotence means the ability to do all things perfectly,
- Therefore, the ability to sin would contradict omnipotence,
- God cannot sin precisely because he is omnipotent and perfect.
Addressing Aristotle:
1. A conditional impossibility - if we say, ‘God can do evil if He wills,’ this is technically a true statement, but meaningless because God will never will evil (just as saying, ‘if a man were a donkey, he would have four feet’ is technically true but based on an impossible condtion),
2. Actions that seem evil to us but would be good if God did them - Some things may appear evil from a human perspective, but if done by God, they would be part of his divine justice and therefore good. For example, destroying a city may seem evil, but if God does it as an act of justice, it is ultimately good,
3. A mistaken pagan understanding - Aristotle might have been speaking according to pagan beliefs, where gods like Jupiter or Mercury were thought to be capable of evil because they were deified men, not truly divine.
Of four, what is Aquinas third objection to the view that God is omnipotent?
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence ‘especially by sparing and having mercy’. Therefore, the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.
Aquinas’ response to objection 3?
- God’s omnipotence is especially shown in mercy - His supreme power is revealed in His ability to freely forgive sins,
- Only a supreme being can forgive sins freely - A being bound by a higher law cannot do this; only God, who has no superior, can pardon sins by His own will,
- Mercy leads to ultimate good - By sparing and showing mercy, God directs people towards the participation in infinite good, which is the highest effect of divine power,
- Divine mercy is the foundation of all God’s works - Everything given to creatures is a gift from God’s mercy, making it the starting point of all divine action,
- Omnipotence is seen in the origin of all good things - Since all goodness originates from God, His mercy and generosity in granting existence and grace demonstrate His absolute power.
Of four, what is Aquinas fourth objection to the view that God is omnipotent?
Objection 4:
1. Biblical Claim – 1 Corinthians 1:20 says God makes worldly wisdom seem foolish. A gloss explains that God reveals as possible what humans see as impossible.
2. Limits of Human Wisdom – Human reason judges possibility based on natural causes, but if God determines possibility, human judgements are unreliable.
3. Omnipotence & Possibility – If God is all-powerful, then nothing is truly impossible. Everything must be possible through Him.
4. Problem of Necessity – Necessity means something must exist and cannot not exist. But if nothing is impossible, necessity is undermined.
5. Contradiction – Removing impossibility removes necessity, but necessity is evident in reality (e.g. natural laws). Since necessity cannot be removed, omnipotence (as defined) must be false.
6. Conclusion – Omnipotence leads to contradictions, so God cannot be omnipotent under this reasoning.
Aquinas’ response to objection 4?
P1. The ‘absolute possible’ is defined by its own nature, not by lower or higher causes. However, possibility in relation to a power depends on its proximate cause,
P2. Actions exclusive to God, such as creation and justification, are only possible through divine power, while actions within nature’s capacity are possible through inferior causes,
C1. Therefore, possibility must be understood in reference to the appropriate cause - either divine or natural - rather than judged universally,
P3. The nature of the proximate cause determines whether an effect is necessary or contingent. If a cause necessarily produces an effect, the effect is necessary; otherwise, it remains contingent,
P4. The wisdom of the world is considered foolish because it assumes that what is impossible for nature is impossible for God,
C2. Therefore, God’s omnipotence does not eliminate impossibility and necessity within created things but rather operates beyond natural limitations without contradiction.
What does Aquinas take ‘divine omnipotence’ to mean?
The quality of God that ‘God can do all things’, which he takes to mean that ‘God can do all things that are possible’.
What two types of possibility does Aquinas distinguish?
- Absolute, or logical, conceptual possibility. In example, an equilateral triangle is possible, whereas a square circle is not possible in any sense,
- Possible relative to an agent. In example, it is possible for me to write this flashcard, as it is within my power as an agent. It is not, however, within my power to create a cosmos, or to change matter into energy by thinking about it.
What definition of possibility does Aquinas argue with must define God’s power in terms of?
- Cannot define the power of God in terms of (2), as we would essentially be saying God can do what it is in his power to do.
- Therefore, must proceed according to (1), and define the power of God in terms of logical possibility.
Based on the types of possibility what can omnipotence be seen as?
A) The power to do anything,
B) The power to do anything which is logically possible,
C) God can do anything which is logically possible, and which does not contradict his perfection.
What are the issues with omnipotence definition A?
- Aquinas’ counterexamples of passivity/movement, sin, mercy, and wisdom.
- Theologians, including Aquinas, argue there are things God cannot do. In example, he cannot alter what has already happened, or force us to choose something freely (paradoxical). Some theologians have also argued that God cannot alter the laws of logic or mathematics, i.e. he cannot do what is contradictory,
What are the issues with omnipotence definition B?
- Note again the sin example. For to sin seems a logical possibility. Therefore, it would seem that (B) is not sufficient,
- Aquinas refers to sin as a deficiency, a form of lack of power. But this isn’t part of the definition of sin. Sins are deficiencies by human reckoning.
What argument is made to reach omnipotence definition C?
If sin is a deficiency, then this insufficiency does not simply rely on omnipotence as a characteristic of God, but also omnibenevolence, holding that God is incapable of doing evil or wrong. Omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience may all be considered as belonging to God in virtue of his perfection, i.e. these are all necessary, essential, constitutive attributes of his perfection, therefore of God as perfect. We could, thus propose definition C.
What is Norman Kretzmann’s argument against the idea of God’s omniscience?
- God isn’t subject to change (immutability),
- God knows everything (omniscience),
- A being that knows everything, also knows everything in time,
- A being that knows things in time is subject to change,
- And, therefore, God is subject to change - which contradicts premise 1.
What is an example that could be used to justify point 4 of Kretzmann’s argument against omniscience?
Suppose that I know that my table is blue. Then suppose that someone paints it red in the night. I wake up and see that it is blue the next morning. It could be maintained that my knowledge has changed and has done so in time. If God knows everything that I know, then its knowledge has changed in time also.
God knew the table was blue, knew that the change would happen, yet still now knows that the table is red not blue.
What counter definition of omniscience is given to Kretzmann’s argument?
God knows everything which it is logically possible for God to know and which doesn’t limit his knowledge.
If we maintain this, we could argue that God knows everything that it is logically possible for God to know and does not know anything which could imply change.
Why is Kretzmann unsatisfied with this new definition of omniscience?
It is unsatisfying, as to specify that God knows everything logically possible for God to know does not add content to the idea of omniscience; to know something, one must know something true, which must be logically possible, for a logical impossibility cannot be true.
What is the biblical understanding of God’s benevolence?
Refers to the understanding of God’s goodness as found in the Bible. Notably the professed love for creation and human beings in particular.
What is the perfection understanding of God’s omnibenevolence?
A philosophical approach finding its roots in Plato and Aristotle, emphasising God’s supreme goodness because of God’s perfection.
What is the moral understanding of God’s omnibenevolence?
Emphasises God as the source of all values.
What is meant by the supreme goodness of God as a perfection?
By perfection we mean that there is no flaw or deficiency and that all necessary qualities are present.
What is traditionally meant by ‘God is eternal’?
That God is atemporal, or outside of time.
‘You were not, therefore, yesterday, nor will You be tomorrow, but yesterday and today and tomorrow You are.’ (St Anselm)
The core idea being that if God is the creator of the cosmos then it must have been outside the spatiotemporal cosmos in order to have created it. This property of existing outside of space and time is called transcendence.
What did Aquinas believe of God, in relation to his eternality?
Aquinas believed that God, as perfect, was immutable, or unchanging. He also thought that in order for God to be immutable, he could not exist in time, and so must be eternal.
For Aquinas, this immutability was also taken to imply a kind of simplicity, in the send of God not having parts. Therefore, God’s perfection becomes expressible as a single, unique perfection. This immutability is a common characterisation of taditional theology.
‘For I, the Lord, do not change’ (Malachai 3:6)
What does Aquinas detail the experience of living outside of time as?
- Imagines two people, one walking along a road, the other looking at the road from a hill above,
- The person on the road cannot see the people behind them, while the person on the hill can see everyone along the entirety of the road simultaneously.
Aquinas suggests thaty every moment of time is simultaneously present to an eternal being. God is perfectly aware of every event in every moment in time, which can therefore be said to be eternally present to God.
Why do modern theologians dispute the traditional eternal depiction of God?
- Nicholas Wolsterstorff suggests that the aforementioned traditional account contradicts the conception of God held by the ordinary believer and makes it difficult to understand how God could interact with his beloved creation,
- If God has a real relation to the temporal world, must also be temporal, as it is often maintained that anything that has a real relation to something temporal must itself be temporal.
What is the modern philosophical thought of God as everlasting?
The technical term used to express this idea is ‘sempiternal’, meaning that God is temporal, existing in time, yet without either beginning or end.
What is Boethius classic view on the eternal nature of God?
‘Eternity then, is the complete possession, all at once, of illimitable life.’
Boethius held that God is atemporal as eternal.
What four key points do Stump and Kretzmann identify in Boethius’ conception of eternity?
- Life - anything eternal has life, i.e. is living, this distinguishes God from the mere infinite existence of inanimate things (e.g. numbers or abstract entities),
- Illimitable - that which is eternal has neither beginning nor end, an eternal being exists beyond time’s constraints,
- Duration - its existence is of infinite duration,
- Simultaneity - that which is eternal possesses this illimitable life of infinite duration all at once. An eternal being experiences its entire existence at once, rather than sequentially.
This argument maintains that God’s eternity is these four aspects.
What criticism is made of against Boethius’ eternity?
Anthony Kenny expresses it as follows:
‘On St. Thomas’ view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again, on this view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.’
This argument relies on the assumed transitivity of simultaneity (if A => B and B => C, then A => C) and that the notion that two events at different moments in time are simultaneous is absurd.
What is the paradox of the stone?
- Bases itself on a certain notion of omnipotence: the ability to do anything,
- Ibn Rushd imagines the question: ‘Can God create a stone so large that He cannot move it?’,
- If God can create this stone, then there is something he cannot do; lift the stone,
- If God cannot create this stone, then there is also something that God cannot,
C1. In either case God is not omnipotent. This could suggest that omnipotence is an incoherent concept.
How does Mavrodes respond to the paradox of the stone?
Notes that there are two possibilities,
1. God is not omnipotent,
2. God is omnipotent.
If (1) is true, then the argument from the unliftable stone is irrelevant; a non-omnipotent being has things which it cannot do.
He clarifies (2). If (2) is true, then the question is: can a being of infinite power create something which even It could not lift. Mavrodes suggests that the self-contradiction here is within the stone not God. If God is truly omnipotent, then the phrase ‘a stone so heay that even an omnipotent being cannot lift it’ is a logical contradiction. This task is not a limitation on omnipotence, but a nonsensical task.
How does C.Wade Savage respond to Mavrodes defence against the paradox of the stone?
- Savage argues that the paradox of the stone is not trying to show that God is not omnipotent specifically, but that the very notion of an omnipotent being is incoherent, as logically inconsistent,
- Savage is saying that Mavrodes is making the conceptual mistake that we have indicated above. Mavrodes treats something as a logical contradiction when it actually isn’t. Instead, it is just something that seems impossible but isn’t truly self-contradictory. This mistake means that Mavrodes wrongly concludes that the thing in question is completely impossible.
What is Savage’s ‘version B’ of the argument?
Savage disputes the claim that if an omnipotent being X cannot create a stone it cannot lift, then there is something X cannot do. His reasoning is that the inability to create such a stone does not reflect a genuine limitation on omnipotence.
Savage presents a scenario involving two beings:
1. A, a stone creator, and,
2. B, a stone lifter.
If B is omnipotent, then no matter how heavy the stones A creates, B can always lift them. This does not limit A’s ability to create heavier and heavier stones. Savage suggests that this logic holds even if A and B are the same being.
Thus, the inability to create a stone that the being cannot lift is not a limitation but rather a reflection of the being’s omnipotence: it can always lift whatever it creates. The paradox collapses because it relies on an incoherent definition of omnipotence - one that demands an omnipotent being to limit itself in a contradictory way.
What are the two horns of the Euryphro dilemma?
- Everything which God does is moral, even if cruel and despicable,
- Everything which God does is good because it accords with an external source of moral authority,
What does Soren Kierkegaard say of the God’s nature, regarding morality?
Willing to accept that God could command seemingly cruel/vicious acts and that they would then be morally permissible. Kirkegaard puts forward the idea that moral values may be overruled by other values. He can be interpreted as suggesting that there is a higher or absolute value, known only by God, which is placed above all other values, including moral.
The will of God is above what we understand as the ethical or moral.
What is Plato’s ‘Form of the Good’?
The independent and objective existence, not dependent on our minds or mental activities, which would have existed in any case, unaltered in nature, if human beings had never existed, which is discoverable by reason.
Why is the second horn of the Euryphro dilemma problematic for theists?
It seems to suggest that morality, or the good, do not need God. Moral goodness, independent of God, would not require a notion of, or connection to, God or God’s will to be attainable or followed. It seems to undermine a potential basis for the worship of God, namely the status as author and source of morality.
What does the Euryphro dilemma’s second horn cause a contradiction of?
It seems to limit God’s power. If the Good is independent of God, then God cannot alter it. Hence the second horn could lead to a challenge to God’s omnipotence. Though we could return to Aquinas’ argument of sin and deficiency, etc.,
How does Aquinas respond to the problem of the second horn of Euryphro?
- Aquinas would maintain that as God has created the world, he has created it such that it, and everything in it, has a certain purpose, or function,
- As this could be considered characteristic of the world and everything in it, God cannot simply change the world to have another function,
- This would be self-contradictory, the function of the world being essential to it and so it is not a genuine limitation on God to suppose that he cannot change the world to have another moral nature. It would be akin to saying that God could create a world, and then go back and radically alter its beginning while still keeping it the same world, which we could argue is incoherent.
What is a fundamental issue with omniscience as argued by Anthony kenny?
The compatibility of God’s omniscience and free will.
Anthony Kenny puts forward the problem by asking whether the following two statements are compatible,
1. God knows beforehand everything that men will do,
2. Some actions of people are free.
If they are incompatible, then one must be false. To maintain the omniscience of God we would need to reject (2) and, therefore, free will. To maintain free will it is necessary to reject (1) and God’s omniscience.
What is the problem in accepting the non-existence of free will for christians?
If we accept that there is no free will, then that would leave God as the sole responsible being for all actions. In Christian tradition there is a judgement day, if I, lacking free will as I am, could not be responsible for my actions, I would be justified in feeling upset about the arrangement between myself and God.
C1. Contradiction between religious beliefs.
If God knew I would sin, and made me such that I would sin, then it seems difficult to place blame on me. On this account, God becomes quite literally responsible for the depravity and brutality that have plagued human history.
What is a possible response to the freewill-omniscience problem?
Kenny highlights Aquinas’ solution; that God is eternal and therefore outside of time.
If God is simultaneously conscious of past, present, and future, then there is no past/future in the sense, only the present. Aquinas maintains that human actions are not predetermined and that we therefore have free will, choosing freely to act as we do. At the same time, God is consciously aware of all we do, but this knowledge, being present knowledge, is not a constraint that forces us to do this action.
The key being that while God is conscious of all our actions, they do not lie in the future for God, as they do for us. Rather, in the gaze of God, they exist in the eternal present.
What is the main argument against the biblical understanding of God’s omnibenevolence?
The problem of evil and suffering. I.e. why does an all-loving God allow the suffering that befalls humans.
