Mind-Brain Identity Theory Flashcards
1
Q
What is the key claim of the identity theory?
A
That the mind is the brain, i.e. the mind is identical to the brain. Every mental state, property, process, or event is simply a state, property, process of event of, or in, the brain. Mental states are just neurological brain states.
2
Q
What is the difference between numerical and qualitative identity?
A
- Something is numerically identical to itself - i.e. I am numerically identical to myself as there is only one of myself,
- Qualitative identity is when two things have the same qualities, proper qualitative identity is between two numerically different thingsm
- By Leibniz’s law, if two things have the same properties, then they must be the same thing.
3
Q
Based off these definitions of identity, what is the mind-brain theorist arguing?
A
That everything that is true of the mind is also true of the brain, and vice versa; therefore the mind is numerically identical to the brain.
4
Q
How is this argument formulated?
A
- This not an a-priori, conceptual argument,
- This is put forward as an empirical hypothesis,
- This is not an analytical reduction, but rather an ontological reduction, in that it claims that the nature of one thing is, or can be understood correctly in terms of, the nature of some other thing,
- The reduction of the properties of one thing to the properties of another thing,
- It is not a reduction of a set of meanings of terms of concepts of our language to another group of terms or concepts.
5
Q
What is the scientific argument for identity theory?
A
- Science increasingly gives a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physiochemical mechanisms - J.J.C Smart,
- Becomes more apparent through observation, experiment, and theorising in neuroscience,
- We know from observation that certain parts of the brain have functions correlated to certain mental states, events, processes, and activities (e.g. Wernicke’s and Broca’s area and language production and comprehension).
6
Q
What is a nomological dangler?
A
Something that doesn’t fit into the physical laws that seem to govern the universe.
7
Q
How are nomological danglers used to argue for physicalism?
A
- Even if the dualist maintains their position whilst accepting that the mind is dependent on the brain, the dualist position is too complex or messy,
- it introduces too many irrelevant or unnecessary extra entities, notably extra substances or properties,
- The physicalist may, for example, using occam’s razor, and referring to evolutionary theory, question what value the supposition of the existence of mental substance or properties serve in the epiphenomenalist theory, if the mind is not causally efficacious,
- What value is there is supposing that there is this extra substance or type of property if it does not have any effects, so that we cannot test empirically for its presence and given that it makes no difference to the world?
8
Q
How could an identity theorist respond to this criticism from ordinary language?
A
- The identity theorist must then respond that what is important here is not the meaning that we attach in our minds to the terms or concepts ‘pain’ and ‘firing of C-fibres’, but rather the references of these terms,
- We cannot perform an analytical reduction, we can, however, perform an ontological reduction, so as long as the terms end up referring to the same thing,
- The identity theorist would be incorrect if, for some mental state, process, etc., there were some properties it had that the brain property did not, or vice-versa. In this example, C-fibres firing without pain or vice-versa.
8
Q
What criticisms do behaviourists make of identity theory, from ordinary language?
A
- It is confused to state that the mind is identical to the brain, because the terms ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ mean different things.
- In the case of the mind, this objection to the identity theory would be put as: when I say I am hungry/in pain/etc., does this mean that I am saying that my brain is in a certain state?
- With pain, we know from neuroscience that pain is correlated with the firing of electrical signals in what aare called the c-fibres of the brain, where these are nerve fibres responsible for pain,
- When I say that I am in pain, do I mean that my C-fibres are firing? It seems not. Indeed most people do not know what c-fibres are.
9
Q
What is Leibniz’s spatial argument?
A
- Use his thought experiment of going inside the brain,
- We would notice that mental states are non-spatial, therefore non-spatially located, unlike brain states, even a brain state that corresponds to the mental state.
10
Q
How does Putnam respond to the spatial argument?
A
- Acknowledges that it seems to be the case that for two things to be numerically the same thing, they must be in the same spatial location; but, the firing of C-fibres may be in the arm or foot, while the pain brain state is in the brain. So they cannot be the same,
2.Putnam gives the example of a mirror image that appears to be behind the mirror and the combination of the object, the light reflecting from it onto the mirror and then back to the eye, - Here, he claims, we have two phenomena: one is the mirror image, the other is the complex composed of: the object, the light reflected from it onto the mirror and then back to the eye,
- The reduction is of the mirror image to this second complex. We reduce the first to the second by explaining the first in terms of the second,
- Yet, while this is a legitimate reduction, they do not seem to be in the spatial location. Putnam is claiming that the first mirror image seems to be located behind the mirror, and that there is, therefore, a difference in location,
- If Putnam is right, then these mind-brain states could be these other physical states, despite not being in the same location.
11
Q
Responses to Putnam’s spatial argument/counter-example?
A
- The mirror image only appears to be spatially located somewhere else, but it is not,
- IF we maintain that it is only only apparently located somewhere elese, then the reduction would be possible,
- If we maintain that it really is spatially located somewhere else to what it can be reduced to, then we either must maintain with Putnam that we really can reduce things to other things in separate locations, or the objects are not the same.
11
Q
Dualist critique of identity theory?
A
- Introspection conveys sensations, feelings, emotions, imaginations, memories, intentions, beliefs, and desires, rather than structures made of neurons, synapses and the chemical and electrical activity between them,
- Further, introspection reveals subjectivity, intentionality, qualitative consciousness, and that these are clearly not physical,
- For the dualist, there remain key aspects, qualities, and functions of consciousness and experience that are not, and seemingly to them, cannot, be explained in terms of, and reduced to, physical objects, structures, and processes.
12
Q
How would an identity theorist respond to the dualist critique?
A
- The same thing can appear in different ways,
- We could again be taking appearances at too much face value. Therefore, we might, as identity theorists, argue that the mind and the brain are not only the same object, but referred to using terms with different meaning, but that the same object can appear as the brain, and also as the mind, so through empirical observation, or private introspection.
13
Q
How would the dualist, again, respond to the identity theorist?
A
- If the brain is the mind, then when we gain access to the brain through introspection, what is the self or subject that the brain appears to, as the mind, in this activity of introspection,
- As there is a screen, or representation, of conscious experiences to the mind, there must be a distinction between the mind and what is represented to it,
- If the brain somehow physically represents certain parts of its activity to itself, and that this is the self-consciousness of introspection, in which we are consciously aware of our own experiences, we can still ask how this representation becomes conscious.
