Functionalism (AI)

Question 1

Functionalism

Answer 1

All mental states can be characterised in terms of their functional roles, which can be realised in multiple ways across different systems.

Question 2

Inverted Qualia Objection

Answer 2

A being could have the same functional organisation as us but experience different qualia, suggesting functionalism doesn’t fully capture mental states.

Question 3

Ned Block’s China Thought Experiment

Answer 3

A hypothetical scenario where the entire population of China simulates the functional states of a single brain, but intuitively lacks consciousness, challenging functionalist accounts of mentality.

Question 4

Knowledge Argument Applied to Functionalism

Answer 4

Even complete knowledge of functional roles does not fully explain the subjective experience (qualia) of mental states, echoing Mary’s argument against physicalism.

Question 5

The Problem of Multiple Realisability

Answer 5

Functionalism argues that mental states can be realised in multiple ways across different systems (e.g., brains, machines, etc.), raising questions about the true nature of these states when realised differently.

Question 6

The Explanatory Gap

Answer 6

Functionalism struggles to explain how subjective experience (qualia) arises from functional roles. While functional states can be described, the gap between these roles and consciousness remains unclear.

Question 7

The “Chinese Room” Argument (John Searle)

Answer 7

Searle’s thought experiment argues that functionalism cannot account for true understanding or consciousness, as demonstrated by a person following rules to manipulate symbols in a way that appears as though they understand a language.

Question 8

Supervenience and Dependence on Physical Realisation

Answer 8

Critics argue that mental states, while described functionally, still depend on physical realisation. The mental may supervene on the physical, reintroducing physicalist elements into functionalism.

Question 9

The Turing Test and Functionalism

Answer 9

The Turing Test suggests that if a machine behaves intelligently like a human, it could be said to have mental states. However, this raises the question of whether machines can truly have consciousness or qualia, or just appear to.

Question 10

Challenge from Phenomenology

Answer 10

Phenomenology emphasises the lived experience of consciousness, challenging functionalism by asserting that functional descriptions alone cannot fully capture the first-person experience of being conscious.

Question 11

Multiple Realisability vs. Single Realisability

Answer 11

While mental states are said to be multiply realisable, some argue there must be a core, universal function or structure underlying all realisations of the same mental state, bridging the gap between flexibility and a unified theory of the mind.