Property Dualism (AI) Flashcards
Property Dualism
Mental properties are not reducible to or dependent upon physical properties, even if they arise from physical systems.
Philosophical Zombies Argument (Chalmers)
If it’s conceivable that beings physically identical to us lack consciousness (zombies), consciousness must be non-physical.
Response to Zombies Argument — Zombies Aren’t Conceivable
The idea of zombies is incoherent — true physical duplicates would necessarily have consciousness.
Response to Zombies Argument — Conceivable ≠ Metaphysically Possible
Imaginability does not guarantee metaphysical possibility.
Response to Zombies Argument — Possibility Tells Us Nothing About Reality
Even if zombies are metaphysically possible, this does not show that our consciousness is non-physical.
Knowledge/Mary Argument (Frank Jackson)
Mary learns all physical facts about colour vision but learns something new upon experiencing colour, suggesting physical facts aren’t enough to explain consciousness.
Response to Mary — Ability Knowledge
Mary gains a new skill or ability (e.g., recognising colours) rather than new propositional knowledge.
Response to Mary — Acquaintance Knowledge
Mary gains acquaintance with colour experiences rather than factual knowledge.
Response to Mary — New Knowledge / Old Fact
Mary learns an old fact in a new way, not new information. She gains new propositional knowledge of the same physical fact.
The Problem of Other Minds
If minds are non-physical and private, how can we ever know other minds exist?
Response — Argument from Analogy
Others behave as I do when feeling things, so it is reasonable to infer they also have minds.
Response — Best Hypothesis
The existence of other minds is the best explanation for observed behaviour.
Category Mistake (Gilbert Ryle)
Dualism wrongly treats the mind as a separate object rather than a way of describing mental processes.
Conceptual Interaction Problem (Princess Elisabeth)
How can a non-physical mind interact causally with a physical body if they are fundamentally different substances?
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states or events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not themselves cause anything.
Empirical Interaction Problem
No scientific evidence shows non-physical substances affecting the physical world.
Epiphenomenalism: Introspective Self-Knowledge Challenge
If mental states don’t cause anything, how can we know them through introspection?
Epiphenomenalism: Phenomenology Challenge
Our mental experiences seem to involve causal connections, which epiphenomenalism denies.
Epiphenomenalism: Evolutionary Challenge
If mental states have no causal role, natural selection would not favour them — yet conscious mental states exist.
What is the Explanatory Gap in the context of Property Dualism?
The explanatory gap suggests that there is a gap between physical explanations of brain processes and explanations of subjective experience (qualia). This gap indicates that physicalism cannot fully account for consciousness, supporting Property Dualism.
What is the Knowledge Argument (Mary’s Room) in support of Property Dualism?
The Knowledge Argument, proposed by Frank Jackson, argues that Mary, a color scientist who knows all physical facts but has never experienced color, gains new knowledge about consciousness after experiencing color, suggesting that mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
What is the Argument from Consciousness for Property Dualism?
The argument claims that consciousness itself (the quality of experience) cannot be explained by physical processes. Property Dualism asserts that consciousness is an additional, non-physical property that cannot be reduced to or supervenient upon brain processes.
What is the challenge of Causal Efficacy of Mental Properties in Property Dualism?
Mental states appear to have causal power over physical states. For example, decisions or intentions (mental properties) can cause physical actions. Property Dualism claims that mental properties play an active causal role that cannot be fully explained by physical properties alone.
How does Personal Identity support Property Dualism?
Property Dualism argues that our sense of personal identity over time is grounded in non-physical mental properties, rather than being reducible to physical brain processes, challenging physicalist explanations of identity.
