Eliminative Materialism

Question 1

What do eliminative materialists maintain in stark contrast to other physicalists?

Answer 1

1. Does not try to carry out reduction to physical, either analytically or ontologically,
2. Rejects this possibility, thinking that what is in fact needed is an elimination,
3. Thinks that mental terms as they are found and used in the folk-psychology that is frequently used are radically inadequate for scientific theory capable of describing, explaining, and predicting the nature of the mind and mental activity in any detail and therefore any words or concepts related to the mind or its functions should be eliminated, e.g. belief, pain, happy, etc.

Question 2

So what do eliminative materialists hold of mental states?

Answer 2

1. That certain mental states, as we understand them, do not exist,
2. That they are bad scientific concepts, in that they are not effective at performing the functions needed for effective science of description, explanation, and prediction,
3. They are similar to concepts like ‘bad air’ from the 1300s and the bubonic plague.

Question 3

What does the eliminative materialist advocate for?

Answer 3

Advocating for new ontologies. They believe that once neuroscience is sufficiently developed, this will be possible.

Question 4

Criticism from evidentiality of mental states?

Answer 4

1. We are quite certain of the existence of mental states,
2. Many would find it counterintuitive to suggest that our sensations of blue, desires, beliefs, subjectivity, intentionality, are mental states or properties that do not in fact exist,
3. Introspection seems to give us quite immediate and certain knowledge that these exist.
4. This argument is based on the certainty, indubitablity, or immediate evidence for the existence of such mental states and properties.

Question 5

How would an eliminative materialist respond to the criticism from evidentiality of mental states?

Answer 5

1. Could reject the idea that this apparent certainty is actually justified,
2. Perhaps certain claims to certainty are not to be taken too much at face value, e.g. ancient belief in geocentrism.

Question 6

What is a inherent problem with the argument of evidentiality of mental states?

Answer 6

They assume that we can really have direct, immediate, unmediated access to that which is being perceived or observed. Perhaps we think that folk psychology is obvious because we are raised and trained to think this way, socially as we are raised and educated.

Question 7

How can you respond to this inherent problem?

Answer 7

1, Might respond that mental states are not comparable to scientific development (e.g. geocentrism to heliocentrism),
2. The certainty we have in the case of mental states and properties is not the same as that which was claimed to be possessed in the previous, erroneous cases,
3. It might be thought that our introspective knowledge is different to such purported cases of supposedly certain but in fact erroneous knowledge,
4. Introspection could give us a direct, immediate, unmediated access to our mental states, and directly acquaint us with our qualia, subjectivity, intentionality, desires, beliefs, etc.

Question 8

How explanatory power be used against eliminative materialists?

Answer 8

1. We use folk psychology to predict and explain each other’s behaviours, often with great success,
2. Why would this be the case if folk psychology’s terms did not correspond to real physical states.

Question 9

How does Paul Churchland respond to the argument from explanatory power?

Answer 9

1. Admits that it does ‘enjoy a substantial amount of explanatory and predictive success’,
2. He still argues, however, that it is characterised by too many shortcomings and imperfections to be fully of use in effective, reliable explanation and prediction,
3. He argues that it fails to explain mental illness, how memory functions, or why sleep is necessary, as examples of clear imperfections or shortcomings.

Question 10

What is the criticism from communication and ordinary language against eliminative materialism?

Answer 10

Folk psychology seems far too useful and efficient in too many contexts of explanation and prediction of behaviour, communication, planning, etc., for it to be abandoned in practice.

Question 11

How does an eliminative materialist respond to the argument from ordinary language?

Answer 11

1. Might accept that some folk-psychology ideas and concepts could be partially preserved,
2. However, they may still maintain that the eliminativist position is correct in that some of these concepts will be abandoned in practice, or at least in effective scientific reasoning and theorising

Question 12

What is the self-refuting criticism of eliminative materialism?

Answer 12

1. If there are no such things as beliefs, thoughts, or knowledge states of mind, then how can the eliminativist think, believe, know their claims to be true,
2. If they genuinely believe it, it is self-refuting, and therefore meaningless

Question 13

How does Churchland respond to the self-refuting criticism?

Answer 13

1. Notes that this objection seems to presuppose the truth of the supporter of folk psychology, as it seems to presuppose those beliefs, thoughts and knowledge states do in fact exist or are notions which do or could refer to particular types of physical states,
2. He thinks that this objection is, itself, circular, and uses it circularity to show that the eliminativist is self-refuting.

Question 14

What example does Churchland use against the self-refuting criticism?

Answer 14

1. Gives the example of ‘vital spirits’,
2. These were a specific type of substance presumed historically to belong to or inhabit living beings, and only living beings,
3. They were taken to explain why certain things were alive and others were not,
4. The idea of vital spirits, along with the position of philosophy of biology known as vitalism, have long been widely rejected,
5. As Churchlands says ‘the anti-vitalist says that there is no such thing as vital spirir. But this claim is self-refuting… For if the claim is true, then the speaker does not have vital spirit and must be dead. But if he is dead, then his statement is a meaningless string of noises, devoid of meaning and truth.’

Question 15

How could respond to Churchland’s example?

Answer 15

1. The rejection that the eliminativist is making is not completely analogous to the rejection of vital spirits,
2. The eliminativist is making a more radical rejection, one that rejects the very meaningfulness of terms and concepts for mental states,
3. This is a rejection of the very idea of meaning as something possessed by expressions, thoughts, and beliefs. It is not just a rejection of the idea that certain beliefs are true, it is a rejection of the very idea that there are things like beliefs or thoughts which are meaningful in possessing meanings,
4. The eliminativist would have to give a very radically new set of neuroscientific concepts to replace those to do with meanings to ‘make sense’ of their rejection.