Physicalism and Philosophical behaviourism (AI) Flashcards
Physicalism
Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical, including properties, events, objects, and any substances that exist.
Hard Behaviourism (Carl Hempel)
All propositions about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions using only physical language to describe bodily states and movements.
Soft Behaviourism (Gilbert Ryle)
Propositions about mental states are actually propositions about behavioural dispositions, expressed in ordinary language rather than reduced to physical terms.
Dualist Arguments Against Behaviourism
Arguments from dualism (e.g. knowledge argument, zombies, conceivability) challenge the idea that mental states can be fully explained in behavioural or physical terms.
Distinctness of Mental States from Behaviour — Putnam’s Super-Spartans
A thought experiment where a community is trained to suppress all pain behaviour while still feeling pain, showing that mental states and outward behaviour are distinct.
Distinctness of Mental States from Behaviour — Perfect Actors
Actors can convincingly behave as though they are in a mental state they are not experiencing, showing behaviour does not always reveal genuine mental states.
Circularity Problem for Behaviourism
Definitions of mental states using behaviour often rely on other mental state terms, creating circular explanations.
Multiple Realisability Problem for Behaviourism
A single mental state can result in a wide variety of behaviours depending on the individual or species, which behaviourism struggles to account for.
Asymmetry Between Self-Knowledge and Other Minds
We have direct, immediate access to our own mental states but only indirect access to others’ mental states through observation, which behaviourism cannot easily explain.
What is the Problem of Mental Causation in physicalism?
The problem questions how mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires) can cause physical actions if everything physical is already causally determined. This raises concerns about how mental states fit into the causal structure of the physical world without violating causal closure.
What is epiphenomenalism in relation to physicalism?
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states are by-products of physical states with no causal effect on the physical world. This could be the result of reducing mental states to physical ones, raising concerns about the causal relevance of the mind.
What is the Problem of Intentionality in physicalism?
Intentionality refers to the property of mental states being about something (e.g., beliefs are about the world). Critics argue that it’s hard to explain how physical systems (like the brain) can generate this “aboutness” characteristic of mental states.
What is the Argument from the Explanatory Gap?
The explanatory gap argues that physical descriptions of brain processes fail to explain the qualitative nature of consciousness (what it feels like to experience a mental state), suggesting that physicalism cannot fully account for conscious experience.
What is the Knowledge Argument against physicalism?
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (via Mary the color scientist) suggests that even knowing all the physical facts about the brain does not give you knowledge of subjective experiences, implying that physicalism cannot fully explain conscious experience.
What is the Argument from Multiple Realisability?
The argument suggests that if mental states can be realized in different physical systems (e.g., different species or AI), they cannot be identical to specific physical states or behaviours. This challenges the idea that mental states are reducible to physical processes.
What is Functionalism in contrast to physicalism?
Functionalism claims that mental states are defined by their functional roles (what they do), rather than by their physical composition. This contrasts with physicalism, which argues that mental states are identical to physical brain states.
What is the Problem of Interpretation and Behaviour in philosophical behaviourism?
Philosophical behaviourism faces the issue of interpreting behaviour in a way that accurately captures mental states. Perfect actors who imitate mental states demonstrate that behaviour does not necessarily reflect the true nature of mental states, challenging the reduction of mind to behaviour.
What is the Problem of Mental Health in relation to physicalism?
The reduction of mental states to physical states or behaviour is problematic for understanding mental health, as many mental health conditions involve symptoms that cannot be fully explained by brain activity or observable behaviour alone.
