Cosmological Arguments Flashcards
What are cosmological arguments?
- Cosmological arguments are based on the supposition that the universe must have an explanation,
- If the uniververse has a cause, then it cannot be something in the universe, rather the cause cannot be internal,
- Furthermore, the argument goes, this cause must be God,
- Finally, the arguments hold that God does not need a distinct cause, because God is God’s own cause, and as such, is a being whose existence is necessary.
What can categorise cosmological arguments as being based on?
- Causation, change, motion: If a cosmological argument is based on causation or a causal principle, we tend to move from the proposition that things in the universe all have causes to the proposition that the universe has a cause. This supposed ‘first cause’ is called ‘God’,
- Contingency: in this context, ‘contingency’ means dependence on something. The arguments suppose that since the universe is contingent, it is dependent on something external to it for its existence.
What terms can we think of Cosmological arguments as, according to F.C.Coplestone?
- Horizontal: a horizontal cosmological argument is one which moves back through chains of causation between events in time until a ‘first cause’ is reached. The Kalam argument is a classic example,
- Vertical: a vertical cosmological argument traces causation of contingency up a chain of hierarchy of ontological dependency - i.e., what depends for its existence on what. We keep going up that hierarchy until we reach that upon which everything exists is dependent, that which created and sustains the universe.
What are primary and secondary movers, according to Plato?
- Primary movers have the power to move themselves and others,
- Secondary movers only have the power to move themselves or other if they themselves have been moved.
What is Aristotle’s ‘unmoved mover’ argument?
- The chain of movers and moved has no beginning. There is no unmoved mover,
- Therefore, there is nothingwhich caused the first thing to move; or the chain has come from nothing,
- But if nothing caused the first cause to move, then there would be no chain at all; the reason here, to clarify, is that Aristotle supposed that ‘The series must start with something, since nothing can come from nothing’,
- Yet there clearly is a chain. Contradiction,
- So, rejecting (2), there must be a first mover, the Unmoved Mover.
What is a syllogism?
A syllogism is a type of deductive argument with three components: a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion.
What is the Kalam argument?
- Everything with a beginning must have a cause,
- The universe has a beginning,
- Therefore, the universe must have a cause.
How does William Lane Craig make a further conclusion from the Kalam argument?
- The Kalam argument doesn’t, in fact, infer the existence of a God, in the full sense of the term. Just that there is a cause to the universe,
- Craig maintains that scientific explanation cannot provide a causal, mechanical explanation of the first cause. This cause must be a personal cause, as mechanical, causal causes couldn’t cause that which created mechanical, causal causes. This personal cause is called ‘God’,
- This argument relies on the assumption that the universe could not have existed for an infinite amount of time.
What is Aquinas’ first way?
A cosmological argument from motion/change, it has an a posteriori basis and can be formalsied as follows,
1. There can exist things in motion/state-of-change,
2. Nothing can move or change itself in an absolute sense,
3. If everything is a secondary mover, then there would be an infinite regress of movers,
4. Reductio ad absurdum - if (3) were true then there would be no primary movers, and thus no subsequent movers, which is false,
5. Therefore, there must be a primary mover, we call this being ‘God’.
What is an extended version of Aquinas’ first way?
- There exist some things which are in a state of change or motion,
- Motion is an alteration/’reduction’ of something potential to something actual,
- Something can be brought from potentiality to actuality by something already in actuality,
- Something cannot have a property both actually and potentially simultaneously,
- Therefore, if something is brought into actuality from potentiality by something, the latter must be different from that which changes. In order words, nothing can move or change itself,
- If everything was changed or moved by something else, then there would be an infinite regress chain of movers,
- By reductio, this is impossible, as there would be no prime movers, which is false,
- Therefore, there must be some unmoved mover, we call this ‘God’.
Natural objection to Aquinas’ first way?
- Challenge premise (3), whether it is always the case. It seems possible to produce a possibly unlimited number of cases in which this is not true for certain properties,
- William Rowe asks whether a plant that dies is itself brought to change from potentiality to the actuality of death by something that is already dead.
How can Aquinas’ second way be formalised?
- There is an order of efficient causes (as every event has an efficient cause),
- Nothing can be an efficient cause of itself,
- Suppose that this chain goes back infinitely. Therefore, there would be no prime/first/primary cause,
- Reduction: If (3) were true, then there would be no subsequent efficient causes, as something cannot come from nothing. This contradicts (1),
- Hence, (3) is false. Therefore, the chain of causes must have a first cause, the source of all efficient causes, which we call God.
What are Aristotle’s four types of causes?
- Material cause: Can be understood as the ‘stuff’ or ‘matter’ out of which something is made. For example, we could think of the bronze out of which a statue is made,
- Formal cause: This can be understood as the form, or structure, or blueprint according to which something is made. For example, this can be thought of as the shape, or mould the bronze is applied in making a statue,
- Efficient cause: This is the the principle that brings about the change. Can be understood in our example as the skill and activity of the sculptor,
- Final cause: This is the end, goal, purpose, function, or telos. This can be understand as the final statue, perhaps, adorning a plaza.
What criticism can be levied against both the first and second way?
- It is simply contradictory,
- Aquinas has stated both that nothing is the cause of itself, and that one thing is (God).
What is Aquinas’ third way?
- Things in the world are contingent,
- Suppose that everything is contingent. Therefore, Aquinas maintains, there was once a time when evything had passed out of existence,
- Reductio - if two were true, then there would nothing now,
- Conclusion 1 - therefore, not everything can be contingent, i.e there must be something necessary,
- Everything that is necessary, either has the cause of its necessity in itself or in something else,
- Suppose that every necessary being has the causes of its necessity outside of itself,
- Reductio - if (6) were true there would be no ultimate cause of necessity,
- C2: Therefore, there must exist a necessary being which causes and sustains all other necessary and contingent beings. We call this God.
What are the characteristics of a contingent being?
- Dependency - existence is dependent on other things,
- Finitude - it has come into existence and at some point of time will go out of existence,
- Modal contingency - it might have never existed.
What criticism of Aquinas’ third way does Mackie make?
God’s existence: It is not a legitimate inference from ‘everything at some point does not exist’ , and ‘at some point nothing exists’.
How can Descartes’ cosmological argument be summarised?
- I have an idea of God and I have a continuously sustained existence,
- In virtue of the principle of sufficient reason, the existence of the idea of God, and my continuously sustained existence need to be explained,
- I cannot be the cause of my idea of God, as I am an imperfect being, and the cause of this idea of a perfect being must itself be a perfect being,
- I cannot be the cause sustaining me at each moment of my continued existence,
- Therefore, the cause of both of these must be external to me,
- This cause must either be its own cause, or itself have a distinct thing as its cause,
- If it has another thing as its cause, then this must either be its own cause, or have yet another thing as its cause,
- Suppose that it has yet another distinct cause. Suppose it is so for every newly posited cause,
- This would lead to an infinite chain of distinct causes. Descartes argues that this cannot be the case,
- Therefore, there must be some ultimate cause,
- This ultimate cause must be its own cause,
- God is the only possible such being,
- Therefore, it is God who is the cause of my idea of Him, and the cause sustaining my continued existence.
What is the Cartesian circle criticism?
- Descartes claims that he can be certain of the existence of God as he has a clear and distinct idea of God,
- He then seems to claim, based on the existence of a benevolent God, that God would not deceive him when he thinks himself to be certain of particular truths in virtue of clear and distinct ideas,
- So, God exists because he has a clear and distinct idea of God, yet God is the cause of these clear and distinct ideas.
What is the principle of sufficient reason, according to Leibniz?
Leibniz understands the PRS to mean that any entity, property, or event in the universe is theoretically capable of being explained. I.e., we could theoretically, in principle, give an explanation for an object, property of an entity, or event, in terms of its causes.
In example, if I find my book torn to pieces and wet with something which strikes me as similar to saliva, I assume that there must be a reason or cause for it am liable to turn to my dogs disapprovingly.
‘No fact can ever be true or existent, no statement correct, unless there is a sufficient reason why things are as they are and not otherwise - even if in most cases we can’t know what the reason is.’
How can Leibniz’s proof of God be formalised?
- PSR - no fact can be the case (be true or existent) unless there is a sufficient reason which explains it,
- There are contingent facts,
- Contingent facts cannot be fully explained solely by other contingent facts,
- No single contingent fact, or set of contingent facts, can explain all other contingent facts,
- Therefore, the explanation of the set/series of all contingent facts cannot itself be a contingent fact,
- As a fact, it must be a necessary fact. We call that which exists because of this fact being true ‘God’.
How does Leibniz define contingent and necessary facts?
- A necessary truth is one for which the negation (i.e negation of P is ‘not-P’) is impossible or inconceivable, i.e. Leibniz thought that we could work out by pure reason that 5+4=9 can be reduced to 9=9, which is so obviously intuitively true that we do not require any further analysis,
- A contingent truth is one for which it is possible/conceivable that it could be false,
- Leibniz also thought that every contingent and necessary truth has some sufficient reason why it is the case.
What could be argued in terms of ‘brute fact’?
- May ask whether every event or object, physical or natural phenomenon in general, must have some cause,
- Might there not be physical entities, events or facts that are simply brute fact, in that they do not need a cause to exist?
- It has become more acceptable to maintain this position considering the advent of quantum mechanics, as it is possible to interpret the mathematical representations that it produces as indicating that some events do not, in fact, have causes or reasons.
What three approaches to infinite regression could be take?
- The cosmological argument is right, and infinite regression is wrong,
- Both are wrong, i.e. the universe is a brute fact,
- The cosmological argument is wrong, and infinite regression is right.
What does Russell argue of infinite regression?
Argues based on quantum mechanics, that it is perfectly conceivable, perhaps even likely, that there are events which have beginnings, but which do not have a cause.
What is Hume’s explanation of God criticism?
- God, in being introduced as first-cause/prime mover, is presented as a being not subject to the same conditions as other, normal beings,
- it is not subject to the same rules or conditions as the contingent, finite beings in the cosmos of which it is the ultimate cause,
- Hume maintains that we can still ask of this being ‘why God?’. Perhaps even if God were a self-causing or uncaused being, we could still ask why God exists?
- On the other hand, if we maintain that God is such a being that does not require explanations other than itself, then it could be asked why this does not apply to the universe itself.
What are the two notions of the causal principle?
- Related to the principle of sufficient reason and maintains that every event has a cause,
- Second is the more specialised notion of Descartes, maintaining that for every pair of cause-effect, the cause must have more or equal ‘reality’ or ‘power’ to its effect.
What does Hume argue of causation?
He has a ‘psychological’ interpretation of causation.
In that causation is never actually experienced, we just impose the concept of causation of the data from past experiences. He maintained that we observe multiple instances of an event occur, and that it is always, or tends to be, followed by another event of a certain type. We then project a relation of causation between events of the first type and events of the second type (i.e the event of me dropping an apple on the planet earth, and the event of an apple falling from a tree on planet earth).
How is Descartes ‘causes must have as much reality as their effects’ argument critiqued by Hume’s definition of causation?
Hume’s counterargument is that we cannot determine the cause of an idea purely through reason (a priori). Instead, we only know causes by observing what comes before an effect in experience. Since we have never observed what causes the idea of God, we cannot claim it must come from something equally perfect or infinite.
What is the fallacy of composition? How does this apply to the universe?
- If we think of the universe as the collection of all existent beings or events, then it would seem to assume that the universe is like these entities,
- Here we are committing a fallacy of composition, i.e., we are treating the collection, or totality, as if what applied to the components/elements applied to it also,
- Applied to the universe then, even if we accept that every object and event must have a cause, we can’t assume that the universe has a cause; it is not an object or event. As Hume would say ‘But the whole, you say, wants a cause’,
- The fallacy is simply that it is illegitimate to infer, from the fact that every member of a group has a property, that the group itself has the property.
