Task 8 - Cooperation Flashcards

1
Q

Game Theory

A

Analysis of interactions between rational agents

  • > each have two or more strategies available
  • assumes people gravitate towards rational solutions as they gain experience
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2
Q

Behavioral Game Theory

A

Study of how people actually behave in interactive situations

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3
Q

Trust Game

A

Someone gets 10$, gives a certain amount to trustee, whose money gets multiplied
-> observed how much money is invested (given) and how much money is given back

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4
Q

Outcomes of Trust Game

A

Western: gave half, got 95% of invested amount back
Kenya: investment lower, return also much less than initial investment (50%)
-> possible reason: more insecure economy

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5
Q

Ultimatum Game

A

Two participants bargain over amount of money (e.g. 10$)

  • > proposer has to offer some proportion of money to responder
  • > if responder accepts offer: they get to keep it, proposer keeps rest
  • > if responder rejects offer, neither party gets to keep money
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6
Q

Outcomes of Ultimatum Game

A

Prediction of analytical game theory: responder accepts any amount, minimum amount proposed

  • > actual results: median offers: 40-50% of money
    mean: 30-40%
  • > offers of 40-50% accepted, below 20% rejected half of time
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7
Q

Prisoner’s Dilemma

A

Game situation:

  • two people arrested, can’t communicate,
  • no one confesses: both get less than 1 year
  • one snitches: no prison, but the other 10
  • both snitch: both get 5
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8
Q

Nash Equilibrium

A

Combination of strategies where it makes no sense for one player to deviate from his strategy
-> e.g. joint defection in prisoner’s dilemma

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9
Q

Public Goods Game

A

Resource allocation task;

  • individuals given endowment, then given option to contribute some, all, or none of it to a pool of resources
  • > after round: whats in pool of resources increased
  • collectively rational: contribute
  • individually rational: withhold contributions
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10
Q

Guessing Game

A

Pick number assumed to be average from what all participants would choose from 0-100, then half of that

  • > expectations chosen, then taking half of it
  • > level k-thinking
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11
Q

Tit for tat

A

Cooperation strategy:

starting off with cooperation, then always copying the others moves

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12
Q

Tit for two tat

A

Cooperation strategy;

starting off with cooperation, the copying others moves but always forgiving once

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13
Q

Tit for tat +1

A

Cooperation strategy;

starting off with cooperation, forgiving the first time you are defected, after that always copying what the other did

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14
Q

Values affecting behavior in social dilemma:

A
Social value orientation:
-prosocial
-individualist
-competitors
Counterfactual thinking
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15
Q

Prosocial value orientation

A

Want to maximize joint gain and equality in outcomes

-associated with secure attachment style and more siblings

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16
Q

Individualist value orientation

A

Interested only in maximizing own gains

17
Q

Competitors

A

Want to maximize relative gain

-> difference between own’s and other’s outcome

18
Q

Upward counterfactual thinking

A

“it could have been better”

  • > more cooperative behavior in second half of game
  • > mostly by prosocial people, least by competitive people
19
Q

Downward counterfactual thinking

A

“it could have been worse”

-> associated with more defective behavior in second half

20
Q

Social dilemma values acquisition

A
Often learned;
e.g. economic majors more likely to free-ride, astonomy class showed greater honesty
21
Q

Trust

A

Willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about another’s behavior

  • > cooperation possibly increased when trust is increased
  • > trust more likely with good reputation
22
Q

Generosity

A

Breaking down of cooperation by noise can be avoided with generosity

23
Q

Noise

A

Erroneous responses in game

e. g. defecting by accident
- > can lead to never-ending cycle of retaliaiton

24
Q

Communication

A

Can eliminate detrimental effects of noise on cooperation

  • > with communication as much trust from low trusters as high trusters after noise
  • > better communication: better cooperation
25
Q

Emotions

A

Psychological states comprised of multiple related processes:

  • cognitive appraisals,
  • physiological responses
  • behavioral action tendencies
  • phenomenological experience of feelings
26
Q

Appraisal Theory

A

Emotions as adaptive responses based on appraisal of situation

  • > appraisals related to motivational goals of agent
  • > appraisals as cognitive antecedents to experience of emotion
27
Q

Guilt in social dilemmas

A

Can encourage trust and cooperation in social interactions

-guilt aversion: belief-dependent guilt enables cooperation

28
Q

Value and emotional interplay in cooperation

A

Players want to maximize material payoffs and minimize aversive psychological payoffs (e.g. disappointing a partner)

29
Q

Anger in social dilemmas

A

Feelings of anger motivate decisions to punish a transgressor

30
Q

Greed and Economics Education

A

Economics education consistently associated with positive attitudes towards greed

31
Q

Dictator Game

A

“Dictator” determines how to split endowment between him and second player
-> recipient has no influence over outcome of the game

32
Q

Right DLPFC

A
when inhibited (TMS): more acceptance of unfair offers
-> only acceptance impacted
33
Q

vmPFC

A

lesions: rejection of ultimatum game offers more frequently

- > responsible for perceived weight of not accepting

34
Q

Caudate nucleus

A

Active when learning about outcomes

35
Q

Oxytocin

A

Dampens amygdala activity

-increases trust