Substance Dualism Flashcards
substance dualism
claims that mind and body are two distinct substances and that the mind is distinctly an ontological substance
substance dualisms claims
there are 2 types of substances
mental substances
physical substances
- dualists deny that the mind is the same thing as the brain, and argue that the mind is made of a completely different substance
- minds are distinct from substances, they aren’t part of bodies because they’re substances they can’t be part of bodies either
descartes indivisibility argument
- argues that if mental substances exist they dont have parts or exist in space
1. the mind and body have different properties
2. if mind and body were the same thing, they’d have the same properties
3. therefore, mind and body aren’t the same thing
objection: the mental is divisible in some sense (1)
- descartes claims that we will think with the whole of out mind not a literal part, however
- mental illnesses such as multiple personality syndrome suggest that the mind can be divided, someone has 1 body but many different personalities within their mind that act in different ways
response to obj 1
saying the mind is divisible is like saying the body is divisible, bodies are spatially divisible, minds are only functionally divisible the different parts of the mind do different things but not in different places, therefore mind and body are only different because they have different properties
objection: the mental is divisible in some sense (2)
patients with epilepsy have their corups callosum removed - the link between right and left hemispheres - the mind can be divided and that two distinct consciousnesses could be housed in the same brain
response to obj 2
something physical might have got in the way of mind+brain, the mind is telling the brain what to do but it doesn’t because of a physical interuputtion if this works then descartes fails
objection: not everything thought of as physical is divsible
descartes says that extension is the essential property of physical objectsm they must all have this to qualify as physical objects in the first place
- argues what is extended can be divisible
- if you cut something up you could always cut it up into smaller pieces, the implication is that physical objects are infinitely divisible
- if its possible to reach a point where physical matter becomes indivisible, then not everything that is divisible is non-physical
- it is possible that the mind is the same kind of substance as the body, just an indivisible form of the same substance
reply to not everything thought of as physical is divisble
we can still conceive of things being halved, theres no logical limit and logical is what he’s after anyway
RESPONSE: not sufficient enough to establish that the mind is not physical
Descartes conceivability
P1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended
P2. I have a clear and distinct idea of body as something that is extended and does not think
P3. If i have a clear and distinct thought of something, God can create it in a way that corresponds to my thought
C1. Therefore, God can create mind as something that thinks and isn’t extended and body is something that is extended and doesn’t think
C2. Therefore mind and body can exist independently of one another
C3. Therefore, mind and body are two distinct substances
Mind without body is not conceivable
- challenge p1
- Can we conceive of mind and body as seperate substances that we can conceive of mind existing without body, clearly and distinctly?
- He assumes he can identify what it is like to think from introspection, but this doesn’t tell us the nature of it
- Descartes may be confused or lack relevant information
- BEHAVIOURISM argues that the mind should be understood in terms of behaviour
- Without a body, you cant exhibit behaviour and without behaviour there is no mind
- If this theory is correct then once we’ve understood what we mean when we talk about the mind, then we will realise that mind without body is inconceivable
What is conceivable may not be meta-physically possible
- suppose we can conceive of mind and body as distinct substances
- Just because we can, doesn’t mean that our minds and bodies really could be distinct substances
- Perhaps to exist at all minds must depend on bodies in some way that we don’t know about
- Logical possibility: what is possible given the meanings of the words we use and the definitions of our concepts
- Meta-physical possibility: what is possible given the real nature and real identity and essence of things
- Splitting up water and H2O is never meta-physically possible
- Assume “conceivable” means logically possible, then what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
Response to what is conceivable may not be meta-physically possible
what is conceivable to be clear and distinct must be meta-physically possible, because the c+d of our conception is gods sign to us that what we conceive is indeed metaphysically possible
WHAT IS METAPHYSICALLY POSSIBLE TELLS US NOTHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL WORLD
- even if we still accept that the mind without body is possible, we can still reject the conclusion that substance dualism is true
- Just because something is possible, it doesn’t mean it actually tells us anything about reality
- Even if it’s possibility that mind and body are seperate substances, this doesn’t show that my mind and body are seperate substances in reality
- It’s equally possible mind and body are the same substance
