Eliminative Materialism

Question 1

what type of theory is eliminative materialism

Answer 1

physicalist ->

Question 2

eliminative materialism

Answer 2

some or all common-sense mental states/properties do not exist and our common sense understanding is radically mistaken

Question 3

what do eliminative materialists claim about mental states

Answer 3

• definitions + misleading and don’t refer to anything that actually exists

Question 4

folk-psychology

Answer 4

refers to our everyday understanding and explanation of mind and behaviour based on mental experiences and states compromise an empirical theory

Question 5

Patricia Churchland

Answer 5

• argues that some concepts of mental properties may not survive the process of being reduced to concepts of neuroscience
• argues the way we think about the mind may be completely changed as neuroscience progresses
• this is because the process has not yet been completed, can’t predict how they will be changed
• reduction is likely to take a while because the brain is extremely complex
• to bridge the gap between the relativity of tiny particles and short periods of time, cognitive science needs to work alongside neuroscience

Question 6

Paul Churchland

Answer 6

• folk-psychology is our common sense view of mental life
• if you are thirsty you search for water -> common sense
• we do this by referring to people desires, beliefs and emotions (FP is an empirical theory)
• if folk-psychology is false, then concepts such as belief and emotion refer to nothing at all that exists
• push reduction as far as elimination because they get in the way of the best explanation and don’t actually contribute anything

Question 7

3 reasons why elimination will happen

Answer 7

1. folk-psychology can’t explain key aspects of mental life, mental illness ect.
2. folk psychology has no progressed
3. folk psychology doesn’t fit with the rest of science

Question 8

obj 1: our certainty about mental states takes priority over other considerations

against em

Answer 8

• eliminative materialism is very counter intuitive
• when descartes said ‘i think’ to be his first certainty he had good reason to do so, becayse what could seem more obvious than the fact ‘i have mental states’

Question 9

seemingly obvious isn’t reliable

reply to obj 1:

for folk-psych

Answer 9

• “seemingly obvious” is not a reliable guide to truth
• something being obvious doesn’t equal it being necessarily true , what seems obvious is always a problematic history of ideas
• descartes took it that there can be no thoughts without a thinker, so he was certain he was a thinking substance
• and yet there are good reasons to believe that there are no substances whose essence is to think
• my mental states may noy be what they appear to be, what is ‘obvious’ doesn’t categorically establish anythingreplt

Question 10

objection misunderstands the claim

reply 2 to obj 1:

for folk-psych

Answer 10

• the objection misunderstands the claim, in that the claim is not about the existence of phenomena, but rather the truth of one particular explanation to those phenomena
• its not saying we need to eliminate mental stats, but eliminate the concept of them, we need to re-understand mental states because they aren’t what we thought they were
• EM doesn’t deny the existence of psychological phenomena
• accepts that the phenomena we conceptualise as thinking occurs when we experience pain
• thinking is not defined by intentionality, as folk-psychology misunderstands and pain is not a matter of qualia, claiming neuroscience will provide the correct account of what these are -> revolution of our mental concepts
• all we can be certain of is the existence of the phenomena we want to explain
• !! appealing beliefs and desires is not appealing to the phenomena, but rather a particular explanation of them
• if fp is false then this should be rejected

Question 11

defending folk psychology =

Answer 11

-> attacking eliminative materialism

Question 12

obj 2: folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power

for folk-psych

Answer 12

• some have criticised folk-psychology for its explanatory powers concerning mental illness -> being disrespectful for eliminating concepts like abuse and ptsd
• however this can be objected to as it is unfair, because fp is not intended to be a thoery of these aspects of mental life, so its not criticism that it doesn’t explain them -> its only intended to explain human action to which it is very successful in
• if i know what you want/believe i can predict if you will study hard for your exams, by contrast neuroscience is useless at this
• we don’t have good reason to think that folk psychological concepts and concepts of intentionality will be eliminated as neuroscience develops
• can accepts from fp that we should only retain concepts that are part of the most explanatory theory, but argue that fp is part of that theory
• the hypothesis that we have intentional mental states remains the best hypothesis for explaining human bheaviour and won’t be replaced in favour of a neuroscientific theory that eliminates intentionality

Question 13

response to obj 2

from EM

Answer 13

• these objections aren’t very strong
• we need to know how human action and behaviour relate to the rest of mental life
• the developments in fp are relatively superficial and are far less powerful than other science, the best way to approach the issue is neuroscience

Question 14

obj 3: the articulation of em as a theory is self-refuting

Answer 14

• (no such thing as beliefs, yet you believe in this theory)
• folk-psychology claims that our common sense and mental concepts comprise an empirical theory
• this is why we can think about proving that it is false and eliminating its concepts in light of scientific process
• however there is good reason to suppose this is a misunderstanding about folk psychology
• em presents arguments, which are expressions of beliefs about what words mean and how reasoning works in order to change our beliefs about folk psychology
• but em claims that there are no beliefs!
• if thats true then all of em’s arguments are meaningless now

Question 15

reply to obj 3

Answer 15

• pre-supposes that the correct theory of meaning is the one that folk psychology gives
• the latter claim isn’t self-refuting, it’s just right
• it claims that we need a new theory of what it means to assert or claim an argument