property dualism Flashcards
property dualism
- the view that mental properties are properties that do not supervene on physical properties in the way that physicalism claims
- they are a fundementally different kind of property from physical substances
- it defends the claim for phenomenal properties of consciousness
phenomenal properties
properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiental quality, and which are appreheneded in phenomenal consciousness
- the feeling of joy can’t be reduced to physical, behavioural or functional properies, they are completely new
the knowledge argument for property dualism: jackson
p1. mary knows all the physical facts about seeing colours before being released from her black-and-white room
p2. on being released, she learns new facts about seeing colours
p3. therefore, not all facts are physical facts
p4. therefore phenomenal properties are non-physical and physicalism is false
response 1: mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge
(objections but aqa calls them responses)
- mary doesn’t gain knowledge
- she doesn’t gain knowledge that red looks like this
- knowledge to do with ‘that’ is propositional and this is not what mary gains
- she gains ‘know-how’ which is ability knowledge
- she has the ability to recognise red and knows how to apply red which she wasn’t able to do until she saw red for the first time
- knowledge argument fails !
- ## failed to establish that there are facts about mental properties that are neither reducible nor supervenient upon physical properties: these are needed to establish dualism
reply to ability knowledge
- ability knowledge brings propositional knowledge with it too
- suppose mary wonders if what she sees as red is the same as what its like for others to see red
- she isnt wondering about her abilities to imagine and recognise red, she is wondering about the truth of a proposition
- mary gains ability knowledge but that brings with it some propositional knowledge of a new fact
(interjections; seeing doesn’t guarentee imagining, not entirely sufficient)
response 2: mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge
- acquaintance knowledge is the direct awareness of something
- according to this argument, to see red is a direct apprehension of red
- suppose what it is like to see red is a physical property of the visual experience (the phenomenal properties of what it is like to see red is as a property of the brain- MBTIT)
- shes not directly acquantied with it
- when she sees red she becomes acquainted with it, gains knowledge but not a new fact
PAT CHURCHLAND: neuroscience describes the brain processes involved in undergoing the experiences of seeing red, but knowing all the neuroscience of what its like to actually experience red doesn’t help mary
- this fact does not entail there is something wrong with the theory, nothig in addition to the physical processes is needed or occurs
reply to acquaintance knowledge
- AQK response misunderstands the argument in that the knowledge argument isn’t about marys experience but rather other peoples
- p1. mary (pre-release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people when they see colour
- p2. mary does not know everything there is to know about other people when they see colour
- c1. therefore, there are truths about other people when they see colour which escape the physicalisys story
- mary didn’t know everything about other peoples experiences, even though she knew everything about their physical experiences, she doesn’t know what it’s like for anyone to experience red -> this is a fact about experiences that mary doesn’t know
response 3: mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (new knowledge/old fact)
- if there are two concepts for the same thing, then there are two facts for each situation involving that thing
- before leaving the room, mary has a concept of red in physical terms in contrast to the phenomenal concept of red
- a phenomenal concept of something is the concept by which we recognise something when we experience it
- mary doesn’t have this phenomenal concept
response 3: water example
- if i know there is water in the glass, is that the same as knowing there is H2O in that glass? NO.
- because someone may know one of these truths without knowing the other, someone can have the concept of water without having the concept of H2O or someone might have both and not know they’re the same thing
- we can say to know there’s water in a glass and to know theres H2O in a glass is to know 2 different facts
- if we use the word fact in this way, then we’re counting facts in terms of concepts if there are two concepts for the same thing then there are 2 facts
reply to response 3
- mary actually does gain the phenomenal concept of red, so kind of does gain knowledge of a new fact
- when mary leaves the room she accquires the phenomenal concept of red for the first time, she can now think of red in a new way, in terms of what it is like to see it
- before she left the room she couldn’t because she didn’t have the phenomenal concept
- we can insist the phenomenal concept is the same thing as her physical concept
- to know what it is like to see red we need to have the phenomenal concept of red which we can only gain by experience
- so she does gain a new fact, only in the sense of the fact that relates to concepts
possible worlds
a way of talking about how things could be, a proposition that is true describes the actual world and a proposition that is false describes the way things are no
- a false proposition can be necessarily false or contingently false
- necessarily = cannot be true, is impossible
- contingently = a way things could be
- in different posisble worlds difeent things exist
metaphysically possible worlds
a world which has all the physical properties of our world, but none of the phenomenal propeties possessed by at least some mental states in our actual world
- if phenomenal properties are identical to physical ones, it would be impossible for something to have the same physical property and not phenomenal
philosophical zombie
an exact duplicate of a person, but wihtout any experiential phenomenal consciousness
chalmers zombie argument
p1. it is conceivable that there are zombies
p2. if it is conceivable that there are zombies, its metaphysically possible that there are zombies
c1. therefore it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies
p3. if it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties
c2. therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supercebe on physical properties
c3. therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true
response 1: a philosophical zombie is not conceivable
- we can conceive of beings that have the same physical properties as us but dont have consciousness
- When we think of physical properties, this doesnt determine what we must think of consciousness
- But when we think of something such as 2x5, it does determine what we must think of consciousness
- Is inconceivable that 2x5 is anything other than 10
- DESCARTES: it does not seem inconceivable that there could be a being with ideantical physical properties to you, yet lacking in consciousness
