Mind-brain Type Identity Theory

Question 1

mind-brain type identity theory

Answer 1

all mental-states are identical to brain states (ontological reduction) although mental state and brain state are not synonymous (so not an analytic reduction)

Question 2

the issue with providing type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states): MAIN CLAIM

Answer 2

• argues that mental properties are not identical to physical properties because the same mental properties are not identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be related to or supervene on different physical properties

Question 3

descartes indivisability argument applied to MBTIT

Answer 3

• the mind cannot be identical to the brain because the mind is not divisible while the brain is
  -> message churchill

Question 4

descartes conceivability agrument applied to MBTIT

Answer 4

p1. it is conceivable that, for any type of mental state, someone has a particular type of mental state without having the brain state with which, the identity theory claims, it is identical
p2. what is conceivable is metaphysically possible
c1. therefore, it is metaphysically possible that for any type of mental state, it can exist in the absence of the brain state with which the identity theory claims it is identical
p3. if one thing can exist in the absence of a second thing, they are not the same thing
c2. therefore, mental states cannot be brain states

Question 5

argument for MBTIT: Ockham’s razor

Answer 5

“entities should not be multiplied without necessity”
- if there are no compelling arguments for dualism, we should reject the notion of distinct, non-physical substances or properties because they are not the simplest explanation
- this explanation doesn’t assert the existence of a completely new type of thing, such as mental substance or non physical mental properties
- we can explain everything that needs explaining just using what we already know to exist, namely physical substance and the brain

Question 6

the issue with providing type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states): premise form

Answer 6

p1. it is inconceivable, and therefore possible for a being with a different physical constitution from us to have the same thoughts or sensations
p2. but it is inconceivable and therefore impossible for something to both have and not have a certain property
c1. therefore, mental properties can’t be the same as physical properties

Question 7

response from MTIT to the multiple realisability of mental states

Answer 7

• we should talk specifically about human pain, not just pain
• human pain is a different mental property from dog pain
• similarly we should talk about specifically, human thoughts not just thoughts, so that we can differentiate them from other kinds of thoughts