functionalism

Question 1

functionalism

Answer 1

all mental-states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised

Question 2

qualia

Answer 2

phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-intentional properties of mental states

Question 3

causal role functionalism

Answer 3

interprets a function as the role played in a network of causes and effects

Question 4

machine-table functionalism

Answer 4

interprets function in terms of a machine that lists a series of conditional statements linking inputs, states and outputs

Question 5

consequence of qualia

Answer 5

some people argue that phenomenal properties are qualia, if they are functionalism cannot be a complete theory of the mind as qualia are non functional properties

Question 6

the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)

Answer 6

• we can show that phenomenal properties cannot be understood just in terms of their functions if we can show that it is possible for two people to have states with identical functions but different phenomenal properties
• both have grown up in the same linguistic community, use red to describe tomatoes and green to describe grass&raquo_space; but the particular wat that tomatoes seem to me is the way that grass seems to you
• functionally, we are identical, yet we have different colour experiences
• they are functionally identical, both are caused by the same in puts and cause the same outputs (saying the grass is green) but are not identical in terms of intrinsic properties, they refer to different qualia
• therefore functionalism is false because different qualia should be impossible

Question 7

Patricia Churchland’s response to the inverted qualia objection

Answer 7

• responds on behalf of functionalism
• although differences are very small, it’s because the causal relations of phenomenal properties are very complex
• have no reason to think that qualia can be inverted in the way the thought experiment describes it
• empirically isn’t possible to invert qualia without a functional difference
• if the thought experiment were to be scientific it would be classed as poor, because it claims there could be empirical differences that are undetectable

Question 8

the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality: Ned Block

Answer 8

• describes a set-up that is functionally identical to a mind but is clearly not the same thing
• the argument comes from machine-table functionalism
• imagine there is a complete functional description of all human states, and every human body is hooked up to the entire population of China
• every person in China is linked up to other people via two way radios and communicate according to the rules set out in the complete functional description of human mental states described earlier
• some people are linked to the outputs, if the Chinese population recreated the functions of neurons, the input would lead exactly to the output and everything would be functionally identical
• so functionalism is false

Question 9

response to Ned Blocks China Brain

Answer 9

• according to functionalism the China brain would be in pain if stabbed
• however this is incorrect
• just because the example of china pain is functionally identical to human pain doesn’t mean the china brain is really in pain
• so functionalism is false as there’s clearly more to mental states than just their function

Question 10

the knowledge/mary argument can be applied to functional facts

Answer 10

-functionalism claims that phenomenal properties are functional properties
- when jackson says that mary knows all the physical facts, he includes the functional facts
- mary knows exactly how the brain functions during an experience of seeing red
- but knowledge argument is meant to show that mary doesn’t know all there is about such an experience
- PP are not just functional properties
- functionalism is wrong