issues for dualism Flashcards
the problem of other minds
- how can we know there are other mind aside our own?
- we each experience our minds directly, our knowledge of other peoples is very different, we can’t experience other peoples mental states
- all we have to go off is their behaviours expressed through their bodies
- if minds and bodies are independent, then how can i infer from seeing a body that there is a mind attachment
- the two things exist independently of one another, other people could be pre-programmed machines with no mind, how would i know otherwise?
response to problem of other minds: argument from analogy
- claims that we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds too
p1. i have a mind
p2. i know from experience that my mental states cause similar behaviour
p3. other people have bodies similar to mind and behave similarly to me in similar situations
c1. therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the sae type of cause as my behaviour, namely mental states
c2. therefore other people have minds
reply to analogy
- argument from common sense, however can object this
- the conclusion of having other minds is based a single case, you can’t generalise it from one case because it could be a special case
existence of other minds is the best hypothesis response
- i can’t prove the existence of other minds, but it remains the best hypothesis for explaining the behaviour i see
- its better than claiming that people are machines without minds
reply to best hypothesis
- how does the mind interact with the physical, we’ve already seen that this causes major problems for substance dualism
dualism makes a category mistake (ryle)
- cartesian dualism claims that mind and body are different substances and that just as there are physical properties and processes, so there are mental properties and processes
- ryle says this is a mistaken understanding
- example: see buildings,lecutres, students: where is the university?, the concept of university has been misunderstood
- substance dualism makes the mistake of thinking the mind is like the body
- mistake is to think mental and physical concepts work in the same way, to have a mind is not to be in possesion of a thing, so mind and body are 2 things
issue for interactionist facing dualism: the conceptual interaction problem, princess of Bohemia
objection proposed in terms of pushing and movement
p1. physical things only move if they are pushed
p2. only something that us extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force
p3. but the mind had no extension
c1. therefore, the mind cannot move the body
descartes reply, this isnt an accurate understanding of how things are moved
- things fall because of their weight, but that weight doesn’t push the thing down, weight is a result of the force gravity puts on the mass of an objectm and gravity is a force of attraction that operates without needing contact between two physical objects
reply to princess of Bohemia
- fails to address if the mind is entirely non-physical, then how can it generate the force required to move things in the physical world
p1. the movement of a physical object is only initiated by a physical force, exterted at some point in space
p2. if substance dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert any physical force
c1. therefore if substance dualism is true, the mind cannot cause any physical object to move
c2. therefore either SD is true or the mind cannot cause the body to move
princess adds an additional later claim
p3. the mind can cause the body to move
c3. therefore, substance dualism is false
the empirical interaction problem
p1. if the mind, as a non-physical substance, moved the body, the total amount of energy in the universe would increase
p2. if the total amount of energy in the universe increased, the law of conservation energy would not apply to the universe, and the universe is not a closed system
c1. therefore, if the mind moved the body, the law of conservation energy would not apply to the universe and the universe is not a closed system
c2. therefore, because the mind which changes the physical energy in the universe, is not itself physical, physics cannot give us the complete account of physical energy in the universe
physics doesn’t tell us everything about what exists, physicis is WRONG to thunk that physical movement can only be caused by a physical cause
issues for epiphenomenalist dualism: challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
- Outlined earlier that “we gave reasons to think that if mental states don’t cause anything, even other mental states, then this threat ends the knowledge of our own mental states”
- According to epiphenomenalism, my belief that i am in pain is caused not by the pain, but by some brain states, so if that brain state occurs i would have the belief that i am in pain whatever i actually feel
- Our self-knowledge is gained through introspection, seems to tell us very clearly that we’re experiencing certain phenomenal properties -> which leads us to believing we are experiencing that specific state at the time
- But that involves our phenomenal properties causing us to believe it
- But epiphenomenalist property dualism denies this, because it is committed to the view that phenomenal properties don’t cause anything at all
- This is the issue
Reply to introspective self-knowledge
- epiphenomenalists argue that the knowledge of something doesn’t always require that thing to cause ones belief
- I can know that i’m in pain without the painful experience causing this knowledge (?)
- Suppose that the brain state that causes my belief that i’m in pain is the same brain state that causes my pain
- In this case, I wouldn’t have the belief that i am in pain unless i was in pain, - the same brain state causes both
- Even though my belief that i am in pain isn’t caused by a painful experience, i can know i am in pain because my belief is caused by a reliable mechanism (reliability)
THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OUR MENTAL LIFE -> EPIPHENOMENALIST PROPERTY DUALISM IS VERY COUNTER-INTUITIVE
- It is part of our experience and mental states that they cause other mental and physical states and events
- More obviously, can cause our behaviour and can be part of a causal mental process
- The property of how pain feels is causing several other mental and physical events, such as being miserable and reaching for painkillers
- The phenomenology of our life strongly suggests that epiphenomenalist property dualism is wrong
Reply to counter intuitiveness
- for Chalmers, it is only epiphenomenal properties of consciousness that are epiphenomenal
- We can say that beliefs and desires have causal powers, since we can analyses these states in terms of physical properties and functions
- However, the feeling of pain is counter-intuitive
THE CHALLENGE POSED BY NATURAL SELECTION/EVOLUTION
- property dualist believes that mental properties are properties of physical objects, namely certain living creatures
- Suppose Darwins theory of evolution by natural selection is true
- -> suggests the millions of genetic alterations randomly take place, some disappear and some help the creature survive and reproduce slowly -> more reproduce so more creatures end up with them
- According to Darwin, the traits that evolve over time are ones that causally contribute to the survival and reproduction of the creature
- We can assume that mental properties, such as qualia, also evolved - but how so if they make no different to what creatures do and whether they survive and reproduce
- Unfortunately, epiphenomenalism conflicts with our best account of the origin of consciousness
Jacksons reply to evolution
- evolution is more complex than suggested
- Many traits that evolved, that don’t contribute to the survival / these traits are by-products of traits that do contribute
- Polar bears have thick warm coats, a warm coat is also a heavy coat -> but a ‘heavy coat’ doesn’t contribute to the polar bears survival, it actually just makes the polar bear slower
- But this is better than having a thinner/lighter coat
- Likewise -> there are brain processes that make a difference to how a creature behaves which are very conductive to survival
- Consciousness, according to epiphenomenalism is simply a by-product of these brain processes, just happens to be a law of nature that these physical properties are correlated with certain properties of consciousness
