Philosophical Behaviourism Flashcards
hard behaviourism
hemple
- all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements
soft behaviourism
ryle
- propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions
- mental states are heterogenous, disposition is a tendancy and is analysed in terms of statements; not reduced
dualist argument applied: indivsibility
- mind and body aren’t the same thing
PB: wrong, mind isn’t a thing, to think the mind is divisble is a category mistake
Ryle: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions
Hemple: propositions about mental states can be reduced to the language of physics
philosophical behaviourism
what we are talking about when we talk about mental states is behaviour
dualist argument applied: conceivability
mind and body are seperate substances
PB: if corrrect, it is inconceivable for mind to exist without body, because the mind isn’t a thing, to think this is again a cateory mistake
Ryle: a mental state can only be had by something that can behave -> mind without body can’t behave
Hemple: agrees with ryle
issue of multiple realisability
- the claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour
- some mental states might be expressed in different behaviours by people in different or similar situations
- seems possible for behaviourism to explain mental states as behaviours without assuming various other mental states
- there is no complete set of behavioural propositions which could give a full account for any mental state propositions
- therefore philosophical behaviourism fails
ryles response to multiple realisability
- mental states are analysable in terms of behavioural dispositions
- mental states involved indefinetly hetrogenous dispositions
- he is not arguing that behavioural dispositions express the identity conditions for MS
- dispositions aren’ tied to individual behaviours, but require observation of multiple behaviours in multiple contexts to determine this
- argues you can ask someone running away from something why they are, or study their face and observe what they do to determine their disposition
- doesn’t reduce mental states in particular behaviour
- therefore says there is no issue, he accepts the issue but denys it as an objection
hemples response to multiple realisability
- claims that conditions of verification -> physics talk, can reduce all mental states without the loss of meaning = the same as translating
ISSUE: there is no complete list of propositions talking about bodily states for each proposition about mental states, can never be simplifed
issue of circularity
- empolys its own conclusion as a premise
- fear X + belief X = behaviour A
- fear Y + belief X = behaviour B
- cant list behaviours of fear without mentioning other mental states, we will never be able to convert mental states to pure behaviour talk
hemples response to circularity
- hemple says he can translate the language of mental states into language of bodily states
- but this can’t be done because theres no way of doing it, so he fails too
ryles response to circularity
- says dispositions are open, can’t be replaced by a complete set of hypothetical statements matching up particular matters of fact
- not possible to specify mental states in words that replaces mental concepts with behaviour concepts
he accepts this because this isn’t what he’s trying to do, to thikn that ryle is trying to define mental states using behaviour is a misunderstanding, he’s trying to say you can use certain dispositions to define mental states
the asymmerty between self-knowledge and knowledge of other peoples mental states
- asymmetry is an uneven relationship between views in philosophy
- arguably the view from common sense
- self-knowledge is an introspection of consciousnessses, we can’t be conscious of anyone else’s mental states in the same way, we can’t be wrong about our own but we can be wrong about other peoples
philosophical behaviourisms response to asymmetry argument
- if mental states were dispositions to behaviour then the asymmetry argument wouldn’t be true, but it is
- it wouldnt be true because i would have to infer what mental states i am having from how i am behaving
- but this isn’t right because i can know what beliefs i want to fear or hope directly without having to infer it
- i am thinking to myself in a way that no one else can
ryles response to asymmetry
- agrees there is asymmetry but disagreeing that proves behaviourism is false, argued it exists because we observe more of our own behaviour than others by paying attention
the distinctiveness of mental states - super spartans and perfect actors
- Super Spartans are an imagined community of people who completely suppress any outward demonstration of pain. They don’t wince, flinch, say “ouch!”, or anything like that. They have no dispositions toward pain behaviour – their heart rate doesn’t even increase.
- we can imagine the super Spartans do feel pain internally. They might not show it externally, but they would still experience a subjective experience of pain if they were tortured, say.
- Remember, behaviourism says pain is a disposition to behave a certain way. But here we have an example of pain without the associated behavioural dispositions. So, the two things – pain and the behavioural dispositions – are two separate things. So, if super Spartans are possible, then behaviourism is false: it’s possible to have the mental state without the behavioural disposition.
