Brainscape's Knowledge GenomeTM

Browse over 1 million classes created by top students, professors, publishers, and experts.


See full index

social, personality and individual differences 2 > Social Decision Making > Flashcards

Social Decision Making Flashcards

1
Q

Social Dilemmas are a situation in whichā€¦

A

each decision maker has a course of actions that may yield superior outcomes for the self
* but if all choose this strategy, all end up worse off them if they had cooperated

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

in social dilemma what is in conflict with one another

A

self interest conflicts with collective interest

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

what can conflict be?

A

social traps and social fences

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

what is a social trap?

A

oneā€™s actions which benefit the self -> cost to the collective

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

what is a social fence?

A

one actions which are costly to the self -> benefit the collective

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

what is the rational self interest model?

A

humans should optimise outcomes for the self by making rational decisions over the collective

  • homo economicus model of human behaviour
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

what does the rational self interest model not account for?

A
  • when and why do humans contribute to the collective?
  • How does society address the free rider problemā€“ the ability for individuals to benefit from collective efforts without contributing (question is how do we contribute to the whole without having our contributions being taken advantage of by free riders)?
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Tomasello (2014) suggests humans as ultrasocial. What does this mean?

A

Humans are uniquely social

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

what have we likely evolved for?

A

as a consequence of challenges to foraging (ā€œcollaborate or dieā€) OR as a consequence of needing to collaborate with a large group

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

the idea of us evolving for collaboration with large group maps onto which social psychological ideas?

A
  • interdependent collaboration
  • group culture emergence
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

_ cooperate more then _

A

humans cooperate more than non-human primates

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

what is different between human and non-human primates?

A
  • humans uniquely punish free riders
  • children apply some form of distributive justice
  • human intervene as a third-party in response to norm violations -> even when youā€™re not directly affected
  • humans seem intrinsically motivated to help others
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

if humans seem intrinsically motivated to help others, what does this suggest facilitating?

A

cooperation

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

what are the 4 key mechanisms of cooperation?

A
  1. reciprocity
  2. indirect reciprocity
  3. fairness
  4. punishment
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

what is direct reciprocity?

A

ā€˜I help you, you help meā€™

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

why does cooperation come at a risk?

A

we may contribute to the collective, but if others do not we will pay a cost

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

how do we ensure both individuals have good outcomes?

A

strategic cooperation

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

what are ā€˜economic gamesā€™ used in game theoretic paradigm?

A

interactive games between participants that bring social dilemmas into the lab allowing us to study social decision-making in a controlled manner

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

how does the prisoner dilemma come to be?

A

both A and B have the choices to either:
* cooperate and refuse to talk (as to not turn either person in)
* defect and testify against your co-conspirator

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

what do people cooperate and when do they defect in the prisonerā€™s dilemma?

A

situations and individual differences

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

social decision-making varies in terms of?

A
  • number of people involved
  • choices you have in a given situation
  • whether youā€™ll interact with that person again
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

what do economic games vary depending on?

A
  • number of players
  • opportunities on order of plan
  • number of rounds
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
23
Q

what is a downside of the prisonerā€™s dilemma?

A

while environment is stimulated, it is not an exact real-world interaction

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
24
Q

what is an iterated prisoner dilemma?

A

played repeatedly by the same participants

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
25
Q

why is a iterated prisoner dilemma useful?

A

helps players learn about behavioural tendencies of their counterparts

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
26
Q

how did the prisoner dilemma work?

A

repeated rounds of the prisonerā€™s dilemma against a stimulated other

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
27
Q

individual differences were measured and predetermined by a prior task, what are the three individual difference conditions?

A
  • individualists
  • cooperators
  • competitiors
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
28
Q

individualists

A

maximise gain for self

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
29
Q

cooperators

A

maximize gain for each player/collective

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
30
Q

competitors

A

maximize relative gain for self/focused on beating the other person

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
31
Q

what were the three behaviour conditions (*they played either of these three conditions)

A
  • totally cooperating
  • totally defecting
  • tit-for-tat
32
Q

what is the tit-for-tat strategy

A

start cooperative and then respond in kind to the other personā€™s actions (match the other playerā€™s last play)

33
Q

what did they find for individualists?

A

worked best for tit-for-tat

34
Q

why did individualists work better on tit-for-tat?

A
  • kept cooperating because then the confederate would, but didnā€™t cooperate very well when they knew the confederate was just going to cooperate every time because then they could defect and make more money.
  • when confederate defected, so did the participant
35
Q

what did they find for cooperators?

A

cooperating or tit-for-tat strategy -> best strategy here is tit-for-tat (but proportion cooperating is highest for cooperating) because regardless of who the person is, youā€™ll end up okay

36
Q

what did they find for competitors?

A

always defect so doesnā€™t matter which strategy to the confederate uses

37
Q

what does the iterate prisonerā€™s dilemma suggest?

A

direct reciprocity strategy can work to your benefit regardless of cooperative nature of the other individual

38
Q

but what happens beyond tit-for-tat / limitations?

A
  • direct reciprocity not always possible
  • decision to cooperate are not always simultaneous
  • do not always have equivalent options
  • they involve more than two people
39
Q

what is upstream indirect reciprocity?

A

balancing out across the community even if youā€™re not a direct recipient

[ā€˜I help you, you help someone else.ā€™]

40
Q

what is downstream reciprocity?

A

even though, itā€™s not direct, there is still a balancing out of contributions

[ā€˜I help you, someone else helps meā€™]

41
Q

in a direct reciprocity game where each player receives Ā£3 at the beginning of the game.

  • For each round players paired off: one player a DONOR and one player a RECEIVER
  • DONOR could choose to give Ā£.50 (the gift was multiplied and then given to the * RECEIVER -> so collectively, you would earn more money).
  • Players told that they would never encounter the same RECEIVER again (to rule out direct reciprocity).
  • Players have an image score (for the donor to decide whether to give you money or not) which increased by one point when they gave and decreased by one point when they didnā€™t.
  • The RECEIVERā€™s image score appears to DONORS when they were making their decisions.
  • At the end of the game, you get to keep your earnings.

What did they find?

A
  • Donors more likely to donate when the receiverā€™s image score was higher than average
  • Donor with a low image score were more likely to donate something and thereby improve their own image score
42
Q

what does the indirect reciprocity game conclude over all?

A
  • generosity was costly initially but paid off in the long run. -> by the end of the game image score was strongly correlated with earnings
  • individuals with a better image score also earned more in a subsequent prisonerā€™s dilemma (i.e. direct reciprocity) game -> higher image score, more likely to win the game (transferred overt to benefit you in an (in)direct reciprocity game

DEMONSTRATES THE CRITICAL ROLE OF REPUTATION IN FACILITATING COOPERATION

43
Q

fairness norms are a power source of _ _

A

social influence

44
Q

what game illustrates violations of fairness norms?

A

ultimatum game

45
Q

(Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982) what is the ultimatum game?

A
  • A receives an initial endowment of money
  • A divides the money as see fit and offers a part of the money to player B
  • B can accept or reject the offer
  • If Player B rejects the offer, no one gets any money (if you accept then you get the money that you were told you would explicitly get).
46
Q

What was the Payoff of the Ultimatum Game

A

The bigger offer A gives, the more B makes, while the less money, the less B makes
* If B rejects itā€™s a flat 0 for anybody

47
Q

What is the rational response in the ultimatum game?

A

B accepts any offer above 0 -> puts player B in the situation of evaluating situation fairness, and acting against their own individual earning to enforce fairness norms

48
Q

what happens in one shot games?

A
  • even in one-shot games, recipients do not behave as ā€œrational agentsā€, rejecting unfair offers, -> 50/50 split, acceptance rate is 100% but as the participant As offer goes down and split becomes uneven, participant B is less likely to accept the offer -> acceptance rates decrease
  • ā€œFirst playersā€ make offers accordingly.
  • BUT STILL HIGHER IF PLAYER IS A COMPUTER -> not as much as a social aspect
49
Q

how many cultures vary in this game

A

different levels of first offers

50
Q

what is the emotional response to fairness?

A
  • people perceive unfair others as less likeable, less agreeable and even less attractive than fair people
  • Emotionally, people respond to unfair others with disgust, anger, and sometimes sadness.
  • People also respond to fairness violations aggressively
51
Q

what is the public goods game?

A

Variant used to examine trust, cooperation and reputation-building in groups.
1. Everyone gets an endowment
2. Everyone puts as many tokens in the pot as they choose/or keep it for themselves.
3. The pot is multiplied by a factor (>1 and <# of players).
4. Pot is split up again/proceeds are shared -> more put in, the more you get back from the pot.

51
Q

What was found from the pay off matrix?

A
  • defect = make more money than anyone else -> free-riding
  • if everyone defects, youā€™ll make the least money possible
52
Q

In a situation where individuals had the opportunity to punish other plays half way through the game (round 11/20) where the individual punishing would lose money just to see the violation / law enforced on the punished individual.

How much do you think they will contribute to the share pot and will participants pay to punish? What did they find?

A
  • contributors decline over time until punishment is added
  • even when punishment is cost (i.e., players must spend money to punish others), people are willing to do it and go back to giving. -> but a willing to sacrifice their earnings to enforce this norm
  • Punishment dramatically increases contributions to the public good.
53
Q

When participants watched other (two participants) play prisonerā€™s dilemma games; once they learn the outcomes they can pay to punish.

conditions: the defection/cooperation of each player in the round -> what does the witness choose to pay to do? Do they pay their own money to punish one of the two participants, depite being one of the third party.

measure: Proportion of trials in which they pay to punish.

What did they find?

A
  • people are even willing to pay to punish when there are merely a witness to unfair behaviour -> more likely to punish a defector when they defect against a co-operator (and just a defector in general). -> despite having no direct gain, that itā€™s annoying to see a fairness violation that itā€™s worth a little a bit of money to see someone (free rider/defector) punished.
54
Q

how do norms for fairness drive behaviour

A

beyond ā€œrational self interestā€ would predict.

55
Q

fairness violations elicitā€¦?

A

powerful emotional and behavioural responses.

56
Q

people will incurā€¦

A

a cost to punish others for unfair behavior, even if they are merely third parties to the behaviour.

*influence oneā€™s decision to act in collective versus self-interest in a given interaction

57
Q

In an interated public group game and where participants were either in a prosocial or proself condition.

Confederate conditions: no confederate, presence of high status consistent contributor, presence of a low status consistent contributor.

Measure: Probability of contribution per round

What did they find?

A
  • contributions remained high in groups with consistent contributors -> collectively earned more
  • consistent contributors ultimately made more money than members of groups with consistent contributors
  • additionally, there was an additive effect of status, whereby high status consistent contributors hd a stronger effect
  • motivational disposition of the group did not make a difference
58
Q

What about a cooperative cascade? In a series of six public good games with different groups of 4 individuals.

Punishment condition: with and without the opportunity to punish

Analysis: the relationship of each individualā€™s behaviour with othersā€™ behaviour across time and across group -> looks at interactions between groups and how your behaviour i.e, with the first group, if youā€™re generous, does generousity spread through the entire community indirectly -> is there a cascade of cooperation across time in between groups even when the person you interacted with is long gone, does it continue to be affected by your behaviour?

i.e. do you exhibit the same behaviour when interacting with lucas, indirectly influence lucas behaviour with erika. Does it effect people in whom youā€™ve never interacted?

What did they find?

A

the contribution of one individual in an interaction influences the other individualā€™s behaviour in the subsequent round

  • each contribution predicts the next cooperation -> more A gives B, the more B gives C in the next round
  • people tend to give more in public good games when punishment is an option
59
Q

what happens when punishment is an option?

A

people tend to give more in a public good game

60
Q

the influence of one individual cooperative behaviour influences others at further degrees of separate, an indirect effect has been found with up toā€¦?

A

3 degrees of separation
* influencing behaviour -> how much this contribution predicts a future contribution

61
Q

what does it mean by 3 degrees of separation?

A

individuals affect others, with whom they had no direct contact over time -> this persists up to 3 groups forwards even gayer they are no longer interacting

62
Q

what is the propagation of cooperation?

A
  • when an individual cooperates with another individual, it tends to influence the second individual in future interactions
  • the original individualā€™s cooperative influence persists over time and across the social network
63
Q

what drives helping behaviours?

A

it might be empathic pathways to helping

64
Q

is all prosocial behaviour cooperative?

A

no.

65
Q

what is pure altruism?

A

helping someone else, even when it is risky, without any reward

66
Q

what are empathy-related processes?

A

(emotional) empathy: inferences about othersā€™ affective states (mood, emotion, pain etc.)

perspective taking / cognitive empathy / theory of mind: inferences about otherā€™s mental states (thoughts, beliefs and motivations etc.)
^ related but disocciable

67
Q

do you have to have deficits in both emotional and cognitive empathy?

A

nope, can have deficits in a single one or both, but they are related to each other in some way

68
Q

describe the pathway to helping

A

feel empathy for someone (and enough motivation to help them, you have comparison -> helping behaviour
BUT empathy can cause you empathetic stress, fleeing the situation and experiencing stress/burnout

perspective taking can influence helping -> understand perspective to help them -> affects empathy -> understanding cognitive details can help you understand what they are thinking and feeling

Or perspective taking can cause Alexlthymia leading to empathetic distress and burnout

69
Q

what is alexthymia?

A

the inability to recognize or describe oneā€™s own emotion

70
Q

A recent study looked at the affective pathway to helping. They examined the relationship between empathy and helping in a. real world sample of members of a ā€˜helping professionā€™.

Participants: 7,500 physicians
Predictive measures: a battery of personality questionnaires
* Empathic concern
* Perspective taking
* Altruistic intentions - intention to help others
* Empathic distress
* Alexithymia - ability to label oneā€™s emotions (less youā€™re able to label your emotions, less able you are to use empathy as a tool to help others)

Outcome measures:
* Compassion satisfaction
* Burnout
* Secondary trauma

What did they find?

A

Empathetic distress (negative feeling from witnessing stress) -> more likely to experience burnout
Alexithymia -> weakly predicted burnout but secondary traumatic stress as well

71
Q

Does past suffering ā€œharden heartsā€ (less compassionate) or facilitate helping behaviours? -> looking at the role of experience

Study 1:
Participants: 254 online respondents
Predictive questionnaires:
* adverse life experiences (injury, violence, disaster, etc.)
* empathic concern (from the IRI)
* perspective taking (from the IRI)
* dispositional compassion (DPES)

Behavioural measure: donation to the Red Cross ($.25 to $1.00)

What did they find?

A
  • those who experience adversity are more able to engage in prosocial cognitive mechanisms -> predicts empathic concerns towards others -> empathetic concern predicted the extent to which someone was compassionate and motivated to help an individual (dispositional compassion) but there was no relationship between DC and perspective taking -> DC predicted actual helping in terms of a charitiable donation
  • evidence supports general model and adds piece about individual adversity and how it facilitates helping behaviour
72
Q

When replicating it with a confederate who had a bunch of tasks to complete yet fell ill -> looking at whether participant would help confederate complete the task

What did they find?

A

life adversity increase perspective taking and empathetic concern which predicted a disposition (towards helping people) compassion, state compassion and real time helping the confederate

73
Q

What is Helping Behaviour facilitated by?

A

empathetic responses

74
Q

but how can we determine if helping actually occurs?

A

critical moderators

75
Q
A

social, personality and individual differences 2 (20 decks)

Brainscape helps you reach your goals faster, through stronger study habits.
© 2024 Bold Learning Solutions. Terms and Conditions