reading dec 3 - New forms and practices of inter-governmental organization

Question 1

ad hoc coalitions in global governance: short-notice, task- and time-specific cooperation

Answer 1

YF REYKERS, JOHN KARLSRUD, MALTE BROSIG, STEPHANIE C.
HOFMANN, CRISTIANA MAGLIA AND PERNILLE RIEKER*

AHC = ad hoc coalition
- e.g. Multinational Joint Task Force, Task Force Takuba

institutions with lower creation, operation or exit costs are at times preferred over treaty-based institutions, esp. when rapid action is required

how AHC contribute to shape the global gov architecture and international crisis response

argue that AHCs demonstrate that actros have cooperative reflexes even when gridlock in formal IOs occurs (e.g. in times of crisis)

-> if this reliance on short notice and temporal arrangements becomes a major trend, then IOs may losse some of their importance in global governance

Question 2

definition AHC

Answer 2

! in general underdefined, used as catch-all concept

AHC = ad hoc coalition
= autonomous arrangements with a task-specific mandate established at short notice for a limited period of time

• autonomous = operate outside institutional framework of other multilateral arrangements (still can cooperate with other IOs)

focus on characteristics as formality and membership -> AHCs largely invisible in the global governance complexity literature

Question 3

AHC three defining characteristics

Answer 3

1. short-notice creation
2. task specificity (focus on single-purpose goals, e.g. counterterrorism, vaccination campaign)
3. initial temporariness (often implicit: when the problem/crisis is solved)
   *in practice they can endure by changing or expanding their mandates or being incorporated into other efforts

other dimensions can vary and are not constitutive of AHCs
- e.g. membership (AHC can have state and non-state actors), legal obligations, formality

common feature all AHC = authority implicitly/explicitly delegated to the largest contributor to coordinate the coalition members as lead nation

Question 3

Task Force Takuba - an illustrative case

Answer 3

requested in january 2020 by gov Mali and Niger to support their counterterrorist activities in the Liptako region
11 European states signed a political statement to provide training and assistance to Malian armed forces
operatint in july 2020 (so: short notice)

structure outside of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy to avoid delays + to retain operational autonomy

initially established under command structure of larger French military mission Barkhane (operating in the region since 2014)
-> command in july 2011 transferred to Sweden (illustrates that leadership can easily change given flexible design AHCs)

had to cooperate in inter-organizational relations, operation linked to many actors in the region

EU supported the AHC, increasingly supports AHCs in general

temporary nature + low dissolution costs: feb 2022 France announced it was pulling troops -> other countries announced their withdrawal -> Takuba’s activities Mali ended in June 2022

• flexible nature also risks: prone to defection + fear about the safety of other missions and the stability of the region

Question 4

situating AHCs in global governance - regime complexity

Answer 4

regime complexity = research stream that focuses on how formal and informal, global and regional organizations and the ways in which they overlap, coordinate, cooperate or compete -> governance arrangements are closely interconnected

IGO = formal institutions that possess a permanent secretariat or headquarters with permanent staff, and are composed of at least 3 MS, which meet regularly in a plenary session
- inter-organizational turn -> focus on ever closer links between IGOs

public-private partnerships / transnational public-private governance initiatives (TGIs) = institutions in which IGOs cooperate with business and civil society actors to govern transnational problems

TGNs = trans-governmental networks
PGOs = private governance organizations
= both regulatory bodies

focus on membership composition and formality

FIGOs = formal IGOs
IIGOs = informal IGOs (not just for “easy” problems + continued rise and prominence)

• e.g. G7/G20
• no task specificity and temporarility
• not all IIGOs are AHC (some are)

LCIs = low-cost institutions: non-treaty based institutions (IIGOs, TGNs, transnational public-private partnerships) = emphasis on flexibility as key asset: avoids gridlock

• umbrella term

!!overlooked element in research = speed with which actors are set up + their intial time-span + task specificity, aka AHCs

Question 5

how a more systematic focus on AHCs and attention to the dimensions of temporality, task specificity and short-notice creation has the potential to contribute to a wide variety of salient research programmes in the fields of IO and global governance studies

Answer 5

1. organizational design
2. organizational performance
3. organizational choice
4. life-cycle of IOs

organizational design: AHC as source of flexibility/adaptability (seen as key given changing geopolitical circumstances) , rather than just informality as source of flexibility -> observe more multilateral action than commonly in scholarship

• also: key questions AHCs are often overlooked: to whom are they accountable? how much do AHCs rely on previous interactions?

organizational performance = looking at AHC helps refine under what conditions task-specific arrangements work better than more general-purpose arrangements + think about performance across time

organizational choice strategies (focus on institutional overlap, strategic options that stats have to undertake multilateral action): AHCs often not recognized as options, rather as suboptimal outcomes

• focus on AHC -> better understanding of what kind of multilateral action is taking place in a world characterized by geopolitical rivalries, to what effect, and how long-lasting it is.

life-cycle of IOs (when IOs die, thrive, survive or are zombie)

• AHC = limited time span, but not necessarily disappear when crisis/situation is over, institutions can be sticky (+ can transform to more stable structures)
• what happens when AHC reaches the end of its life-cycle?
• AHCs can have disruptive effect on the life-cycle of existing IOs: caundermine legitimacy and efficiency

Question 6

table

Answer 6

there’s a table outlining diff global governance arrangements

idk if we need to know it, see if it is in the lecture