lect 6 international cooperation

Question 1

what is international cooperation?

Answer 1

the mutual adjustment of behavior by states (and other actors) to achieve common aims

• Robert Keohane (except the part between brackets)

Question 2

when is cooperation necessary/possible?

3 types of relationships among states

Answer 2

1. cooperation is not possible = states have no common interests or policy preferences -> behavior is always conflictual (per definition: no one wants anything the other also want -> no cooperation possible: no common aims)
   -> twee aparte cirkels: een met staat a en een met staat
2. cooperation is not necessary = states have identical interests and policy preferences, so they pursue common aims without adjusting their behaviors = no adjustment required, they both do what they want and it’s the same thing
   -> een cirkel met daarin beide staten
3. cooperation is possible, but not guaranteed = states have overlapping interests (not completely diff and not completely equal) and policy preferences, so they can only achieve common aims by mutually adjusting their behaviors
   -> twee cirkels half over elkaar

Question 3

the depth of int’l cooperation

Answer 3

Graefrath and Jahn - conceptualizing interstate cooperation (2023)

minimal = states implicitly (not openly and formally, no agreement) coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits

• via mutual observation and policy adjustment over time
• ex. US and USSR on non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons: both sides knew they were choosing not to employ them, knowing that the other also doesn’t do it, with common aim of protecting satellites

thin = states explicitly (openly, formally) coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits

• via negotiation and agreement on policy adjustment
• does not involve doing anything together: agree that A will do this, and B will do that rather than that A and B together do …
• ex. US and USSR on anti-ballistic missile treaty (ABM treaty): no missiles that can destroy other missiles, believe it would make the world more stable (avoiding nuclear war)

thick = states engage in joint pursuit of mutual benefits

• via shared commitment to joint activity and mutual support
• states work together, do things together
• ex. UK, US, USSR to defeat Nazi Germany

Question 4

what motivates states to cooperate?

Answer 4

1. shared threats
2. shared or complementary material interests
3. shared identities

!int’l cooperation does not necessarily serve morally ‘good’ purposes (e.g. fascist Germany and fascist Italy) -> don’t assume cooperation is good

Question 5

what motivates cooperation - shared sense of threat

Answer 5

states are vulnerable to threats that can be reduced through cooperation

external military threat

• Vietnam and US: cooperate bc sense of threat related to China

internal political threat

• Belarus and Russia: both have sense of grassroot movements that might overthrow them

global threat

• cooperation on climate change (potentially)

Question 6

what motivates cooperation - shared/complementary material interests

Answer 6

world econ creates opportunities for material gain through cooperation

shared = both get the same out of it
complementary = both get something else out of it, but they both gain

gains from trade

• cooperation improves eco efficiency -> benefits both state A and B overall

interdependence

• policies adopted in state A affect conditions in state B and vice versa, so cooperation benefits both by reducing their vulnerability to external shocks

class interests

• certain types of cooperation reinforce capitalism and thus benefit the transnational capitalist class

Question 7

why cooperate - shared identities

Answer 7

common values, history, culture motivate states to cooperate

political values, form of gov

• frontline states (against apartheid South Africa)
• community of democracies (against autocracies)

moral values, religion

• Organization of Islamic Cooperation

history

• British Commonwealth of Nations

culture, language

• ‘five eyes’: UK, Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand = cooperation in sharing intelligence, have in common the English language

Question 8

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?

Answer 8

cooperation is really fragile bc

1. transaction costs
2. security dilemma
3. credible commitment problem
4. relative gains problem
5. free rider problem
6. two-level games

Question 9

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- transaction costs

Answer 9

Williamson 1990 - economic organization

cooperation isn’t free, the process of achieving agreement and implementing cooperation involves ‘transaction costs’

• information costs = identifying opportunities for mutual gain (need to identify where their interests overlap)
• decision-making costs = negotiating the term of cooperation
• sovereignty cost = compromises on autonomy to achieve cooperation
• enforcement costs = monitoring behavior, punishing violators

when transaction costs are higher than the gain from cooperation, there will be no cooperation, even though states do have motive to cooperate

Question 10

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- security dilemma

Answer 10

Jervis 1978:

anarchy -> fear and insecurity -> defensive actions -> more fear and insecurity -> difficulty of cooperation

Question 11

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- credible commitment problem

Answer 11

cooperation often requires that all actors focus on long-term interests (rather than maximizing short-term gains), but they may not trust others’ promises to cooperate
- bc short term: A might benefit from exploiting B, long term cooperation rather than exploitation is beneficial

does A trust B to focus on the long term? how does A know B won’t exploit it, pursuing short term gains

why this mistrust?

states lack good information on others’ intentions and future actions

• other may be lying, trying to cheat or exploit me
• other may change its mind
• other may change its gov

today’s gains are more certain than future gains

result =

• misfit between long-term incentives (cooperation is beneficial) and short-term incentives (can’t trust that the other will do its part)
• mistrust -> cooperation is hard to achieve and easily broken

Question 12

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- relative gains problem

Answer 12

when facing possible cooperation, states may focus on

• absolute gains = how much do I gain?
• relative gains = how does my gain compare to other’s gain?

under anarchy, “relative gain is more important than absolute gain” (Waltz)

anarchy -> focus on relative gains -> cooperation is unlikely

Question 13

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- free-rider problem

Answer 13

Olson (1965): logic of collective action

self-interested actors seek to benefit from public goods and common resources without contributing to their provision (without paying for them)
- free riding = public transportation: take the train, benefit from it, don’t pay (others pay for it)

public goods:

• non-excludable: accesible to all
• non-rival: use by A doesn’t limit use by B
• ex. safe transit of ships; elimination of diseases
• free riding -> under-provision of public goods

common resources:

• non- excludable: accessible to all
• rival: use by A reduces use by B
• ex. ocean fisheries; satellite orbits
• free riding -> loss of common resources

both examples of free rider problem that actors are tempted to free ride, tempted to free ride -> don’t cooperate (don’t pay for the public transport)

Question 14

what makes int’l cooperation so difficult?
- two-level games

Answer 14

Putnam (1988)

when considering possible int’l cooperation, national govs must consider domestic audiences (voters, business…) and international audiences (other govts)

two-level game/negotiation = national gov has to keep in mind:

• domestic audiences (level two game)
• international audiences (level one game, negotiation with other state)

cooperation is only possible when both audiences are satisfied: gov has to satisfy domestic constituencies + international partners, if either of those is not satisfied, cooperation won’t happen

consequences:

• to maintain support at home, gov sometimes make unrealistic demands of other states, which makes cooperation difficult
  e.g. Macron tries to build domestic support with farmers -> says to intenrational partners within the EU and in Mercosur that he wants to make the EU-mercosur trade deal better for france farmers = blocks cooperation

two level game helps understand why Macron is blocking negotiation that has been on the way for years
- to gain leverage in int’l negotiations, gov may exaggerate the strength of domestic opposition to cooperation

Question 15

what makes cooperation possible
- 3 modes of int’l cooperation

Answer 15

1. hegemonic cooperation = cooperation enabled or imposed by powerful states
2. decentralized cooperation = cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement
3. institutionalized cooperation = cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions

Question 16

modes of int’l cooperation
hegemonic cooperation

Answer 16

cooperation enabled or imposed by powerful actors

great powers have more resources and are expected to lead, so they can promote or impose cooperation

hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger, Gilpin) = cooperation requires hegemony
-> hegemonic leadership is necessary to get cooperation started and to create cooperative institutions

requirements for hegemonic leadership:

• capability = resources to promote negotiation, monitor compliance, punish violators
• willingness = political interest in promoting cooperation
• legitimacy = acceptance by others of hegemon’s role and plans

without hegemony, cooperation and institutions break down acc to hegemonic stability theory
- can help us understand: US less hegemonic, we see less cooperation now

Keohane: post-hegemonic cooperation (modified argument hegemonic stability theory)

• hegemon’s power may be necessary to get cooperation started and to create cooperative institutions
• after hegemonic decline, states’ shared interests in managing interdependence may enable cooperation and institutions to continue

Question 17

modes of int’l cooperation
decentralized cooperation

Answer 17

cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement

*decentralized cooperation = aka cooperation under anarchy

sometimes made possible by:

• weak security dilemma
• absolute gains
• reciprocity
• incentives - negative or positive
• reassurance
• shared identities

Question 18

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
weak security dilemma

Answer 18

strength of security dilemma (Jervis 1978) depends on:

1. offense-defense balance: does current military technology favour offense or defense
2. transparency of offensive vs defensive posture: can states observe and distinguish each other’s military posture

strong dilemma = offense dominant, low transparancy

weak dilemma = defense dominant, high transparance

e.g. Warsaw vs NATO: whenever one had military maneouvres, other would be invited to observe = increased transparancy -> made security dilemma less strong

security dilemma not as constant but as variable -> it is not always an obstacle to observation

Question 19

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
absolute gains

Answer 19

Snidal: relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation (1991)

states may focus on absolute gains:

anarchy does not force states to focus on relative gains when considering cooperation, they are more likely to focus on absolute gains when:

1. many states are involved in cooperation (more states -> more incentive to focus on absolute gains: diff to compare with more states)
2. consequences of cheating are not threatening (if cheating by other is likely to be threatening, then more incentive to focus on relative gains)

Question 20

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
reciprocity

Answer 20

Keohane (1986)

reciprocity = an int’l norm that compromises by one state should be balanced by compromises by others

• specific reciprocity: A and B make simultaneous compromises to enable an agreement
  not dependent on trust, so there’s no credible commitment problem
• general reciprocity: A makes a compromise to enable an agreement with B on the understanding that B will make an equivalent compromise later
  heavily dependent on trust, so requires shared identity or expectation of an ongoing relationship (distant shadow of the future)

significance: reciprocity enables cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement

EU heavily relies on this, could not function without it: if everytime you need to make a deal every concession immediately needs to be paid back, no agreement would ever be done (would take too much time)
- A makes concession, doesn’t get paid back, A cashes in later
- as long as states continue to pay each other back, even over long period of time, the norm persists

Question 21

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
incentives

Answer 21

diff incentives can be created to help cooperaation

positive incentives = benefits for those who cooperate or support cooperation

how?

• log rolling: a deal with off-setting benefits for all participants (part of the deal benefits A, another part benefits B, etc.)
• side payments: compensation for any actor (domestic or int’l) that doesn’t benefit from cooperation and could block it (cooperation benefits A&B, but C can block it -> A&B offer some other ‘goodies’ to C so that it does not block cooperation)

negative incentives = sanctions against non-cooperators, to reduce free-riding and credible commitment problems

not easy to impose:

• some non-cooperation can be hidden
• no states want to be monitored & punished by others
• few states want to do the punishing, because it annoys partners
• sanctions can be avoided

e.g. NS: people come and check in the train + gate at the front (makes it diff; tries to deny you access to the good)

Question 22

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
reassurance

Answer 22

Gross Stein (1991):

logic = if fear feeds the security dilemma, which makes cooperation difficult, then reassuring words and actions can promote positive identification and cooperation

strategy: use words and actions (incl. self-restraint and de-escalation) to make Other less fearful & allow focus on shared interests

• if reciprocated it can create a positive spiral

e.g. Gorbachev used reassurance to reduce confrontation at the end of the cold war

Question 23

decentralized cooperation can be made possible by:
shared identities

Answer 23

Risse-Kappen 1995

ease of cooperation depends on the extent of shared values and norms among states

during the cold war cooperation between Canada, Europe and the US was facilitated by shared values (problem-solving through dialogue and openness to civil society) that outhweighed other interests

Question 24

modes of int’l cooperation
- institutionalized cooperation

Answer 24

international institutions can promote cooperation:

• reduce transaction costs
• shape expectations
• make commitments more credible
• facilitate reciprocity
• extend shadow of the future
• enable interlinkage of issues

Question 25

how internatinal instutitons promote cooperation
- reduce transaction costs

Answer 25

• information costs = institutions consolidate expertise, identify the opportunities for mutually-beneficial cooperation
• decision-making costs: institutions promote regular contacts, set agendas, establish decision-making procedures, encourage compromise
• sovereignty costs: institutions enable joint input on cooperation
• enforcement costs: institutions centralize and de-politicize monitoring and sanctions

Question 26

how internatinal instutitons promote cooperation
- shape expectations

Answer 26

rules tell us what actors are likely to do, what is acceptable and not acceptable

int’l institutions shape actors’ expectations by establishing:

• procedures for sanctioning bad behavior
• rules that define acceptable and unacceptable behavior

-> solves credible commitment problem (can’t trust what the other is going to do)

Question 27

how internatinal instutitons promote cooperation
- make commitments more credible

Answer 27

• monitoring: increase transparency of (non-)compliance
• sanctioning: shaming and punishing non-compliance

Question 28

how internatinal instutitons promote cooperation
- facilitate reciprocity

Answer 28

• remind sates of shared identities and shared interests in cooperation
• arrange complementary compromises (specific reciprocity)
• promoting on-going relationships (general reciprocity)

Question 29

how int’l institutions promote cooperation
- enable inter-linkage of issues

Answer 29

int’l institutions promote cooperation via multi-issue ‘package deals’ in which all actors compromise on some issue(s) to achieve gains on other issues

• harder to do with one-issue organization

Question 30

today’s reading: what about nonhegemonic cooperation

Answer 30

Yong-Wook Lee (2016)

major trends in East Asian financial cooperation =

• China trying to play a more hegemonic role: China-led AIIB -> struggle/tension between China-led hegemonic led cooperation and more decentralized Chiang Mai initiative
  we don’t know yet where this is going, if CMI will survive
• CMIM thing was not made by a hegemon, non-hegemonic cooperation
• nonhegemonic cooperation is working, power distribution has enabled cooperation without initiative or resources of a hegemon

which model best fits ‘nonhegemonic cooperation’?
decentralized cooperation or institutionalized cooperation or hegemonic cooperation?

• institutionalized cooperation: absence of hegemon -> allows states to create institutions -> through institutions there is cooperatoi

(rewatch + maybe ask what we need to take away from this reading)

Question 31

the negotiation of int’l cooperation, with varying levels of complexity

Answer 31

one level-game =
A and B are negotiating, we understand what’s happening by understand that both have a minimum and an ideal point

• outcome depends on : relative power, intensity of preferences, possibility of issue-linkage, possibility of reciprocity, identities and values

negotiation space, range of outcomes under discussion, is between A’s minimum and B’s minimum

two level game = need to look at interests of two governments and two domestic audiences

two-level game across time = domestic actors may change pressure/interests against their gov -> changes minimum and maximum of the state

• if this only counts for one state, the negotiation space can become narrower

Question 32

how int’l institutions promote cooperation
- extend shadow of the future

Answer 32

int’l institutions promote on-going relationships, which encourages states to prioritize long-term gains form cooperation over short-term gains form non-cooperation