reading 1 dec 10 - power shifts and international order Flashcards
The Most Dangerous Game: Do Power Transitions Always Lead to War?
intro
Manjari Chatterjee Miller 2024
rise of China + logic of modernization -> US thought it would become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system
China seemed to embrace western norms and institutions
but now hope is dying: Beijing seems to be rejecting rather than accepting the US-led global order -> US asks how to solve the “China challenge”
- Qs = how to deter an invasion of Taiwan, how to respond to expansionist claims in the South China Sea
power transition theory
ascendant powers routinely emerge to challenge the dominant power and the international order order established by it, eventually leading to conflict
Allison calls the seemingly inevitable clash between the US and China the “Thucydides trap”
- conflict between Sparta and emerging power Athens -> Peloponnesian War: was inevitable bc growth Athenian power + it caused fear in Sparta
!implicit in the theory = the way the established power manages the international order can matter as much as (or even more than) the ambitions of the challenger
- established power can adjust rules and institutions, use the international order to contain the emerging power
- emerging power bound to existing laws, norms and institutions
Organski’s recurring pattern in international relations
modern power transition theory originated with Organski
in every era of history there is a status quo power that eventually faces a challenger (that is dissatisfied with the way the dominant power influences the distribution of goods in the international system)
expectation = when challenger is sufficiently strong to contest the power, the system is no longer stabilized
-> dire outcome with US and China today
often overlooked implication power transition theory
why does the rising power seek to challenge the great power in the first place?
power transition theorists argue that conflict emerges not simply as a consequence of a challenger’s growing power, but because of the challenger’s relationship to the global order
-> the way the status quo power manages the international order can determine whether rivalry turns into conflict
-> need to understand which aspects of the international order rising power wish to change and how
- e.g. Athen’s rising power was dissatisfied with some cultural and political norms of Sparta
new generation of power transition scholars
-> more attention to how rising powers interact with the international order
(e.g. how rising powers frame their views of order to domestic and foreign audiences (Xiaoyu Pu)
- China: engages in “conspicuous giving” and charity through its AIIB in an effort to convert eco power into diplomatic power
tendency of challengers to sacrifice material interests in order to be accepted as a part of the great-power club
- Japan: agreed to limit the size of its fleet despite drive to become a major naval power
- China: agreed to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 1996 despite efforts to build a larger nuclear arsenal
rising stat4es seek to be recognized as full equals of established powers
Shifrinson: rising powers often careful to avoid antagonizing a declining great power
(e.g. US supported UK at start cold war)
bc accommodating the incumbent -> rising power can more quickly expand its own capabilities
in general = rather than challenging the international order outright, rising powers tend to accept many existing norms, cooperate to reject other aspects and are sensitive to accusations of being overthrowers
they play a long game with 2 objectives:
- use arrangements of current order to bolster their own rises
- weakening the architect of the order until they can attain sufficient power to create a new one
home-field advantage
by rethinking formal institutions and existing practices of the international order, the established power can fortify its own position
US has avoided contemplating changes to the liberal international order that could help slow its decline
US is not strengthening or reforming existing institutions, it is turning to ad hoc informal institutions and diplomacy -> more fragmented and contested international order
erosion of international institutions can accelerate China’s rise
- e.g. US sanctioned Iran (fellow member Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) for nuclear program, yet sought to legitimize India as nuclear weapons state -> may weaken international arms control arrangements
US management of the order has been underwhelming
if US wants to use its home-field advantage, it has to play quick before Beijing has the clout and capability to create a new order
aspects of the liberal international order that China and other challengers accept
end C19: owning colonies, empire seen as necessary to obtain superpower status
-> China follows this pattern: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as debt-trap diplomacy, gaining influence over affairs of smaller countries
- US can’t directly accuse China and the BRI of revisionism -> would be hypocrit + creates perception US can’t compete with China in the global econ
- US should: offer better alternative than BRI, has not succesfully done so
more friends, more power
US needs to rebuild the liberal order to sustain American power - how?
one promising approach = address issues that are not yet governed by international norms,
- e.g. cybersecurity, social media, cross-border data flows, food security, AI, pandemic preparedness
to restructure the order, the US needs buy-in from its allies: international order can’t be built or rebuilt by the hegemon alone, it takes a coalition of the willing
- problem = rationale for supporting US-led innovations to the order not as clear as it was in the cold war: many countries are glad to do business with both China and the US + want to preserve that flexibility
- still, US has introduced several new formal arrangements with other countries, e.g. AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
- China has no special friendships or strategic partners or formal military allies (emerging partnership with Russia is fragile)
US needs to show its interests are not in opposition to non-Western countries bc the center of world politics is shifting away from the west
- WTO: Washington has supported changes that aim to be inclusive but are also pragmatic and efficient: increasing use of multilateral negotiations e.g.
- US promotion friend shoring (away from China) = potential for building more trade links with developing countries
conclusion
if the US hopes to avoid being unseated, it can’t rely on confronting China or complaining about how China is playing the game, it will need to change the game itself
