lect 9 - autonomy of IGOs Flashcards
definition IGO autonomy
= ability of IGOs to set their own goals and to act in ways that contradict the interests and policy preferences of member states
(for formal IGOs, you can see it partially in the treaty, but it’s only a part of the story)
autonomy and the 3 faces of IGOs:
- forums: places where states meet and negotiate (no autonomy: meeting place can’t act, does not have own goals)
- instruments: tools that states use to achieve their interests (tool does not have own goals, can’t act = no space for autonomy)
- actors: independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act -> possibility for AUTONOMY??
(autonomy of IOs may also be seen as independence of IOs)
IGO autonomy - not just an academic debate
EU = is the EU an ‘out-of-control bureaucracy?’ (EU as frankenstein monster, out of control)
- is major reform necessary to re-establish control by member states?
- is exit the only option to maintain control?
UN
- is it an ‘out-of-control world government’ and a threat to national sovereignty?
- is the UN Secretary General a secretary or a general?: secretary (chief administrative officer, facilitate communication among member states) or general (represent UN broader interests + act as spokesperson)
IGO autonomy - the ‘governor’s dilemma’
Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, Zangl
question of IGO is an example of the governor’s dilemma at local, national, global levels
- question of authority of organizations takes place on all levels of governance, not only for IGOs, also e.g. in the governance of The Hague
FACT = most governance is indirect, implemented through intermediaries
- governor (e.g. local city level, national level) = not themselves carrying out their orders: for each level governors rely on organizations to carry out their orders
QUESTION = how much autonomy should the governor give to intermediaries?
DILEMMA = micromanagement vs loose cannons
- too much control -> weakens intermediary competence + risks policy failure
= if they don’t have autonomy -> need really strict rules, if situation does not quite fit the rules, they should call the governor and ask what they should do = organization you delegated power to does not function well, can’t carry out their tasks properly -> need to give them some autonomy - too much intermediary competence -> risks control failure
organization will do things the governor does not want
organization as intermediary: you don’t want micromanagement + also don’t want loose cannons
e.g. submarines with nuclear weapons: sail around + when asked should fire
-> governor’s dillema: how much autonomy do you give to the captain to decide when to fire? -> normally: only when contacted (but what if communication is broken for days, should they fire?)
theories on IGO autonomy
- realism: no autonomy
- marxism: relative autonomy
- principal-agent theory: limited autonomy
- organizational theory: high autonomy
realist theory on IGO autonomy
Waltz, Mearsheimer, Gruber …
IGOs have NO autonomy from the interests and preferences of powerful states
- IGOs serve the interests of powerful states, they do as much/little as powerful states want them to do
- IGOs change when the distribution of power among states changes (new governor)
small states have no influence: strong states design them and control them
marxist theory on IGO autonomy
Cammack 2003
IGOs have RELATIVE AUTONOMY from capitalist states
*relative: IGOs don’t work for particular capitalists (e.g. Musk) or capitalist states, but they serve the interest of capitalism as a system
- IGOs promote capitalism as a system, but do not necessarily follow the (monopolistic) preferences of particular capitalist states or corporations
Cammack’s example: WB and IMF promote global capitalism by supporting debt sustainability and anti-poverty programs that enable capitalism to survive
principal-agent theory on IGO autonomy
Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, Tierney
(notes by iago = it is a rationalist approach)
IGOs have LIMITED AUTONOMY from their member states
in order to achieve preferred outcomes, states delegate a limited amount of decision-making authority to IGOs via contracts that empower the IGO to act on behalf of the states while allowing the states to control the IGO
- Principal (delegates authority) = states
states hand over ertain amount of autonomy to agents through contracts - Agent (gets authority) = IGOs
IOs have limited autonomy = some autonomy, but its under control
- contract empowers agent to act (gives autonomy)
- contract limits the actions of the agent
principal-agent theory : the pros and cons of delegating authority to IOs
agency gains = member states can benefit from delegating authority to IGOs, in various ways:
- specialization of functions (organization specializes, not every gov has to specialize, to understand the ins-and-outs of a specific issue)
- easier decision-making
- easier resolution of disputes
- greater credibility of commitments (maybe rewatch, just before 13.55)
- greater policy continuity
agency costs = member states can lose from delegating authority if the IGO acts in a way that is undesired by member states = AGENCY SLACK
- shirking = IGO minimizes its efforts on behalf of states
- slippage = IGO shifts policy away from states’ preferences, toward its own preferences
principal-agent theory: the challenge of controlling IGOs
conflict of interests
- states want IGOs to be effective and under their control
- IGOs want autonomy from states (organizational theory says this is just the case)
how member states (try to) control IGOs:
- limit the discretion available to IGOs
- discretion = freedom of choice
- done through treaty: you are created to do X and Y, and not ABC - monitoring and reporting requirements
- states will monitor IGO + IGO has to report (e.g. UN annual report with what they have done, how much they spent) - institutional checks and balances (e.g. EU has Parliament, Council of Ministers, and Council of Europe)
- diff intergovernmental bodies of IOs have an influence -> limits autonomy of supernational parts - sanctions, especially budget cuts
- when IGO becomes lose cannon, states can cut budget or change treaty (to make it clear you can’t do that)
obstacles to member state control of IGOs
(dynamics that make it hard to control IOs)
- disagreement among member states (expands IGO autonomy: when members are divided, IGO can do more)
- e.g. UN does something that some members don’t like, but others do -> hard for them collectively punish the organization
- e.g. European Commission after invasion Ukraine: members divided on how strongly to respond -> Commission led by Von der Leyen committed to respond -> pushed the limits on autonomy bc she knew members were divided and couldn’t punish her - societal interests support IGOs (becomes hard for gov to crack down on the IGO)
-> some IGOs deliberately cultivate support to protect themselves from punishment by member states - IGOs lobby states, seeking to change their preferences
(e.g. Europe House in the Hague lobbies for EU ?to? NL gov)
Organizational theory on IGO autonomy
Barnett and Finnemore (1999)
*organizational theory is based on sociology
IGOs have HIGH AUTONOMY
(IGOs as bureaucracies = interdisciplinary argument)
- they are not “empty shells or impersonal policy machinery … manipulated by other actors”
IGOs are bureaucracies with independent expertise whose powers and actions often do not fit the interests and preferences of states
- bureaucracy with independent expertise -> act beyond or contrary to what states want
-> IGO action cannot be explained by state-centric theories (realism, rational design, principal-agent)
IGO ‘pathology’ = tendency to produce outcomes that are dysfunctional or undesired from the perspective of their member states
- IOs as pathological, diseased
3 mechanisms due to the bureaucratic nature of IGOs:
- compartmentalized knowledge (IGOs/bureaucracies work in departments with own knowledge/expertise) -> tunnel vision
*this is not unique to IOs as bureaucracies, counts for all bureaucracies
- IGO actions are tailored to fit rules and standard operating procedures (all bureaucracies have standard operating procedure)
- e.g. US military practices attacking SU periodically, so did so during height of cuban missile crisis (not what Kennedy would’ve wanted) - tendency to downplay local variables -> IGOs make inappropriate policy recommendations
- IGO has way of doing things -> act in that way no matter specific local variables - divergent norms within a bureaucracy (e.g. non-interference vs humanitarian action) -> IGO outputs are incoherent/contradictory
(helps understand IGOs as bureaucracies, helps understand how IGOs can come with outcomes that are not wanted by states)
where did the concept of principal-agent come from
autonomy of parliamentary committees:
Members of parliament can’t do all the work, so the create committees with staff
how autonomous are these committees?
can they do their own thing or are they controlled by MPs
- principle = MPs
- agent (who works for principal) = committees
agency costs - shrinking vs slippage vs slack
slack = when an IO acts in a way that is undesired by the states
shirking = IO minimizes its efforts on behalf of states
*IO doesn’t try to do what the state wants
slippage = IGO shifts policy away from states’ preferences, toward its own preferences
*this is worse than shirking: state wants X, agent says no I want Y
added:
principle agent theory sees IGOs as actors, they want to be autonomous
but says they are under limits, under control from the treaty
organizational treaty sees them as actors that are almost out of control
