lect 8 - design of IOs Flashcards
definition IGO + types
= organizations with states as members that govern a cross-border geographic area (regional or global) or issue area (trade, environment, etc.) or both
- FIGO = formal intergovernmental organization
- IIGO = informal intergovernmental organizations
3 faces of IGOs
all faces are involved in our day-to-day thinking about IGOs, they are all correct
IGOs as forums = places where states meet and negotiate
- UNSC: “will … show?”
IGOs as instruments = tools that states use to achieve their interests
- “they’re just tools of great power X,” “it has been captured by group Y”
IGOs as actors = independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act
- “WTO imposed sanctions on…” headline
international regimes
(in between form: not just rules or organization, it is a collection)
= sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and organizations that govern behaviour within a region or issue-area
often involve a formal treaty and/or formal IGO, but not necessarily
Antarctica regime = to govern activities in Antarctica
- Antarctic Treaty + 200 other agreements
- since 2014: Secretariat in Buenos Aires
- geographical area
Ozone regime = to protect the atmospheric ozone layer
- Montreal Protocol and Vienna Convention
- Multilateral Fund
- issue area
IGOs relationship to international regimes
- a single IGO may be active in multiple regimes
- UN active in int’l human rights regime, nuclear non-proliferation regime, int’l refugee regime…. - a single regime may include multiple IGOs
- nuclear non-proliferation regime include int’l Atomic Energy Agency (monitoring), London Suppliers Group (export controls), UNSC (sanctions)
different forms of IGO
- membership
- limited: open to states with a given character (OPEC e.g. limited to petroleum-exporting countries + EU limited by geography, political, economic and administrative criteria)
- universal: open to all states (e.g. UN (with UNSC approval))
!e.g. Palestine not approved by UNSC even though it is often considered as state
different forms of IGO
- function
- to govern an issue-area (WTO, WHO)
- to govern a geographical space (EU, African Union)
- to promote a particular culture or set of values (community of democracies, organization of Islamic cooperation, organisation int’l de la Francophanie)
- mixed: to govern an issue-area within a geographical space (Asian Development Bank, Council of Europe)
different forms of IGO
- formality
“easiest way to remember: a formal IGO you can knock on the door and ask to go to the toilet, for informal IGOs there is no door to knock on”
*now more and more informal IGOs
formal
e.g. UN, WHO, WTO, EU
- organizing principle = written and formally adopted
- membership = defined by legal agreement
- structure = regular meetings, formal budget, secretariat
- delegation of authority to IGO
informal
e.g. G7, G20, G77, BRICS, ASEAN, Visegrad
- organizing principle = explicitly shared expectations (no treaty)
- membership = explicit but non-legal
- structure = regular meetings, rotating chair, little or no secretariat
- no delegation of authority to IGO (there’s nothing you can delegate to)
different forms of IGO
- decision-making
Supranational = decisions/policies are made by an executive, legislative, or judicial body that is not (directly) controlled by member states
inter-governmental = decisions/policies are made collectively by member states
- consensus: unanimity (every member has a veto but can abstain) or unanimity-minus-one (to prevent veto by a single state)
- majority: 50%-plus-one, super majority (more than >50%), weighted majority (based on size, contribution, etc.)
- mixed: some have veto, others don’t + no veto plus majority
e.g. EU
- supranational = EU Commission (supposedly), European Parliament (directly elected, not answerable to member states), European Court of Justice
- inter-governmental = EU foreign policy (consensus) + budget (weighted majority based on population)
what factors shape the creation, design and reforms of IGOs?
so many diff forms -> how can we explain why IGO A has this structure, while IGO B has different structure
(e.g. why P5 UNSC members? first proposal was France, but France refused -> got place. why no African states etc.)
- power
- shared interests
- shared normative aims
- past choices (re-design)
power and IO design
Gruber
strong states design and promote IOs that maximise their self-interests
+
weak states accept these IOs when rejecting them would be more costly
when new great powers emerge, they create and impose new IOs
so: we can explain design of IGOs by looking at the power of diff states
- e.g. India no P5 of the UNSC, despite being one of the largest states -> WHY? bc had little power when UNSC was designed
!!!!!!!!! IGO design comes from the preferences of the powerful !!!!!!!!
shared interests and IO design
- basic logic
Keohane
Interdependence exposes states to external risks (economic, environmental, etc.) AND creates opportunities to achieve joint gains
Int’l institutions help states to manage interdependence through mutually-beneficial agreements.
Which IO design will states ‘demand’ (i.e., support)?
- Demand for various IO designs “will vary directly with the desirability of agreements to states and with the ability of [each design] actually to facilitate the making of such agreements.”(152)
!!!!diff interdependency -> diff wishes for design: it depends on the interests of states in a particular interdependency context!!!!
shared interests and IO design
- hypotheses + findings
Koremenos et al. (2001)
States design international institutions in order to overcome cooperation problems and achieve joint gains
assumptions:
- shared interests of states shape the design of int’l institutions
- states behave rationally - they make choices based on costs and benefits
argument = nature of cooperation problem faced by other states -> choices on institutional design
some findings:
(*before arrow is cooperation problem, after arrow is IGO design result)
- more uncertainty about preferences of other states -> more restrictive/limited membership rule
(easier coordination with fewer members)(limit membership to states in which you have a bit more confidence that you know what they want) - more difficult distribution of gains -> broader issue scope
- more actors -> more centralization of tasks
normative aims and IO design
Ruggie
The design of IOs is shaped by the shared normative aims of the states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests (material interests).
- what is their shared idea about a good governance outcome? i.e. what are the shared government aims?
Post-WW2:
- Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would advance social welfare (!not te same as free trade, goal was social welfare, lower tariffs)
- Result: GATT was designed to balance growth (via tariff reductions) and welfare (via domestic social protections) – ‘embedded liberalism.
’Post-Cold War:
- Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would maximise economic growth.
- Result: WTO was designed to promote tariff reductions and to limit the ability of govts to adopt social protections – ‘neo-liberalism.
contradiction organization trade regime 40s, 90s, WTO vs GATT can be understood by looking at changes in shared normative aims
*end cold war as triumph for neo-liberal ideas -> states come together to redefine their shared normative aims: shared aim to move to liberalism
past choices and IO re-design
Hanrieder 2014
past choices shape and limit the design choices you can make today = historical institutionalism (path dependency)
past choices on IO design shape current options and decisions
- e.g. an IO’s treaty may enable a minority of member states to block re-design, even when change would be advantageous for most states (e.g. UNSC reform blocked by P5 veto power)
- can explain why things haven’t changed even though problems and power have changed
-> irrational responses to functional incentives or IO change
- LAYERING: IO gains new functions despite not fulfilling old functions (hope that new piece of bureaucracy will function, even while the basis isn’t working, makes no sense from efficiency pov)
e.g. int’l labour organization adopts new conventions even though many old conventions aren’t ratified or implemented - DRIFT: IO isn’t updated so it survives but becomes less effective
e.g. office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees loses relevance bc govs block redefinition of ‘refugee’
assigned reading de Souza
Brazilian diplomat, article is summary of his PhD research
what questions/puzzles motivate this article?
- explain how we got to the WTO, why we moved away from the GATT
what is de Souza’s answer or argument?
how persuasive is de Souza’s argument?
what do you think led the global south to accept the WTO?
– the exercise of state power under anarchy?
– problem-solving under interdependence?
– shared normative aims?
– the dynamics of global capitalism?–something else?
Is Medina de Souza right to argue that Global South suffers from the WTO & free trade? What is Philip Golub’s argument (lecture 3) on this?
