reading 2 dec 10 - power shifts and international order Flashcards
China and the liberal international order: a pragmatic and dynamic approach
intro
Ruonan Liu and Songpo Yang (2023)
US-China strategic competition = defining issue of 21
aim = understanding China’s evolving attitudes towards the LIO
diff views on if China is revisionist, how it stands on the LIO
- all countries engage with international norms and institutions in a selective manner, incl. the US, which can also be seen as revisionist (esp with Trump)
aim = provide a foundation for a nuanced understanding of China’s current approach to the ILO
- main disparity = China’s pragmatic and functional view vs West’s ideological emphasis of the order -> western scepticism China’s intentions, but in practice China has interacted dynamically with diff subcomponents of the LIO
- China continues to exhibit a significant degree of support for the present order and has not yet displayed intent to establish a wholly new international order
China encouraged to propagate own values of the international order bc tensions political systems and some western values + rise of populism and decline US leadership
the debate around China’s vision of the international order
western scholars divided in beliefs regarding China’s intentions
- China main beneficiary of the LIO -> has interest in maintaining it
- improvement national strength and international status -> role in the LIO has changed -> increased need to reform and even replace the LIO
Chinese literature = also two camps
camp 1 = current international order beneficial for China -> no need for China to overthrow it
- LIO has greatly alleviated disorder in the anarchical system + provides eco opp for developing countries
rests on two assumptions:
- current US unipolar system will eventually give way to a US/China bipolar system or a multipolar system dominated by major powers who value political stability, international norms and global eco integration
- US will remain committed to protecting its core areas of hegemony, which China should avoid challenging directly + China will increase power in less crucial areas = system of symbiosis
camp 2 = LIO growing dysfunctionality due to lack legitimacy -> China should offer alternative framework to address global crises
- problem LIO = only based on western norms + used as instrument of US hegemony + interventionist tendencies (-> regional chaos)
- China can offer a blueprint for a new order: Tianxia (more holistic and inclusive) as optimal philosophy for world governance + call for Wangdao (humane authority) rather than Badao (hegemony)
Chinese perceptions of the LIO
Chinese academia: establishment and maintenance LIO requires 3 conditions:
- LIO product of US pursuit and consolidation of its dominant position, oriented to US interests and liberal values
- US power advantage + system of global alliances constitutes the security basis for the LIO
- multilateral institutions that promote the liberal character of the US (e.g. free trade and market econ), provide the necessary institutional foundation for the LIO
= hegemony is the end, strength is the foundation and the institutions the means
Chinese gov does not say LIO, it says existing international order, postwar international order, international order underpinned by international law
= it refers to parts of the LIO it supports: emphasizing importance international rules
- diff labels international order reveal distinct value preferences
diff with western focus = China’s pragmatic position by
- putting emphasis on objective foundations (rules-based multilateral international framework)
- refusal to attach ideological value to the international order
*US and allies see the multilateral rules as means to promote liberal values - rejecting that liberal democratic values and the system of military alliances are an intrinsic part of the order
-> mutual suspicion and accusation
- US sceptical of China’s commitment to uphold the LIO
- China criticism ‘hypocrisy’ of the LIO: presents itself as global order but operates as en exclusive club only for countries with western ideologies and policies
LIO as essentially American order that always prioritizes US interests and liberal values over international norms and rules
LIO’s key subcomponents and China’s broad reactions
China’s approach to the LIO = complex and dynamic
China engages with diff aspects of the LIO in diff ways
three key subcomponents of the LIO
- UN-centered international political/security order
= China strongly supportive - multilateralism-based international economic order
= China supportive but with intention to promote reforms in certain domains - regional economic order
= China dynamically evolving
China’s approach to the international order = pragmatic, bound up with three intertwined dynamic variables:
- domestic political and economic agenda
- national strength
- relationship with the US
the international political/security order - China’s reaction
= centered around the UN + based on the UN Charter and international law
this order = cornerstone of maintaining global peace and stability
principle of sovereign equality and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (UN Charter) = consistent with China’s 5 principles of peaceful coexistence
China has consistently highlighted its importance + increasing investment in it
bc:
- international regimes and norms align with China’s aspiration to attain great super power status (UNSC veto + uses it to achieve its agenda)
- emphasis on state sov, equality and non-interference (confers China with the legitimacy and institutional power for ‘defending the nation’s sovereignty against foreign encroachment’ and ‘circumscribing the liberal emphasis on individual political freedoms)
- UN gives China platform to show commitment to multilateralism + address global issues critical to its domestic stability and security
in short: UN-centred international political/security order aligns with China’s objective of advancing ‘a triadic model of [economic] development, strong state, and social stability’)
the international economic order - China’s reaction
China’s attitudes more dynamic
- international eco order has nurtured China eco growth
- growing national strength -> China willing and able to push for reforms -> shifts in interaction with them
international eco order has 3 suborders:
- mulitlateral trade order
- international financial order
- international development assistance order
multilateral trade order - China is firmly supportive, emphasizing determination to uphold the trading system
international financial order - China is trying to increase its influence: voting power largely determined by balance of power among states, original distribution does not reflect changes in the eco landscape (rise China and other emerging states)
- China seeking to enlarge power within existing institutions
- creation alternative institutions (AIIB and Silk Road Fund) give it additional means to gain leverage needed to increase power within existing institutions
efforts to internationalize Chinese currency and reduce dependene on US dollar -> concerns about intentions, but this perspective overestimates China’s current capabilities + overlooks how deeply China is entrenched in global financial markets powered by the US dollar
- China’s objective = minimizing exchange risk and liquidity shortages
international development assistance order - China attempts to complement it, providing overseas dev. assistance (traditionally only rich western states would do this and so promote democracy and liberalism), Chinese help does not hinge on political achievements of recipients, it does not promote political reform
- BRI: Chinese gov and academia deny strategic intention, but some argue it has political and security purpose or that it aims to shift excess industrial capacity
undeniable = it serves both China’s domestic dev. goals and its desire for global prestige - allure BRI and its financier AIIB = boosted by disinterest of western private capital in bridging infrastructure financing gap in developing nations
the regional economic order - China’s reaction
US has long sought to create an inclusive, high-standard, rule-based eco order in the Asia-Pacific region
China’s response = dismissive -> accommodative
e.g. attitude towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership
- initially: China suspicious: saw it as US policy of rebalancing to Asia aimed at containing China’s regional hegemony
- gradually: started to think about joining
- later TPP -> Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
bc Trump 2017 left - since then China’s attitude even more positive
!decisionmaking based on cost-benefit analysis rather than desire to compete with the US (visible in the fact that China was alr more positive before US left the TPP)
challenges to the LIO and China’s responses
current challenges to the LIO in the context of intensified US-China strategic competition:
western scholars:
- COVID-19 pandemic
- rise of populism
- growing disorder in regional politics and security
- perceived threat posed by China
Chinese officials and academia: LIO in process of transformation, drawbacks of the LIO are becoming pronounced in 3 areas:
- LIO under-represents the interests and demands of developing and emerging countries
- LIO perceived as unfair: western led eco globalization has contributd to widening wealth gap
- diversity and complexity global and regional crises have revealed dysfunctionality of the LIO -> calss for more pluralistic model of governance
perceived drawbacks -> China active in promoting thoughts on reform of the LIO:
- economically: pushing for greater representation and participation of emerging and developing countries in international affairs
- socially/ecologically: concept of balanced, coordinated and inclusive growth + launched the Global Development Initiative (GDI) that emphasizes taking real actions, focusing on dev. problems and following the concept of people centered approach
China’s recent responses to LIO -> two major changes stand out:
- proposals more ‘macro’ in character = regime-oriented -> norm-oriented + align with some countries at the UN to advocate the idea of developmentalist human rights as an alternative to western human rights norms
- increased investment in international institution-building
-> US sees any moves from politically illiberal China as ideologically unacceptable
China overturn the LIO?
no apparent intention to overturn the LIO
it seeks to see an international order that:
- recognizes its great power status
- provides a more equitable distribution of benefits
- allows resistance to some liberal norms that may jeopardize core interests and harm its regime security
China seeks a more balanced relationship with the US
China’s current overall capacity ad vision of International order are insufficient to support a new international order
+ has yet to come up with universal values that can supplant American values
conclusion
article finds that China still largely supports the current order, except for concerns over global crises that have not been adequately tackled by the existing global governance
China does not attempt to change the core elements of the order (at the moment)
If China sticks to the pragmatic line and remains focused on globalization without exporting ideologies, we can be cautiously optimistic that the world will avoid a new Cold War in the foreseeable future
