lec 12 - power shifts and international order Flashcards
why do great powers rise and fall?
- differential growth rates
- power resources and imperial overstretch
- domestic ideology and global recognition
why do great powers rise and fall?
- differential growth rates
A state’s domestic arrangements and stage of technological development determine its rate of economic growth.
Differences in economic growth rates accumulate over time, leading some states to lose power and others to gain
= some states have higher growth rates than others: determined by domestic structures (investment in eco dev. etc.) + technological development
(China’s growing fast)
= differential growth rates explain why some states rise and some states fall in relative terms
- e.g. standard of living in Europe has not gone down, but growth rate is lower than that of the US and China, others grow faster
they accumulate over time, that leads some states to lose power and some states to gain
why do great powers rise and fall?
- power resources and imperial overstretch
The power of states depends on their economic and military resources and how efficiently they use those resources, relative to other states.
Great powers decline when their global ambitions exceed their economic & military resources (‘imperial overstretch’),leading to costly, unwinnable wars and under-investment in economic strength
- imperial overstretch = tendeny for super powers to take on commitments that they can’t sustain with the resources they don’t have (e.g. engage in wars they can’t win)
- can lead a great power to decline
- e.g. US involved in Afghanistan -> contributes to its ultimate decline
- US has been overstretched for decades: does not invest in the sources of its power, it is investing in wars here and there -> ovestretching its capacities
why do great powers rise and fall?
- domestic ideology and global recognition
it’s more than resources – rising powers are not all the same.
- Active rising powers: states with growing economic and military strength (resources) that adopt domestic ideologies that legitimize their global ambitions and that mimic/copy the prevailing great power actions to gain global recognition of their status.
- Reticent rising powers: states with growing resources that do not pursue the domestic ideology or global recognition of a great power
reticent = reluctant/hesitant, no ideology that emphasises a global role + doesn’t try to mimic global power
e.g. now China active rising power, India reticent rising power
= she brings ideas and status into the discussion
how do power transitions affect international institutions?
- redistribution of power destabilise international rules and institutions
- redistributions of power don’t necessarily destabilize international rules and institutions (Keohane)
- int’l institutions and the strategies of rising powers
what int’l order do rising powers want, and why?
- rising powers and seek recognition and voice
- rising powers favour a hybrid int’l order
- China pursues a hybrid strategy on int’l order
- China’s selective approach to liberal int’l order
- China favours a new int’l order consistent with CCP ideology
- China is not committed to the liberal int’l institutional order
- China is contesting the UN’s liberal agenda, with mixed success
what int’l order does the US want, and why?
- US conditional approach to liberal int’l order
- crisis of liberal int’l order is due o its declining legitimacy within western states
How do power transitions affect international institutions?
- redistribution of power destabilise international instittions and rules
Mearsheimer
great powers create int’l rules and institutions to maintain or increase their share of world power
redistribution of power weaken the foundations of existing international rules and institutions … and often lead to war
new gat powers create new rules and institutions
How do power transitions affect international institutions?
- redistributions of power don’t necessarily destabilize internatinoal rules and institutions
(Keohane)
Hegemon can decline, but institutions and rules can continue bc states want to manage interdependence (-> want to keep the rules they have developed to do so)
- keep the benefits of interdependence without incurring the costs
Hegemons (great powers) create int’l order (rules on trade, etc.) that benefits them, and use their power to maintain it.
- Wise hegemons create int’l order that also provides public goods (benefits accessible to all).
- As hegemon declines, other states fear loss of public goods, so they invest in maintaining existing rules and institutions
How do power transitions affect international institutions?
- international institutions and the strategies of rising powers
Puzzle: Rising powers sometimes challenge an int’l order that enables their growth, and at other times support an order that constrains them.
Explanation: The nature of int’l institutions shapes the choices of rising states as they pursue equal status with established powers:
- Open membership rules and fair decision-making procedures promote cooperation.
- Exclusion and unfairness promote conflict.
The future of contemporary int’l order depends on the ability of int’l institutions to address the status ambitions of rising powers such as China and India.
if an order accepts you as a great power, than you accept the order
if an order does not accept you as a great power, they challenge the order
-> they want to be accepted as equal in the club of great powers
e.g. China has benefited from int’l order (e.g. accepted in WTO -> massive growth) -> has in ways been critical and accepting of the order
!!it’s about status
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- rising powers seek recognition and voice
look at BRICS summit (informal IGO): read statements that came out of it > they were looking for status: wanted acceptance at the table where decisions were made
!!!rising powers want status, a seat at the table!!!!
Argument: The difficulty of adapting int’l order to rising powers depends on what these states are contesting & demanding.
Question: How are rising powers challenging int’l order?
- Normative contestation: content of int’l rules, kind of order they support
- Representational contestation: who gets to set and oversee int’l rules
Method: study language used in summits of BRICS leaders
Finding: BRICS accept basic int’l norms while contesting representation – they are more focused on great power status & multipolar decision-making than on normative change.
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- rising powers favor a hybrid int’l order
Rising powers’ dilemma:
- Increased dependence on world economy -> support for status quo. (keep the int’l order bc its been good for you)
- Statist forms of development (state crucial in dev., e.g. in China) -> tension with liberal principles of free market and individual rights.
Result: Rising powers favour a hybrid order: more transnational integration but based on less liberal principles.
= do we want the status quo that made us rich or do we want a model that is less liberal -> favor a hybrid int’l order (integrated world econ, but less liberal in governing principles)
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
China pursues a hybrid strategy on int’l order
*same as last flashcards, but specifically for China
Factors shaping China’s strategy on int’l order:
- National development via global market integration.
- State-directed capitalism based on close relations between business and the Communist party-state.
Result: Hybrid strategy, combining adaptation, confrontation, and building alternative institutions, with variation across issue-areas.
- continue with integration, but in some areas less liberal
-> Chinese is challenging some aspects of liberal int’l order, accepting others.
!!today’s reading
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- China’s selective approach to liberal int’l order
look at what scholars and gov officials are saying
!!this does not include everything that’s in the article
Chinese scholars and govt officials are selective about the LIO, which they see as a tool of US hegemony.
-> they want to work with pieces of it, but not with everything
Aims: to promote sovereign equality under int’l law (no hierarchy based on how states treat their subjects, that is an internal matter); to become a rule-maker, not just a rule-taker; to build institutions beyond the lLO architecture (still also acting within it)
Obstacles: shortage of power resources; shortage of allies; internal problems; lack of universal values.
“Although China has no apparent intention to overturn the LIO, it does wish to see an international order that recognizes its great power status, provides a more equitable distribution of benefits, and allows resistance to some liberal norms that may jeopardize its core interests and harm its regime security. Moreover, China seeks a more balanced relationship with the United States, the dominant power in the LIO, to satisfy its aspirations for great power status.”
!!probs need to learn this article
!!power transitions is a concept????????
don’t focus on the nitty gritty
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- China favours a new int’l order, consistent with CCP ideology
China’s approach to int’l order depends on the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.
Key elements of CCP ideology:
- state over markets;
- state interests over individual rights;
- rule by law, not rule of law;
(not nobody is above the law, but state uses law to achieve its goals) - ethnic nationalism, not civic nationalism. (privilege Han ethnicity)
As a result, China favours an international order that…
- prioritizes state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference;
- enables states to protect citizens from market forces;
- limits the priority of individual rights.
= to understand what China wants in the liberal order, you need to look through the eyes of the dominant party ideology
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- China is not committed to the liberal int’l order
researched what treaties rising states were committed to
not just the treaties they accepted, but individual protocols
A statistical study of commitment to the int’l institutional order (IIO).
- China accepts treaties that create broad multilateral principles but resists additional protocols that create more concrete or demanding/binding obligations.
- China is less embedded in IIO than other P-5 states, BRICS, Japan, Korea
- China and Russia are less embedded in human rights institutions than other P-5 (FR, UK, US) or other BRICS (BR, IN, SA)
finding: China is less embedded in international institutional order than other members P5, BRICS, Japan and Korea
what int’l order do rising powers want and why?
- China is contesting the UN’s liberal agenda, with mixed success
Since 2000, China is contesting UN’s focus on human security (protection of civilians and ‘Responsibility to Protect’), advocating a focus on state security (preventing war).
- UN is moving in liberal direction: prioritises the individual (e.g. R2P)
Method: UNSC vetoes, more funding for UN actions, more Chinese officials in UN bureaucracy, new normative discourse on development and security.
Effects: Uneven thus far (reasons below), but longer-term effects could be greater.
- Liberal paradigm is embedded in UN institutions and practices.
- Geopolitical concerns and rivalries reduces audience for China’s agend
what kind of int’l order does the US want?
- US’ conditional approach to liberal int’l order
Due to shifts in power, the US is increasingly critical of the liberal int’l order.
- To win the Cold War, the US accepted the costs of collective security, economic openness, and democracy promotion.
- After Cold War, costs were harder to justify.
US power is declining + cold war is over -> US more selective (just like China)
US approach is now more conditional:
- Support where US retains dominant power (IMF, NATO)
- Challenge where US has lost power (WTO, UN)
what kind of int’l order does the US want?
- crisis of liberal int’l order is due to its declining legitimacy within Western states
Growth of ‘liberal international order’ created by US and based on economic openness, multilateral institutions, security coop’n, democratic solidarity.
- After WW2, included US, Western Europe, Japan.
- After Cold War, states in East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa adopted democracy and capitalism.
In recent decades: Neoliberalism -> economic inequality -> far-right populism and nationalism in EU and US -> rejection of liberal int’l order
globalization had painful effects of home -> anti-globalization backlash -> leads US to be critical of global institutions
!you need to look at how the international order boomeranged into the hegemon, how it causes pain
(helps us understand the politics of Trump)
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- classic study of power transition
- power transition theory
- power transitions are always conflictual (Mearsheimer)
- bipolarity and nuclear weapons both reduce the risk of war during power transitions
- power transitions depend on regime type
- power transitions depend on identities and ideologies
- power transitions are what rising powers make of them
- power transitions are what dominant powers make of them
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- classic study of power transition
Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war
war between Sparta and Athens 431-404 BC
argument = dominant state (sparta) used force against a rising state (athens) to stop it from gaining more power
growth of Athenian power and fear this caused in Sparta -> war inevitable
dominant state will start war to prevent that the rising power will surpass it (-> will US use force to stop China?)
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transition theory
updated Thucydides
uneven rates of eco growth -> power transitions
during power transitions, two factors determine a state’s preference for war vs peace
- position in the int’l distribution of power
- satisfaction with current int’l order
= variation in satisfaction with the status quo, in which small/dominated states are not happy but not powerful so won’t challenge the dominant state
hypotheses:
- satisfied states don’t challenge the dominant states
- e.g. NL now - unsatisfied but weak states don’t challenge the dominant state (they’re not strong enough to change it)
- e.g. Bangladesh - strong, unsatisfied states challenge the dominant state -> war
- e.g. China (although it has a mixed attitude: it is also satisfied with some elements)
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transitions are always conflictual
Assumptions:
- The threat of war is always present in international politics.
- Anarchy -> insecurity -> all states prefer to dominate their neighbours.
- Only some states (‘great powers’) achieve a dominant position.
Expectations:
- As rising states approach ‘great power’ status, they become more aggressive.
- Dominant states will use force to resist rising state
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- bipolarity and nuclear weapons both reduce the risk of war during power transitions
(Waltz)
Multipolar distributions of power tend to be unstable, with high risk of war.
- Uncertainty about alliances and war outcomes -> willingness to take risks.
Bipolar distributions of power tend to be stable, with low risk of war.
- Clear balance of power -> low expectation of gain -> low risk of war.
- Small states seek security by allying with a great power, but have little impact on the overall balance
nuclear weapons -> consequences of war are predictable -> low risk of war
(nuclear weapons make governments cautious)
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transitions depend on regime typ
democratic peace hypothesis: emocracies don’t fight each other
(norms form foreign policy)
!democracies are not peaceful, they just don’t fight each other
Power transitions involving two democracies are more likely to be settled peacefully than power transitions involving other types of regimes.
1890-1910, dominant power UK (democracy) faced two rising powers:
- USA (democracy) -> peaceful transition
- Germany (non-democracy) -> war
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transitions depend on identities and ideologies
Studied 9 crisis in UK-US relations between 1820s and 1940s. = 9 moments they could’ve gone to war
Finding: Converging identities of UK & US enabled peaceful transition.
– UK became more democratic (more like the US)
– US became more imperial (more like the UK)
Result: UK and US focused more on their cumulative power compared to other states than on their relative power compared to each other.
Prediction: Deep ideological differences between US and China will make power transition very conflictual, focused on relative gain
(anarchy is what states make of it)
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transitions are what rising power smake of them
rising state may cooperate with or challenge declining great power
choice = based on rising state’s calculation of power and threats (not interdependence or ideology!!)
- rising power will cooperate with declining great power when useful to offset threats from other great powers
- rising power will challenge declining great power if it doesn’t face threats from other great powers or cooperation helps it overcome these threats
after ww2, rising US cooperated with declining UK to offset rising USSR
How do power transitions affect the risk of war?
- power transitions are what dominant powers make of them
!!article we read today!!
the degree of conflict during power transitions depends on how the dominant power responds to the rising power.
Dominant power’s strategy shapes rising power’s satisfaction w/ int’l order:
- confront and repress -> rising power dissatisfied, inclined to conflict
- contain and accomodate -> rising power satisfied, inclined to cooperate
The US could use its dominant position to revise the existing int’l order in ways that increase the legitimacy of its hegemonic position, attract support from other states, and reduce China’s interest in overturning int’l order. But so far, it has not done so
is war between China and US inevitable?
- US-China conflict is inevitable (Mearsheimer)
- thucydides trap
- there is no thucydides trap in china-us relations
- small and middle powers shape hegemonic change
- power transition and the future of alliances
is war between China and US inevitable?
- US-China conflict is inevitable
Mearsheimer
In 1990s, US had a choice: resist or assist the growing relative power of China
- US leadership believed that economic growth and interdependence would produce domestic reform and cooperative int’l behaviour.
- US integrated China into world economy (WTO), facilitated its growth.
Power trends:
- Population: China 3x greater than US.
- Economy: China will be 1.5-2x greater than US.
- Military: China is gaining, soon more powerful than US in East Asia region.
Expectation:
- China aims to dominate its region (east Asia, western Pacific).
- US will not tolerate China as peer competitor
-> Conflict is “inevitable.
is war between China and US inevitable?
- Thucydides trap
Thucydides trap = great powers fear + rising powers ambitions -> high likelihood of war
historical record: war in 12/16 cases when rising state had enough power to challenge the hegemon
conclusion: avoiding war requries great political and psychological flexibility
is war between China and US inevitable?
- there is no Thucydides trap in China-US relations
*he found this yesterday
War is unlikely because China-US relations differ from Athens-Sparta relations:
- US has little to fear: China is growing but US is far ahead in military power, alliances, influence over int’l orgs, cultural power.
- Economic interdependence.
- Nuclear deterrence.
- US allies in Asia-Pacific have economic ties to China, so favour peace.
- China is part of various Asian IOs that promote dialogue.
US-China relations is not likely to lead to war
is war between US and China inevitable?
- small and middle powers shape hegemonic change
Avoid the ‘Thucydides fallacy’ – don’t focus just on great powers!
The world order consequences of hegemonic change depend on:
- Supply: What declining & rising powers are offering the rest of the world.
- Demand: What the rest of the world wants.
As countries of Global South become richer and more powerful, their expectations will shape the outcome of the US-China rivalry. .
is war between US and China inevitable?
- power transition and the future of alliances
*he skipped this
Trends:
- Globalisation + China’s rise + US decline -> geopolitics and geoeconomics are no longer aligned.
- Many US security allies (EU, Australia, others) are linked economically to US rivals (China & Russia).
Consequences:
*Cooperation and competition vary across issue-areas
*Small & medium-sized states will pursue mixed strategies: bandwagonwith US on some issues but balance, hedge and even pursue strategic autonomy on other issues
*China and US will struggle with the inconsistency of allies & alliances.
