NY BAR REVIEW - IMPORTANT CASES Flashcards
REVERSED in WEST COAST HOTEL CO. V. PARRISH
BAKER V. CARR 1962
Forced Tenn leg to reapportion itself on basis of population,
ending excessively high representation of rural areas in stte leg and
establishing that Sup ct amy intervene in apportionment cases.
Rural areas dominated Tenn and other states’ leg politics. Every
vote carries equal weight regardless of voter’s place of residence.
In REYNNOLDS V. SIMS 1964,
required virtually every stte leg
to be reapportioned, causing political power in most stte leg to shift
from rural to urban areas.
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES SCHOOL
DISTRICT V. PICO 1982
Restricted ability of school boards to censor school libraries. Ct
reversed NY decision that allowed a local school board to remove
books it found offensive. While a board may exercise a certain amt
of discretion in creating a library to reflect community values, it
cant arbitrarily impose its own will on effort and trample citizens’
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st AMEND rts. Books shown to be vulgar or irrelevant may be
removed, but those simply containing unpopular ideas may not.
BOWERS V. HARDWICK 1986
Fundamental rt to privacy, guaranteed by const, doesn’t extend to
sex acts regarded as sodomy under stte law, even if those take
place bw consenting adults in confines of home. A gay Ga man
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arrested in his home for engaging in oral sex w another man in
violation of stte sodomy law. Sup ct upheld constitutionality of Ga
statute on grounds that it reflected a legitimate belief by society
that certain sex acts are immoral and unacceptable. Dissenting,
JUDGE BLACKMUN- that ruling violates 1 of most fundamental
rts of all- “rt to be let alone.”
BRADWELL V. ILLINOIS 1873
Upheld Illinois sup ct decision, denied a woman rt to practice law
bc of gender. Appealed to sup ct on ground that stte cts decision
was at odds w privileges and immunities clause of 14th AMEND.
High ct took same narrow view of clause that it had established a
day prior in SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES- BUTCHERS
BENEVOLENT ASSOC OF NEW ORLEANS V. CRESCENT
CITY LIVESTOCK LANDING AND SLAUGHTERHOUSE.
Sex- discriminatory statutes didn’t begin being struck down on 14th
AMEND grounds till 20th century.
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA 1954/5
Racial segregation in public schools violated 14th AMEND, saying
that no stte may deny equal protection of laws to any person w/in
its jurisd. Separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.
Brown reversed earlier ruling PLESSY V. FERGUSON that
permitted “separate but equal” public facilities. This was limited to
public schools, but is believed to imply that segregation wasn’t
permissible in other public facilities. Laid out guidelines for ending
segregation and advised that school boards must proceed “w all
deliberate speed” to satisfy guidelines.
BUTCHERS BENEVOLENT ASSOC OF NEW ORLEANS V.
CRESCENT CITY LIVESTOCK LANDING AND
SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CO. 1873
Limited protections provided by 14th AMEND (- prohibiting stts
from denying any person “equal protection of law”). A sttesanctioned slaughtering monopoly didn’t abridge other
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slaughterhouse owners’ privileges and immunities as US citizens
and deprive them of property rts, as had claimed. Ct didn’t extend
federal protection of civil rts to property rts of businesspersons,
consequently, weakening power of 14th AMEND to protect civil rts
of blacks and other minorities.
CRUZAN V. MISSOURI DEPT OF HEALTH 1990
Upheld constitutionality of persons rt to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment as long as clear and convincing evidence is
presented that such refusal is desired by person. Ct ruled that
comatose patient hadn’t sufficiently conveyed her wishes and
therefore that life-sustaining treatment must continue. Ct allowed
that when demonstrable evidence of patient’s wishes is given, lifesustaining treatment may be removed in interest of preserving
individual liberty and quality of life.
ENGEL V. VITALE 1962
State-sanctioned prayer in public schools is unconstl. Even when a
prayer is essentially nondenominational and pupils who so desire
may be excused from reciting it, if action is stte sponsored, the
stte’s in violation of constl separation of church and stte.
Devotional exercises in public school go against establishment of
religion clause.
ERIE RAILROAD CO. V. TOMPKINS 1938
Required fed cts to apply stte law in diversity, where litigants are
from diff jurisds. Beforehand: SWIFT V. TYSON 1842- diversity
cases decided on basis of what was held to be a kind of federal
common law consisting of “laws of several stts” plus federal cts’
interpretation of those.
Justice Brandeis that earlier ruling uncstl, changing, thus, the
course of diversity proceedings. Theres no federal common law
in diversity cases; only federal application of stte laws.
EX PARTE McCARDLE 1869
Sup cts appellate jurisd can be limited by congressional act,
establishing cong’s leg supremacy over exec and jud branches of
fed govt. A Miss editor jailed for sedition after criticizing federal
reconstruction efforts. He appealed to sup ct for a writ of habeas
corpus. Cong passed a law stripping ct of its power of judicial
review in regard to reconstruction measures, ct dismissed his
appeal on ground lacked jurisd over such matters. Peak of radical
republican power to determine natl policy.
EX PARTE MILLIGAN 1866
Prohibited federal govt fom establishing military cts to try civilians
except where reg cts were no longer functioning in actual theater
of war. Milligan was arrested in Indiana home in 1864 and tried in
military ct on charges of aiding the confederacy. Sup ct declared
that neither PRESIDENT nor cong had authority to set up such ct.
Milligan had been deprived of constl rt to trial by jury,
consequently, freed.
EX PARTE YOUNG 1908
Federal ct may enjoin stte from enforcing a law that’s
constitutionally challenged. Law was a railroad rate reduction
statute in Minnes challenged by railroad co. shareholders on
ground that it deprived them of their property w/o due process of
law. They applied in fed district ct for injunction, granted, yet later
ignored by stte authorities.
Sup ct found for shareholders and district ct, holding
Right to enjoin didn’t violate 11th AMEND restrictions on power
of federal cts to hear suits against stts.
FURMAN V. GA 1972
Capital punishment laws, as then enforced, uncstl.
Death penalty itself didn’t violate const but manner of its
application in many stts did. Capital punishment was likely to be
imposed in a discriminatory way and blacks were far more likely
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to be executed than whites. Required a system for applying death
penalty that would not be discriminatory against any racial or other
minority. Many stts passed laws, since, that meet ct’s requirements
of specifying crimes or circumstances for which death penalty’s to
be considered.
GIBBONS V. OGDEN 1824
Stts cant by leg enactment interfere w power of cong to regulate
commerce. NY authorized monopoly on steamboat operation in
stte waters, action upheld by stte chancery ct. Sup ct ruled that
competing steamboat operators were protected by terms of federal
license to engage in trade along coast. Development in the
interpretation of commerce clause, and freeing all navigation of
monopoly control.
GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT 1963
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th AMEND guarantees defendants rt to counsel and an indigent
def must be provided w court-appointed lawyer in felony cases.
Overruled BETTS V. BRADY 1942- prevented extension of due
process clause of 14th AMEND to stte as well as federal criminal
proceedings. Led to expansion of due process guarantees and other
fundamental rts in trial procedures.
GITLOW V. NY 1925
Extended 1st AMEND freedom-of-speech and 14th AMEND equalprotection provisions to stts as well as fed govt. Gitlow’s
conviction in NY ct on criminal anarchy charges upheld by sup ct
“a stte may punish utterances endangering foundations of
organized govt and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.”
Ct noted that freedoms of speech and press are among
fundamental rts and liberties constlly protected from impairment
by stts.
14th AMEND extended provision of BILL OF RTS to stte action.
GREGG V. GA 1976
Upheld constitutionality of death penalty for 1st degree murder as
long as individual character of offender and circumstances of
crime are taken into acct. 2- part proceeding:
1. determine guilt or innocence
2. determine sentence.
Opponents of GA death penalty statute claimed it violated 18th
AMEND guaranteeing against cruel and unusual punishment. Sup
ct found the statute contained sufficient guidelines regarding jury
deliberation and discretion to enable law to be imposed w/o
constituting arbitrary or discriminatory application. In other 2
cases that same day, ct cautioned against stts requiring mandatory
death sentences for certain crimes, since such precluded possibility
of considering mitigating circumstances.
GRISWOLD V. CONN 1965
Invalidated law prohibiting use of contraceptives, even by married
persons. Executive of Planned Parenthood League of CONN
convicted of counseling clients to use contraceptives. Conviction
overturned. Justice Douglas- theres a “zone of privacy” w/in a
“penumbra” created by fundamental constl guarantees that
includes rt to personal privacy. CONN was found to have
unconstitutionally interfered w that privacy in enacting and
enforcing the ban on contraception.
HAMMER V. DAGENHART 1918
Struck down Keating-Owen Act 1916 regulating child labor.
Sup ct ruled the act exceeding federal authority and representing
unwarranted encroachment on stte powers to determine local labor
conditions. Justice Holmes dissents- evils of excessive child labor,
inability of stts to regulate child labor, and unqualified rt of cong to
regulate interstte commerce, including “rt to prohibit.”
Ct’s ruling overturned in US V. DARBY LUMBER CO. 1941.
HEART OF ATL MOTEL V. US 1964
Upheld constitutionality of CIVIL RTS ACT 1964, giving federal
law enforcement officials power to prevent racial discrimination
in use of public facilities. An ATL motel refused to rent rooms to
blacks, claiming the establishment was privately owned and
operated only w/in stte, thus its immune from fed statute. Govt
sued on ground that motel received out-of-state patrons, since
located near 2 interstte hwys, thus coming under both public
accommodations section of CIVIL RTS ACT and interstte
commerce clause of const. ct sustained govt’s position and
enjoined motel from discriminating on basis of race.
IN RE DEBS 1895
Upheld govt’s use of injunction against unlawful strikes. Labor
leader Deb’s violation of federal ct injunction against 1894
Pullman Train Car Co. plant strike.
Sup ct upheld injunction on grounds of natl sovereignty and
govt’s authority to remove obstructions to interstte commerce
and mails. PULLMAN INJUNCTION used as a model for strike
stoppages till decisions during New Deal era began to weaken it.
INTL SHOE CO. V. WASHINGTON 1945
Expanded stts powers to claim jurisd over out-of-stte parties.
Prior to ruling, stts often couldn’t establish jurisd (in personam)
over outside parties, even when the latter could be shown to have
contracted w or tortiously injuring a stte or its citizens. Sup ct held
that when “minimum contacts” as such are maintained w a stte,
notions of fair play and substl justice require the contacting party
to be made subject to that stt’s laws.
Consequently, stts enacted “long arm” statutes extending their
power to apply in personam jurisd.