lecture 2 commons Flashcards
hardin 1968 how do we deal overpopulation
-no tech solution
-stop the freedom to breed
-
hardin 1968 conclusion tradagy commons
to stop tradagy of the commons must stop over population
pop low = no harm
only way out socialism or gov ownership
Ostrom 1999 key view about tradagy of the commons
tradegy commons wrong not inevitable that they will be overexploited, more solution than gov ownership or sociasm.
ostrom 1999 what can instions do
restrict acess , create incentives invest recources, desighn effective property rights
norms cpr
-build trust
-not just free riding
-monitor each other
-authorities limit use
-users can enforce rules
people create rules - s
ostrom 1999 what does s resources depend on
-depend on recoue
-autonmy make decisions
-benfits saving outweigh cost
ostrom 1999 main challenges govern commons
-scale up problem
-loosing culture, more individualised
-accelerating rates change
-complication interlinked CPR
requirement unamnous decsion collective choice rules
-only one globe experiment resources
ostom 1999 conclusion tragedy commons
doesnt have to be if we learn from lesson past use communication and build trust.
define rules
generally agreed upon enforced prescription reuire, forbid , permit certian action
define right
particular action authorized
define property right
authority undertake paticular action related to specific domain
define access
right enter physically defined property
define withdrawal
right to obtain products resource
define management
right regulate internal use pattern transfrom recources and make improvements
define exlusion
right to determine who acess area
define alienation
right to sell or lease rights
schlanger and ostrom why defacto rights important -fishman
1) devise effective systems to stop overharvesting stop inefficient use recources
2) create operational rules match physical, economic, conditions area
3)reform wipe away effort local self regulation
4) local regulations beneficaries regulate costs= more efficient
schlanger ostrom 1992 what challanging rights
expansion tech, privatisation
adkikari 2021 how do local manage CPR
-creation formal and informal institutions
adkikari 2021 when does overexplotiation CPR occur
when open access and unregulated
adhikari and lovett 2004- what should system gov be like to manage recourses
highly flexible unsure managment is relevant to local conditions
adhikari lovvet key condtion effective gov
accountabilty, conflcit managment , particpation, equity, effiecency, effectivenss
kimegsi et al what is needed to improve community gov nepal and camerron
-strong legal and insitutional setup
-increase participation females
-strong federation users
-scientific forest managment
-more indignous and traditional approaches
Robinson et al 2018 why need land tenure?
-help local development and conservation
-
robinson et al 2018 what could be done to improve land tenure and conservation?
-assess baseline s-e polical situation and underlying tenure issues
-examine how land tenure interact conservation programs
-consider effects inteventions on groups
-when tenured secure reassess action to most likly achieve desighed outcomes
what are CPR
non excludable and subtractable recourses
what public goods
live in cant exlude using won’t dimish others use eg national defence, air
what are club goods
regulate structures pay to acess e.g private parks , subscriptions
what are private goods
-food, clothing, cars, fossil fue;s
which people associate tradegy of the commons to
-William Forster loyd 1833
-hardin 1968
is it a tradegy of the comon?
no- open acess
Ostrom- 1990 problem hardin
-open acess sitation rare, people cooperate by making rules
manage them common property regimes
define property right
how resource, ecomic good owned and used
define recourse tenure system
-arrangment people gain access to natural recourses
- condtions which use recources and distribute benfits arising from them
-instutions and processes to manage processes
what are 4 main tenure systems
-private
-communal
-individual
-open access
benefits private property mange recourses
-clear ownership, authorty , abilty apply rules, long term securty= incentives manage recourse
negative private property to manage recourse
owners not interested conservation = manage unsustainably
issues state property managmet
-some not recourses to manage
-indignous not recognise = disputes
-lack capacity enforce rules= open acess
how can state controll property rights
-laws
-tax
what did hardin believe stop tradegy commons
-population control
-private property
-top down regulation
how custimory insitution manage recouse
- social norms
-taboos
issues custimory institions
-no legal footing
-hard to challange
what is legal pluralism
rules and local customs exist alongside each other
example legal plurilsm ghana
-cant cut down some trees as seen belong chief
+ state regulation what trees can be cut
what external pressures make customary institutions vulneralbe
-migration
-modernsing forces
-marketss
why did nationalization of forest recourse nepal fail
local not feel ownership forest = overexploit
lacked abilty to enforce property rights
how many hectares forest managed CF nepal
2.2million ha
why secure tenure good thing cons
-com know exlude otehrs recource
-promote s.use
-now manage long term
differetn types tenure cons
-private property- PA
-common property- CBC
what ostrom principles effective institutions
Define clear group boundaries.
- Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions.
- Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
- Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities.
- Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ behavior.
- Use graduated sanctions for rule violators.
- Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution.
- Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected system.
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