CBRNM Flashcards
berkes 2003 what makes CBC part larger historic shift
-system view envi
-include human in ecs
-look institutions
-more interdisplanry cons
-deal increase complecity
how berkes 2003 define com
multi-dimensional cross scale, social politcal units network changing through time
berkes 2003 what needed effect CBC
-interdisplinary cons
-adaptive managment deal xomplex dynamic
-incentive mutliple stakeholdrs
-TEK
-creatre cross cultral cons ethic not just preservationist western view
conclsion Berkes how to rethink conserveation
PARADIGM SHIFT TO INTERDISCIPLINARY HUMAN EMBEDDED, VIEW WORLD COMPLEX SYSTEM, MORE PARTICPORARY APPROACH INCLUDE civil society envi problems must be solved all
berkes 2003 what does adaptive management need
-share management power and responsibility
-create context encourage learning and stewardship build mutual trust
-incentivise multidimension- equity and empowerment
-legitimate accountable
-TEK
need develop cross cultural definition cons
child and barnes 2010 what does CBRNM need
1)property rights, local political organisation, gov economic process
2) replace fiscal centralisation focus bureaucracy to com benefits
Child and barnes 2010 definiton CBRNM
institutional reform and delineation property rights and collective action improve sustainability and values wildlife
child and barnes 2010 what does sucessful CBRNM have
1)economic allocation resources higher value uses
2)political organisation society
3) create technical, envi, and social capability behind envi technocrat
4) building capacity to learn from and manage S-E system adaptively
child and barnes 2010 benefit CBRNM
1)internalise cost living wildlife
2) benefit locals
3) participatory democaracy
child and barnes 2010 what procedues effective CBRM need
-annual elections
-face to face revenue allocation through quarterly assessment expenditure compare budget
-genuine participation NRM processes quota setting and competitive market
-external auditing finance and democratic procedure
child and barnes 2010 what enabling condition needed CBRNM
-learder dedicated vision
-legislated devolved rights
-partnerships professional com
-leaning through practice
-research
-donar provide money
child and barnes 2010 what needs to happen future improve CBRNM africa
-internalise recourse cost and benefit = remove market failure
-devolve benefits and management to the local landholder
-devolve choice and management to people live with resources through sound institutions
child and barnes 2010 conclusion CBRNM
CBRNM best approach cons but need shift thinking how society govern and protect NR
dressler et al 2010 why CBRNM failed Philippines
in realtiy just supported state interest and market expansion
dressler et al 2010 why CBRNM failing
-privildge cons
-com disempowment
-displacment
standadised policy misaligned local reality
dressler et al 2010 how to save CBRNM
ensure social justice, material wellbeing, envi integrity, socail equity
-design local condition
-embed soci-cultural relation, politic , resource need and landscape changes
Dressler 2010 what does sucess CBRNM depend on?
societal relation
politics
resource need
landscape changes
western 2015 how can help stop HWC
-devolve rights manage wildlife= local incentive coexist
-CBC help wildife make income
-increase skills live alongsife wildlife
-use tradtional k help work out how to share space
Frost and band 2005 how much mpney did CAMPFIRE make 1989-2001
$20 million
Frost and band 2005 how many conservancies revcieved 97% benefits CBRNM
12/37
Frost and band 2005 why was CAMPFIRE benefits unevenly distributed
-variability wildlife resources and institutional arrangements
Frost and band 2005 what key lesson can you learn from CAMPFIRE for developing PES schemes
1)community level commercial transaction can’t pursued isolation
2)non-differentiated payment weaken incentives
3)start up costs can be high and may need to be underwritten
4) competitive bidding can allow service holders to hold onto rents
5) schemes must be flexible and adaptive
Frost and band 2005 what major challanges facing CAMPFIRE
-macroeconomic and political pressure undermine local managment
-poverty = more people poaching
-donar support decreasing
-rural disrtict council not much local funding= delay payment- decreasing dissatisfaction
Frost and band 2005 what needed improve CAMPFIRE
-define property rights
-ensure tenure
gardner et al 2020 since first locally marnine managed area how much fish increased madagasca first (LMMA)
189%
gardner et al 2020 where was madagasca first LMMA
Velondriake
who were actor madagasca LMMA
-blue venture NGO
-local com
gardner et al 2020 what key lesson to be learned madagaska first LMMA
-co-management better just community management
-permanent field presence of supporting NGO and social enterprise
-focus on locally important recourses
-address poverty related barriers to enable recourse management
-decision makers by users not scientists
-diversified entrepreneurial funding model
-monitoring and adaptive management
what challanges face madagscan first LMMA
-inability to influence sea food supply chains
-promoting participation and good gov
-promoting rule application
-stand up to outsiders
-promoting long term envi managment
-maintain funding(not reliant donars)
gardner et al 2020 conclusion about madagascan first LMMA
-change open access to com run fisheries helped preserve resources
-likely NGO and other actors not just com needed for success
-NGO role support does not take control
-can have success cons even areas no customary institutions
-where lack state support NGO can take role
hulme murphree 1999 what is ‘new conservation’ model
increase local CBRNM
-cons include many landuse
-market achieve cons goal
-resorces utilised
hulme murphree 1999 what does CAMPFIRE sucess depend on
-type NR
-pop density
-changing top down structure
-question benefits encouraging agricultre
hulme murphree 1999 conclusion new conservation
not solve all issues but good basis more effective policies and institutions
hutton and learder williams 2003 whats best to conserve pas or s.use
impossible stop people accessing nr=need to find way people to incentivize conservation speices through s.use
ecosystem need to become part of global accounting systems
raymon 2007 reason ecological savages don’t exist
-little evidence
-cause extinction
-ecologist not conservationist
-just belief
-when gain riffle often overexploit
-don’t understand causes behind animal decreases
-idea created just to advance NGO agenda
-idea created to argue self determinism IP
raymond 2007 reasons for idea ecologically knowble savage
-managed recources long time s
-wynes edward 1962-species evolve adaption stop degradation
-sustainable extract resources
-want to preserve for the future
why did CBRNM evolve
-failure fortress conservation model
-failure state to manage natural resources
-rise bottom-up initiatives
-greater recognition of the capability of institutions in managing resources
what are main assumption around CBRNM
-local com greater interest recouses managed than distant agencies
-local com TEK help ensure management
-local com effectively manage resources through local institutions
-secure tenure required provide incentive s. management
-natural resources can be exploited s
what idea behind CBNRM
make cons more economically viable than extractive landuse
market based approach cons
what idea behind CBNRM
make cons more economically viable than extractive landuse
market based approach cons
where did CBRM orignitate
south africa
agricultural marginal lands
why did CBRNM start marginal agricultural lands
com already find hard to make living = easier to incentivise protection already struggling
child and lyman definition CBRNM
the process by which landholder gain access and use rights, ownership nr, collaborate, transparently plan, participate management resource use achieve financial and other benefits stewardship
Benefits CBRNM
1)increased social legitmacy & likelihood implementation of management decision
2)application diverse knowledge scouces for managment
3) improved on the ground recouse managment
4) increased monitoring and adaptive managment
5)decrease conflcit resouces
6)increased trust and relationship com
7)improved livlihood
8)greater com capacity
9) improved envi condition
10) more resilient s-e system
what s use CBD
use biod way and rate not cause decline meet need present and future
What is CAMPFIRE
-zimbabwe
-communal area managment program for indigenous recourses
what was wildlife management like before CAMPFIRE zimbabwe
-before all owned by the state = people no benefit= saw it as problem
-conflict and retaliatory killing
-continual ivory poaching
how did CAMPFIRE stop elephant conflict
-control elephants handed back to com 100-150 permit
-elephant pop increase poachng controlled com = conflict decrease
how much permits for CAMPFIRE
$12000=$15000 UD
why funding stopped CAMPFIRE
animal welfarist campaigned against killing elephants
frost bond 2008 how much money CAMPFIRE make 1989-2001
USD $20 million
frost bond 2008 between 1989-2001 how much money was spent on community development
52%
how is impact CAMPFIRE unequil
97% revenue generated = 12/37 districts
why is benefits CAMPFIRE unequal
elephants not everywhere
and unequal tourism
how much was the increase in household revenues due to CAMPFIRE
15-25%
What was tourism like in Nambia before LIFE program
controlled private interest
wildlife belonged state
locals not benefiting wildlife
What did LIFE program Nambia do
-rights and management local
-created conservancies to define limits, membership , gov structure, consultation, benefit distribution plan, provide tax and grants
how many nambians part of a conservancy
1/4
what are benefits LIFE
-poaching decrease as wildilfe seen valuable asset
-wildlife pop increased
-job creation
income used development
good gov
learnt skills hold gov accountable
make citizen more aware improve agencies other areas
how many jobs LIFE create
fulltime- 500
part time - 3000
what features community forest nepal
locals-forest owner and managers
- have rights and responsibilty recognised
-non users excluded access
-common property
-forest protected managed
resason CF nepal sucess
-halt deforestation improve ecological condition
-reduced poverty
reason CF failure
failures equitable distribution benefits and equitable participation
-win-win solutions rare
what features sucessful CB fisheries bangladesh sutana thompson 2007
com need formal recognition and long term use guaranteed
why has there been more failure CB africa than sucess blaikie 2006
-eak leardership
-corruption elite capture
-uneven participation
lack offical recognition and support
Why CBRNM failed madagsca
-agenda set by conservationist put conservation over communities
-rules disempower communities
eg laws against shifting agriculture
What is CFM in philiplenes
state way to sedentarism indigenous mountain com=loss culture
why CBRNM more just conservation issue
-most biod outside PA
-can’t always generate revenue nonconumptive use (e.g ecotourism
-hard to make conservation economically attractive landuse
-if other land uses more economic land will be converted
what recourses CBRNM not that effective at conserving
-low value , reproduce very slowly
eg forestry
why forestry dificult manage CBRNM
-slow growing
-soils require growing ecs to farm
-need long term support and commitment
dressler 2010 has CBRNM worked
-not ideal in practice
-need deal with various forces, movement and dynamics =
-often turn out different what creators wanted
has CBRNM been sucess jones and murphee
performances and promises very different
-sometimes outcome abysmal
lele et al 2010 why CBRNM not worked
failures with implementation not idea
reason back to barrier
CBRNM failed
reasons not to go back to barriers
-backlash undermine CBRNM before porbaly be tries
-CBRNM not one size fit all cannot be one size fit all implemented different context and recouse characteristics
robinson 2021 what kind off aproach needed to manage vast range lands
multilevel
horizontal
flexible approaches
why is it hard to asses whether CBRNM has been a success or failure
-socail and envi impacts hard to measure
-idea only decade old some recourses slow growing not yet at stage properly evaluate
-need more evidence
often mixed results hard to conclude one way other
what has been socail impact CBRNM poiller et al 2016 tanzania
–food security increae
-wealth and child health unchanged
socail impact CBRNM nambia riehl et al 2015
-wealth unchanged
-education decrease
CBRNM soical impact nepal o;dekop 2019
pov decrease
multiple positive outcome rare
fidnings of porter-boland et al 2012 meta analysis comparing CBRNM and PAs
-less annuel deforestation
-empowiring and incentives local com with institutional and market mechanism eg PES needed
-make more releilient in future
-need more action CBRNM success
bray et find CFM vs PAs mexico and guatamala
higher deforestation in PAs bt not statistically significant.
nepal biological outcomees CFM
-forest cover increased
-increased ecological condition
does devolving power lead cons sucess
-not necessarily
need enabling conditions
what happens only devolve nominal power
disenfranchment , failure
what key enabling condition sucessful CBRNM
-secure tenure
-rights exclusion , enforcement powers
-strong institutions
-capacity building
what are main negatives CBRNM
-implemented top down, limited participation, or understanding socio-cultral conditions
-start up and training costs high= need subsidize = less efficient direct payments
-com- never really exist =problem governance, lack understanding characteristic
-elite capture and problems benefit sharing
-social cohesion trumps rule enforcement
-decentralisation power often limited in reality
