LANDMARK CASES L-N

Question 1

Lake v. Cameron (DC COA, 1966) FOTC

Answer 1

• Lake 60F found wandering DC by police, taken to St Elizabeths
• Writ of habeas corpus for release
• Psychiatrists dx chronic brain syndrome w/ aging and memory difficulty . Not dangerous and wouldn’t intentionally harm, but prone to wandering/being exposed at night
• Family offered to help but insufficient funds to provide adequate supervision
• B/w commitment and COA hearing, DC passed Hospitalization of the MI Act, saying persons could be hosp or ordered for other txs which court believed best interests, including outpt, foster, halfway houses, nursing homes, etc

Question 2

Lake v. Cameron (DC COA, 1966) H & R

Answer 2

H: Remanded back to Distr Co saying incumbent on court to inquire about alternative less restrictive courses of tx
R: Court said Lake didn’t have means/ability to explore less restrictive alternatives, but hospital staff could

Question 3

Lake v. Cameron (DC COA, 1966) Dissent

Answer 3

Said only issue was if hospitalization was valid confinement. Said other institutions would obviously be better, but also obviously couldn’t turn her loose to streets

Question 4

Lake v. Cameron (DC COA, 1966) Historical Significant

Answer 4

Bazelon presided, first MH case with “least restrictive alternative” phrase

Question 5

Landeros v. Flood (CA SC 1976) FOTC

Answer 5

• Landeros (11mo) taken to San Jose hospital w/ numerous injuries highgly suggestive of child physical abuse. No XR, dx of child abuse, or report to authorities from Dr Flood
• 3 months later, new injuries, different hospital, dx battered child syndrome and report made
• CA has child abuse reporting statute
• Child in foster care, eventually parents convicted of child abuse
• Action brough based on Dr. Flood’s negligence which allowed pain/suffering to infant, as well as possible amputation of L hand
• Trial court dismissed, saying didn’t state cause of action in medical malpractice
• Appealed

Question 6

Landeros v. Flood (CA SC 1976) H & R (2)

Answer 6

H: Reversed. Did state cause of action: physicians expected to dx battered children
R:
- Standard of care is to dx and treat battered child syndrome
- Big question was foreseeability, if it was foreseeable, didn’t matter that mother had actually performed the action as intervening act. Flood’s report could’ve triggered adequate investigation to avoid further foreseeable injury. For the jury to decide

Question 7

Landeros v. Flood (CA SC 1976) Similarity to Tarasoff

Answer 7

In both cases, intervening criminal act didn’t preclude liability

Question 8

Lessard v. Schmidt (Federal Distr Co E.D. WI 1972) FOTC & Issue

Answer 8

• Lessard picked up by police, resulted in invol psyc hosp. No notice, right to cross-ex, or any offer of independent psych eval
• Atty filed class action suit under $1983 including all persons held invol under WI commitment statute
  ISSUE: Did WI invol civil commitment statute deny adequate D.P.?

Question 9

Lessard v. Schmidt (Federal Distr Co E.D. WI 1972) H (4.6 - Gen, 6 Reqs, Standard/BOP for Commitment, Other Requirement)

Answer 9

• WI statute found unconstitutional
• Patients should be given: 1) advanced notice of commitment hearing/basis of detention; 2) right to a jury trial; 3) right to counsel; 4) privilege against self-incrimination; 5) exclusion of hearsay evidence; and 6) notice of the substance of the state’s proposed testimony
• Standard for commitment should be “extreme likelihood that if not confined he will do immediate harm to himself/others,” BOP on state BARD based on recent acts/attempts/threats
• Also said person recommending hosp should bear burden of proposing least restrictive alternative

Question 10

Lessard v. Schmidt (Federal Distr Co E.D. WI 1972) R (3)

Answer 10

• Same fundamental liberties at stake as in criminal safeguards, safeguards previously not enforced bc of parens patriae attitude
• Privilege against self-incrimination shifted from criminal to civil whenever deprivation of freedom at risk
• Severe effects on judged MI persons, difficulty getting job/licensures/etc etc

Question 11

Lessard v. Schmidt (Federal Distr Co E.D. WI 1972) Historical Significance (& other case) (3)

Answer 11

Most stringent safeguards for civil commitment
Criminalized commitment procedures (in WI) just as Gault criminalized juvenile court proceedings
- Led to “Dying with Your Rights on Article)

Question 12

In re Lifschutz (CA SC 1970) FOTC

Answer 12

• Housek tx’d by Dr. Lifschutz, psych, 10 years before suit for emotional distress from assault by high school student
• Def’s atty learned about and subpoenaed doctor/records to address damages
• Appeared as witness but refused to testify on tx itself, & refused to produce records claiming to exert constitutional privilege even though Housek hadn’t claimed
• Defensed moved to hold in contempt of court, Lifschutz spent days in county jail and released pending habeas corpus

Question 13

In re Lifschutz (CA SC 1970) H (2) & R (2)

Answer 13

H: Contempt of court conf by CA SC; habeas corpus denied
- Pt, not doctor, owns the privilege
R:
- Tpist has no constitutional right to privacy. Rejected Lifschutz’s claims that disclosure would impair his practice and remove “property right” of practicing psychiatry, bc intrusion was minimal and only that pt chose to waive
- Also rejected E.P. argument plantiff put forth comparing psychiatrist-patient privilege to priest-penitent privilege

Question 14

Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. (US Distr Co, NE 1980) FOTC

Answer 14

• Cribbs tried to buy shotgun from Sears, but had been invol, completed form saying mental patient, but salesman suggested he deny it
• In following months, Cribbs left VA outpt day tx program AMA, fired shotgun into nightclub killing/wounding Liparis (couple)
• Mrs. Lipari filed suit against Sears negligently selling to known MI.
• Sears filed complaint against US gov’t that negligently tx Cribbs, should’ve known dangerous and taken proper steps
• Lipari filed second complaint against gov’t on similar grounds
• Def’s filed motion to dismiss bc no cause of action

Question 15

Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. (US Distr Co, NE 1980) H & R

Answer 15

H: Motion to dismiss denied
R: Are times when psychotherapy had duty to persons other than pt, in this case, public at large, bc foreseeable victims and thus duty to detain persons who would be dangerous if released

Question 16

Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. (US Distr Co, NE 1980) vs. Tarasoff (& Subsequent Historical)

Answer 16

Went further than Tarasoff bc Tarasoff was limited to identifiable victims, this created duty to any class of individuals who are foreseeable victims
- NE subsequently passed Tarasoff-limiting statute precluding this type of case bc the duty is limited to identifiable victims

Question 17

Daniel M’Naghten’s Case (1843) FOTC

Answer 17

• M’Naughten shot and killed Drummond
• Evidence showed delusions which overrode M’Naghten’s abilities to control his actions (psychs testified)
• Judge gave jury Q: whether at time of act, prisoner had no use of understanding, so as not to know he was doing a wrong or wicked act. If so, verdict of insanity
• After verdict, law lords had questions about law of insanity in England. M’Naghten opinion attempted to address

Question 18

Daniel M’Naghten’s Case (1843) Opinion (Answers to 3 Questions)

Answer 18

1) Instructions to jury? A: Proper charge should be: “At time of the act…accused laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if did know…what he was doing was wrong.
- Wrongfulness shouldn’t be in abstract but with respect to the specific act
2) If acting under delusion, but still knew was acting contrary to the law? A: Would be punishable
3) If commits act in consequence to delusions, excused? A: Must be considered responsible w/r/t guilt if the delusional facts were real (i.e., can’t just kill somebody bc delusional pissed off at).

Question 19

McKune v. Lile (SCOTUS 2002) FOTC & Issue

Answer 19

• Lile convicted rape/sodomy/kidnapping despite assertion consensual
• Prior to release, ordered to participate in Sex Abuse Tx Program (SATP) & required to sign “Admission of Responsibility” for Offense, as well as polygraph of sexual history w/ no privilege against future crim proceedings
• Lile refused to participate, asserting violation 5th A
• Refusal would result in loss of privileges & xfer to max security
• Sought injunction to prevent loss/priv + xfer
• Distr Co granted him summary judgment
• COA affirmed
• Prison appealed SCOTUS
  ISSUE: Does SATP/consequences for non-participation create coercion that violates sex offender’s 5th A?

Question 20

McKune v. Lile (SCOTUS 2002) H & R (5 - Gen, Legal Immunity, Adverse Effects, Xfer, General Const in Prisons)

Answer 20

H: SATP serves vital penological purpose, and its minimal incentives don’t arise to coercion violating 5th A
R:
- SATP legitimate rehab
- Lack of legal immunity doesn’t render program itself invalid
- Adverse effects of nonparticipation related to objectives and =/= atypical/significant hardships in relation to ordinary prison life; not coercion violating 5th A
- Xfer about opening space for participant, not punishment
- Constitution gives wide latitude to bestow/revoke incentives for behavior

Question 21

McKune v. Lile (SCOTUS 2002) Dissent (2)

Answer 21

SATP’s laudable goals don’t justify reduction in constitutional protections and voluntary tx program reasonable alternative

Question 22

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) FOTC

Answer 22

• Vinson teller at MSB. Brought action against bank/mgr for “constant sexual harrassment” violating Title VII CRA 1964
• Reported out of fear of job loss, agreed to sex 40-50x w/ boss. Also fondled at work, rape
• Bc of fear, never reported
• Taylor (mgr) denied all, bank denied knowledge

Question 23

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) Court History (Distr Co 2 / DC COA 3.2)

Answer 23

• Distr Co denied relief w/o resolving conflicting testimony: said if was sexual relationship, voluntary and didn’t affect employment. Also since bank no notice, can’t be held liable
• DC COA reversed/remanded: said violation Title VII could be either 2 types sexual harassment:
  1) Quid pro quo based on sexual favors
  2) Harassment that creates hostile work environment
• COA said Distr Co hadn’t considered 2nd type, even if relationship was voluntary
• Also said employer liable for harassment by supervisory personnel, whether or not known/should’ve known

Question 24

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) Issues (2)

Answer 24

1) Is claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment form of sex discrimination violating Title VII CRA?
2) When employers liable if lack notification about alleged sexual harrassment?

Question 25

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) H (3 - Result & Answer to 2 Issues)

Answer 25

Upheld COA’s reverse and remand for different reasons:
1) Hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII
2) COA wrong to impose absolute liability on employer for acts of supervisors regardless of circumstances

Question 26

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) R (3 - 2 Hostile environment, 1 - Liability for Employer)

Answer 26

• Language of Title VII CRA (unlawful to discriminate based on…) not limited to ecomonic or tangible discrimination
• Distr Co wrong to focus on lack of economic effect and voluntariness: correct is whether complainant indicated they were unwelcome, not about voluntariness
• COA erred in concluding automatically liability for employer, but also rejected bank’s view that mere existence of grievance procedure insulated entirely. Instead, based on each case

Question 27

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (SCOTUS 1986) Significance

Answer 27

Established hostile environment as valid form of sexual harassment, obviating need to demonstrate QpQ

Question 28

Montana v. Egelhoff (SCOTUS 1996) FOTC & Issue

Answer 28

• Egelhoff befriended some strangers out in MT, all got wasted, they found dead GSW head with him wasted in back seat
• Charged w/ deliberate homicide, “purposely” or knowingly”
• Claimed due to extreme intoxication, incapable and doesn’t remember
• Jury instructed under Montana Code couldn’t consider his intoxicated condition in determining necessary mental state
• Found G, appealed
• MT SC reversed, jury had right to consider all relevant evidence. Because Code prevented considering evidence, state had been relieved from BOP BARD, so violationg of D.P.
• State appealed SCOTUS
  ISSUE: Whether D.P. 14th A violated by MT Code saying voluntary intoxication can’t be considered in determining requisite mental state?

Question 29

Montana v. Egelhoff (SCOTUS 1996) H & R (3 - State v Fed, Assessing Merit, and Larger Society)

Answer 29

H: Reversed. Right to have jury consider voluntary intoxication not “fundamental principle of justice,” so MT ban on such evidence didn’t violate D.P.
R:
- Crime more state issue than fed, so should have limited intrusion into how they do it except for fundamental principles of justice
- Can assess fundamental principle by historical practice. Gen voluntary intox has been aggravating principle, some more recent reconsideration, but numerous states hadn’t adopted, so can’t say fundamental principle
- Disallowing consideration also has effect of increased punishment -> deterrence & supports general moral perception

Question 30

Montana v. Egelhoff (SCOTUS 1996) Dissent (2)

Answer 30

Subjective mental state proved only circumstantially, so disallowing relevant evidence might come to wrong conclusion
- Also negates essential element, so state’s BOP much easier, so violates D.P.

Question 31

Miller v. Alabama (SCOTUS 2012) FOTC & Issue

Answer 31

• Miller 14M when (with friend) assaulted neighbor and set fire to trailer, killing
• Found G of capital murder w/ arson and given mandatory LwoP
• Miller appealed AL COA challenging constitutionality of LwoP for minor (mandatory)
• Upheld, Miller appealed SCOTUS
  ISSUE: Does 8th A prohibit mandating LwoP for juvenile homicide offenders?

Question 32

Miller v. Alabama (SCOTUS 2012) H & R (4 - Gen Const, 2 Previous Cases, Nonhom vs Hom, Xfer to Adult Court)

Answer 32

H: 8th A forbids mandating LwoP for juvenile homicide offenders
R:
- 8th A prohibits excessive/disproportionate sanctions
- Roper and Graham, SCOTUS had put categorical sanctions on severity of penalty for juveniles, established children constitutionally different from adults for sentencing
- Although Graham was nonhom, “nothing…crime specific”& mandatory sentencing scheme prevents consideration of youth
- Also many states mandatory xfer systems of children of juv to adult court, which may impede consideration of background/tx

Question 33

Miller v. Alabama (SCOTUS 2012) Dissent (3)

Answer 33

3 Separate Dissents - common theme was “will of the people” through majority state legislatures authorized LwoP for juv homs.
- Roberts said reasonable to remove members of most heinous murders as concrete standard
- Also nothing in const prohibits legislatures from doing this

Question 34

North Carolina v. Alford (SCOTUS 1970) FOTC

Answer 34

• Alford indicted for 1deg murder, capital offense
• Evidence massive against him, with no evidence for him
• Atty recommended plead G to 2deg murder to avoid death penalty
• During proceedings, Alford protested his innocence
• Sentenced 30y. After, sought postconviction relief, saying only pled G to avoid death penalty
• COA ruled plea involuntary due to that primary motivation

Question 35

North Carolina v. Alford (SCOTUS 1970) H & R

Answer 35

H: Vacated COA opinion; trial court didn’t commit constitutional error in accepting plea. Defendant may voluntarily and intelligently plead G while protesting innocence
R:
- G plea that voluntary/intelligent choice among teh alternatives available, especially choice represented by comp counsel, isn’t compelled violating 5th A just bc avoiding
- May voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly consent to imposition of sentence even though unwilling to admit participation
- May enter G plea w/ protest of innocence when intelligently concludes his interests require G plea and record strongly indicates guilt