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FORENSIC BOARDS > LANDMARK CASES E-F > Flashcards

LANDMARK CASES E-F Flashcards

1
Q

Estelle v. Gamble (SCOTUS 1976) FOTC

A
  • Gamble (TX DOC inmate) injured performing prison work (bale of cotton fell)
  • Received medical tx but cont’d complaints back pain/inability to work
  • Prison disciplinary committee for failure to work, placed in solitary
  • Alleged civil rights violation under Section 1983
  • Distr Co dismissed for failure to state claim
  • COA held alleged insufficiency of medical tx required reinstatement of complaint
  • Appeal taken to SCOTUS
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2
Q

Estelle v. Gamble (SCOTUS 1976) H (2) & R

A

H:
- “Deliberate indifference” to illness/injury standard for 8th A violation
- However, claims here didn’t represent deliberate indifference
R:
- Saw Gamble 17x but no XR or other diagnostic tests: maybe med mal, but that doesn’t become constitutional just bc individual is prisoner. Maybe tort

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3
Q

Estelle v. Gamble (SCOTUS 1976) Dissent

A

Stevens dissented bc assigned primary significant to subjective mindset of the individual afflicting, rather than the act itself

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4
Q

8th A Progression

A

Initially to forbid torture/barbarism, now updated to include actions incompatible with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”

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5
Q

Estelle v. Gamble (SCOTUS 1976) Def of Deliberate Indifference

A

Didn’t provide, instead provided in Farmer v. Brennan 1994)

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6
Q

Estelle v. Smith (SCOTUS 1981) FOTC

A
  • Smith convicted murdering store clerk, sentenced to death
  • Exhausted appeals, but habeas corpus’d COA to freeze
  • Challenged that during death penalty sentencing hearing requiring future probability of violence BARD, Grigson testified that would be violent in future
  • Grigson had evaluated CST, despite Smith’s atty’s being completely unaware
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7
Q

Estelle v. Smith (SCOTUS 1981) H (2)

A

H:
- Violates 5th A to, at capital sentencing hearing, introduce stuff from psych interview w/o advising of rights (silent, used against at sentencing)
- Also violates 6th A RTC

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8
Q

Estelle v. Smith (SCOTUS 1981) R (2 Responses to State Args, Other Const, and Other Case Citation)

A
  • State Arg 1: Didn’t violate 5th A bc during penalty phase not trial on charges. SCOTUS found no basis to distinguish b/w
  • State Arg 2: Smith’s statements not really being introduced bc Grigson didn’t repeat, instead just offering conclusions. No, because testimony based on his statements, not just obs.
  • Psych IV w/o notice to counsel to advise violates 6th A
  • Also Miranda v. AZ 5th A violation: Grigson basically became agent of state collecting unwarned post-arrest statements
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9
Q

Estelle v. Smith (SCOTUS 1981) Attorney Present During Eval

A

Didn’t suggest that right, acknowledged that might contribute little and heavily disrupt

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10
Q

Estelle v. Smith (SCOTUS 1981) Warnings Applicability

A

Limited to capital sentencing, don’t apply to all types of evals

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11
Q

Fare v. Michael (SCOTUS 1978) FOTC & Issue

A
  • Michael C 16y/o implicated in murder during robbery
  • Previous offenses, under Juvenile Court jurisdiction at time
  • Brought to station, fully advised of situation/Miranda’d
  • Michael asked for P.O., denied, so then he said he would talk w/o atty
  • Provided incriminating statements and sketches
  • Trial court denied invocation of 5th A
  • CA SC reversed, saying that request for PO was per se invocation of 5th, bc trusted guardian figure juvenile might ask for during apprehension (also state law that says PO represents juvenile’s interests)
    Issue: Did Michael invoke Miranda rights when asked to speak with PO, thereby rendering statements/sketches inadmissible?
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12
Q

Fare v. Michael (SCOTUS 1978) H&R (2)

A

H: CA SC erred, request was not per se invocation 5th A rendering statements/sketches inadmissible. In totality, clear that voluntarily/knowingly waived 5th A rights
R:
- Miranda rule that if def indicates wants atty, IV must cease, based on unique role atty plays in process to preserve rights. PO, while maybe trusted position, does not serve that same function
- Also, fact that serves interests still doesn’t mean that can render legal assistance, esp when part of duty is to report wrongdoing and report to CJS

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13
Q

Farmer v. Brennan (SCOTUS 1994) FOTC & Issue

A
  • Farmer was pre-op transgender sentenced for CC fraud.
  • Prev to incarc, taken hormones, unsuccessful surgeries, and dressed “in effeminate manner”
  • Xferred from corr. facility to penitentiary in IN, no obj to gen pop
  • W/in 2 weeks was beaten and raped, then segregated
  • Complaint alleged deliberate indifference (violating 8th A) from prison personnel by placing in gen pop despite knowing violent enviornment/inmate assaults of penitentiary, and that “projects feminine characteristics” should have known at higher risk
  • Dist. Co. granted summary judgment saying no d.i. bc no knowledge of actual risk
  • COA affirmed
  • SCOTUS granted cert bc inconsistent tests for d.i.
    Issue: Does mens rea for d.i. require actually known or just should have known risk of harm?
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14
Q

Farmer v. Brennan (SCOTUS 1994) H & R

A

H: Liable under 8th A d.i. only if he KNOWS inmate faces substantial risk and disregards. Subjective test.
R:
- COAs general equated d.i. to recklessness: civil recklessness is known/should’ve known (obj.), criminal is only known (subj.) MPC def recklessness closest to subj. standard

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15
Q

Ford v. Wainwright (SCOTUS 1986) FOTC

A
  • Ford conv murder/sentenced to death
  • No IST suggestions offense/trial/sentencing
  • However MI afterwards. Extensive evals by 2 defense psychiatrists
  • One concluded not competent executed bc no understanding, also believed wouldn’t be executed bc could control gov w/ brain waves
  • Governor appointed 3 psychiatrists, IV’d Ford together for 30min in presence of others
  • These 3 conflicted dxs, but agreed CTBE
  • Governor’s office refused to accept defense psychiatrist’s reports or allow adversarial process/cross-ex, and signed death warrant
  • Habeas corpus denied Distr Co, upheld by COA, appealed SCOTUS
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16
Q

Ford v. Wainwright (SCOTUS 1986) H (3)

A

H:
- Reversed/remanded
- 8th A prohibits death penalty on insane
- FL’s procedures determining CTBE inadequate bc denied adequate fact find procedure/hearing

17
Q

Ford v. Wainwright (SCOTUS 1986) R (General, 3 Reasons Not Executing Insane, and 3 Specific FL Procedural Deficiencies)

A

Gen: Capital cases require higher standard of reliability in fact finding
Not Executing Insane:
1. Questionable retributive value
2. Lack of deterrence value
3. Simply offends humanity
3 FL Deficiencies:
1. Failure to include prisoner in truth-seeking process/no opp to be heard
2. Denial of opportunity to challenge/impeach state-appointed psychs
3. Ultimate decision wholly within executive branch even though he appointed experts and everything

18
Q

Ford v. Wainwright (SCOTUS 1986) Test for CTBE (& Some State Editions)

A

In dicta, Powell said if prisoner is aware of his impending execution and the reason for it
- Some states (SC, LA), require that he also be able to assist counsel in preparation of appeals

19
Q

Foucha v. Louisiana (SCOTUS 1992) FOTC

A
  • Foucha charged agg burglary/illegal firearm
  • Found NGRI and hospitalized at East Feliciana forensic facility
  • Panel of doctors reported no evidence of MI there, recommended conditional discharge
  • Testified likely drug-induced psychosis, recovered, no psychosis now
  • However, dx ASPD, numerous fights, so couldn’t say not dangerous
  • Retained in hospital
  • Appealed LA SC upheld, then SCOTUS
20
Q

Foucha v. Louisiana (SCOTUS 1992) H & R (5.1)

A

H:
- Overruled continued confinement, as Jones v. U.S. (1983) language interpreted as acquittee may not be held unless BOTH MI and dangerous
R:
1. Even if detainment were const, would require civil commitment hearing of BOTH MI and dangerousness
- Due process requires nature of commitment bear reasonable relation to purpose of it (Jackson v. Indiana)
2. If no longer can be held as insanity acquittee in mental hospital, then normal constitutional procedures for continued confinement
3. Substantive Due Process means gov’t can’t arbitrarily impose actions, such as punishment bc he wasn’t convicted
4. This would really be one step away from incarcerating people not based on criminal acts, but rather just on dangerousness
- Also Equal Protection 14th A violation bc insanity acquittee treated diff than other criminals who have completed terms

21
Q

Foucha v. Louisiana (SCOTUS 1992) Dissent

A

Said majority failed to recognize criminal nature of proceedings, and inexactitude of psychiatry “regained sanity”

22
Q

Frendak v. United States (DC COA 1979) FOTC

A
  • Frendak charged w/ murder of co-worker
  • Arrested after fled the country w/ murder weapon
  • Said somebody had shot her gun
  • Found CST after 4 hearings
  • Court imposed NGRI defense over Frendak’s and prosecution’s objection
  • Jury found NGRI
  • Frendak appealed involuntary imposition of insanity defense
23
Q

Frendak v. United States (DC COA 1979) H (2) & R (5)

A

H:
- Court can’t force NGRI defense on competent defendant if makes decision intelligently and voluntarily.
- Finding CST isn’t in itself sufficient to show def capable of rejecting insanity defense, judge must inquiry if defendant made intelligent/voluntary decision. If not, can impose insanity defense
R:
- Previously Whalen rule that required judge to impose NGRI defense w/ sufficient Q, but focused more on strength of defense rather than defendant’s desire not to choose it
- However recent cases (incl Alford) that gave defendants more control
- Legit reason why def might refuse: length of commitment, psych hospital setting, stigma, protest that NGRI would denigrate
- Dusky standard CST insufficient bc doesn’t measure NGRI capability(?), so might need additional examination to determine
- Strength of defense shouldn’t be primary factor, except to assess rationality of refusal

24
Q

Whalen Rule 4 Considerations for Imposition of Insanity Defense

A
  1. Bizarre nature of crime
  2. Desire to defense counsel to raise defense
  3. Differing views of experts regarding insanity
  4. Def’s behavior at trial
25
Q

Frye v. United States (DC COA 1923) FOTC

A
  • Frye convicted of killing doctor
  • Appealed bc his own profferring of lie detector test (BP monitor) was excluded
26
Q

Frye v. United States (DC COA 1923) H & R

A

H: Affirmed bc hadn’t gained such standing/scientific recognition among authorities that would justify courts in admitting this expert testimony
R: Exact line between experimental and demonstrable principle/discovery, but in general, “the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”

FORENSIC BOARDS (34 decks)

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