LANDMARK CASES G-H

Question 1

In Re Gault (SCOTUS 1967) FOTC

Answer 1

• Gault, 15M, committed to industrial/training school until 21 for accusations of making lewd telephone calls
• Adult would only serve minor fine/2 mo
• When taken to custody, family not notified, no warrant, complainant never appeared, conflicting testimony
• AZ law didn’t allow appeals for juv cases
• Habeas corpus upheld by AZ SC, appealed SCOTUS

Question 2

In Re Gault (SCOTUS 1967) Issue (w/ 6 Specifics)

Answer 2

ISSUE: Does Juvenile Code of AZ violate 14th A D.P. bc of unlimited discretion and denial of following basic rights:
1. Notice of charges
2. Right to counsel
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination
4. Privilege against self-incrimination
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings
6. Right to appellate review

Question 3

In Re Gault (SCOTUS 1967) H (6 Rights)

Answer 3

H: Reversed and remanded, upheld rights to timely written notice, right to counsel, right to confrontation/cross-ex, and protection against self-incrimination.
- Didn’t rule on right to transcript and right to appeal

Question 4

In Re Gault (SCOTUS 1967) R (2 Diff b/w Juv/Adults, and Gen Const)

Answer 4

Long hx of diff b/w juvenile/adult cases, juveniles based in rehab, not punishment, and children had right to “custody,” not “liberty”
- However, 14th A nor BOR not for only adults. Unbridled discretion, even if benevolent, not substitute for principle/procedure

Question 5

Major Right Afforded to Adults but not Juveniles

Answer 5

Right to trial by jury

Question 6

Godinez v. Moran (SCOTUS 1993) FOTC

Answer 6

• Moran killed bartender/patron/ex-wife, tried to kill himself
• Pled NG
• 2 psychs said CST, but one said depressed
• Moran said wanted to dismiss attys and plead G.
• Court found understood nature of charges, able to assist, knowingly and intelligently waiving counsel, and guilty pleas free/voluntary
• G pleas accepted and sentenced to death

Question 7

Godinez v. Moran (SCOTUS 1993) Court Process (3 Courts, 4 pts)

Answer 7

• Distr Co denied later motion for habeas corpus
• COA reversed bc “record in this case” meant court should’ve entertained good faith doubt about competency, and should have held a hearing to determine before accepting
• Said that competence to waive constitutional rights higher than CST, instead of Dusky, should’ve used “reasoned choice” standard
• SCOTUS granted cert bc competency standard for waiving these constitutional rights had divided COAs and state courts

Question 8

Godinez v. Moran (SCOTUS 1993) H & R (3)

Answer 8

H: Rejected that competence to plead G or waive right to counsel must be measured at higher/different than Dusky standard
R:
- Decision to plead G no greater/more complicated than sum total of decisions def might have to make over course of a trial
- Def who waives right to counsel does not have to be more competent than one doesn’t, bc it’s about the decision to waive, not the actual ability to represent himself, even if he might suck
- Courts still must verify that these decisions are knowing and voluntary

Question 9

Godinez v. Moran (SCOTUS 1993) Dissent

Answer 9

Person incapable of conducting his own defense can’t be considered competent to make that decision, just like person who chooses to jump out of window believing he can fly can’t be considered competent to make that decision
- Said it contravenes fundamental principles of fairness and impugns CJS

Question 10

Godinez v. Moran (SCOTUS 1993) Later Case

Answer 10

Indiana v. Edwards (SCOTUS 2008), SCOTUS did identify diff standard than Dusky to represent self

Question 11

Graham v. Florida (SCOTUS 2010) FOTC & Issue

Answer 11

• Graham 16M (+3 other juvs) botched robbery, arrested & charged as adult
• Pled G, 3 years prob
• Arrested 6mo later for home invasion/robbery
• Found violated prob and sentenced life w/o parole
• Appealed under 8th A, COA said sentence not grossly disproportionate to crimes
• FL SC affirmed
• Appealed SCOTUS
  ISSUE: Does sentencing juvenile to life w/o parole for nonhomicide offense violate 8th A?

Question 12

Graham v. Florida (SCOTUS 2010) H & R (5)

Answer 12

H: 8th A forbids life w/o parole for nonhomicide juvs. Doesn’t need to guarantee eventual release, but if life, must provide some realistic opportunity to obtain release
R:
- 8th A doesn’t just ban barbaric punishments, but also disproportionate
- Bc was categorical challenge to term of years, merited analysis of state practices: many allowed but few actual sentenced nonhom offenders to Lw/oP.
- Juvs have less culpability and are less deserving of most severe punishments, & 2nd most severe penalty permitted by law especially harsh
- Normal penological justifications (Big 4), didn’t provide adequate justification for juvs Lw/oP, and this gives these juv offenders chance to reform
- Also said disproportionate to other developed nations

Question 13

Graham v. Florida (SCOTUS 2010) Dissent (4)

Answer 13

Thomas
- 8th A not originally understood to apply to proportionality
- Also declared entire class of offenders immune from noncapital sentence, using previous approach for death penalty case review, eviscerating distinction that “death is different”
- Majority of state legislatures still allowed, so def not nat’l consensus
- Sociological research on maturity doesn’t apply to facts of every case

Question 14

Hall v. Florida (SCOTUS 2014) FOTC & Issue

Answer 14

• Hall and accomplice kidnapped, beat, raped, murdered pregnant woman, then sheriff deputy
• At hearing, introduced ID (Court had not issued Atkins v. Virginia ruling preventing ID executions)
• Sentenced to death
• FL SC affirmed sentence
• Atkins issued, Hall filed motion and presented IQ 71, but FL law cutoff 70
• FL SC again rejected appeal and said 70 point cutoff was constitutional
  ISSUE: How should ID be defined in order to implement Atkins?

Question 15

Hall v. Florida (SCOTUS 2014) H & R (4)

Answer 15

H: Reversed and remanded, FL statute unconstitutional
R:
- Used IQ as final/conclusive evidence, when experts would consider other evidence
- Relies on scientific measurement while refusing to recognize imprecise/standard error, going against unanimous professional consensus w/r/t test score interpretation
- Majority of states rejected strict cutoff and allowed introducing other evidence
- When within SE, should be allowed to introduce add’l evidence of ID

Question 16

Hall v. Florida (SCOTUS 2014) Dissent (2)

Answer 16

• States divided on whether SE should play a role
• Also reliance on views of professional associations (e.g., APA) risky bc as those associations change stances, then tying 8th A law leads to instability/further litigation

Question 17

Hargrave v. Vermont (2nd Cir. COA 2003) FOTC

Answer 17

• Vermont law allows adults to execute DPOA-HC
• 1998, Vermont enacted Act 114, allowed invol meds for civil commitment or MI prisoners, over DPOA’s wishes, if > 45 days w/o significant clinical improvement/CST
• Hargrave schizophrenia, numerous admissions
• Completed DPOA to refuse meds/ECT
• Claimed Act 114 violated ADA II and Secton 504 Rehab Act bc excluded only individuals from DPOA, a “service, program, or activity” provided by VT

Question 18

Hargrave v. Vermont (2nd Cir. COA 2003) VT Arguments (3), Lower Court Ruling, and Issues (2)

Answer 18

• VT said didn’t apply bc invol commitment meant “direct threat” exception of ADA
• Since only applied to invol commits, not general MI, that was the class excluded, which was not qualifying disability
• Also, to change practice would “fundamentally alter” services provided, which is ADA
• Distr court found Act 114 facially discriminates against mentally disabled, violating ADA and Sec 504, ordered injunction to prohibit enforcement
  ISSUES:
  1. Does Act 114 violate ADA by distinguishing b/w “qualified individuals” on basis of MI?
  2. Does Distr. Co’s injunction prohibit enforcement of Act 114 effect fundamental alteration to the discriminatory “service, program, or activity?”

Question 19

Hargrave v. Vermont (2nd Cir. COA 2003) H (2) & R (4)

Answer 19

H:
1. A114 discriminates against mentally disabled, violating ADA/Rehab
2. Defendants failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate injunction fundamentally alters state program
R:
- Defs hadn’t shown every person involuntarily commited poses “direct threat,” so excludes otherwise “qualified individuals
- Discriminatory procedures where only mentally ill who have become incompetent might have wishes overridden, not equally incompetent physically ill/injured pts
- Bc only individuals civilly committed 2/2 MI subject, it discriminates against basis of MI
- Defs hadn’t shown injunction would fundamentally alter authorization/enforcement DPOA

Question 20

Hargrave v. Vermont (2nd Cir. COA 2003) Consequence (2)

Answer 20

NY and VT
- Once state develops statute for adv directives, invol committed MI pts can’t be xcluded, so can refuse invol if expressed in adv. directives. So clinicians might view psych adv. directives as less helpful than intended
- Court acknowledged might have consequences not contemplated and could be burdensome, so offered some suggested legislative remedies

Question 21

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (SCOTUS 1993) FOTC & Issue

Answer 21

• Harris worked for Forklift Systems Inc. -
• President often made unwanted sexual comments and gender based insults, also would have women grab coins from pocket and throw things on ground to pick up
• Harris quit and sued, claiming conduct had created abusive work environment
• Distr Co said “close case” but didnot create an abusive environment bc they were “not so severe as to seriously affect psychological well-being” or lead her to “suffer injury”
• COA affirmed
• SCOTUS granted cert
  ISSUE:
  What is the definition of a discriminatory “abusive work environment” under Title VII of Civil Rights Act 1964?

Question 22

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (SCOTUS 1993) H (4 - Gen and 3)

Answer 22

• Reversed and remanded
  1. “Abusive work environment” doesn’t require conduct to seriously affect employee’s psychological wellbeing or cause injury
  2. Meritor standard requires both objectively hostile/abusive environment, as well as victim’s subjective perception that it’s abusive
  3. Sufficiently hostile or abusive to be actionable requires consideration of all circumstances, not any 1 factor (e.g., psychological effects)

Question 23

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (SCOTUS 1993) Reasoning (4)

Answer 23

• Title VII of CRA 1964 says unlawful to discriminate on basis etc etc, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson said violated when work environment permeated with discriminatory behavior creating hostile/abusive work environment
• Meritor also required both objectively hostile/abusive and subjective perception (so actual psychological damage relevant here)
• Title VII comes into play before nervous breakdown/damages psychological wellbeing, bc can/often detract from job performance, discourage remaining on job, or keep from advancing
• Abusive/hostile requires looking at all circumstances, including frequency, severity, threatening or humiliating, interferes, etc