LANDMARK CASES I-K Flashcards

1
Q

Ibn-Tamas v. United States (DC COA 1979) FOTC

A
  • Ibn-Tamas conv 2deg murder bc shot husband (NSGY) to death
  • Substantial evidence victim had been violent towards her, including AM of shooting
  • Conflicting testimony about extent of self-defense
  • Court excluded psychologist (Dr. Walker’s) testimony as expert on “battered women”
  • Was going to 1) describe phenomenon and 2) Give opinion about how Ibn-Tamas corresponded it
  • Defense said relevant bc would help jury appraise credibility that she had perceived self is such imminent danger that shot in self-defense
  • Trial court excluded bc would “invade province of the jury” as sole judges of facts and triers of credibility
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2
Q

Ibn-Tamas v. United States (DC COA 1979) H

A

H:
- COA erred in precluding psychologist testimony bc would not invade pronvince of jury, either on ultimate issue or “beyond the ken” basis. Remanded to gather more evidence on methodology

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3
Q

Ibn-Tamas v. United States (DC COA 1979) R (2 Ways Expert Preempts Jury’s Function, 3-Fold Test for Admissibility as Beyond the Ken, General Standard Cited for Expert Admissibility)

A

Preempt Jury Function:
1. Testify to Ultimate Issue
2. Testify on matters the jury just as competent to consider, “the matter is not beyond the ken of the average layman.”
3-Fold Test for Admissibility as Beyond the Ken:
1. Subject matter must be so scientific as beyond ken of average layman
2. Expert must have sufficient knowledge/skill/xp in that field so that testimony will aid truth finding
3. The specific art must permit reasonable opinion by an expert
GENERAL: Cited Frye test. SCOTUS said didn’t have sufficient information on general acceptance of battered woman methodology, so remanded

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4
Q

Ibn-Tamas v. United States (DC COA 1979) vs. Daubert

A

Ibn-Tamas superseded by Daubert in those jurisdictions that use Daubert

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5
Q

Indiana v. Edwards (SCOTUS 2008) FOTC

A
  • Edwards attempted to steal shoes, then fired gun at security guard and wounded bystander
  • Underwent 3x CST proceedings and 2 self-representation requests
  • Committed to state hospitals as IST, occasionally some improvement
  • 5 years later, right before trial, asked again for continuance to proceed pro se
  • Court refused, went to trial with atty
  • Conv of criminal recklessness and theft, no verdict on other charges
  • Year later, court going to retry on other charges
  • Again requested to represent self
  • Court still found schiz and CST, but said not competent to represent self
  • Represented by counsel, convicted on other charges
  • Appealed, stating court’s refusal of pro se violated 6th A
  • IN SC found state required to allow Edwards to represent self
  • Indiana petitioned to SCOTUS
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6
Q

Indiana v. Edwards (SCOTUS 2008) H & R (6 - 2 Godinez, 1 other case, 1/3 Other Risks, and Ultimate Decision on IN SC Ruling)

A

H: Const permits State to limit right to self-representation by requiring rep by counsel at trial if defendant lacks mental capacity to conduct trial defense unless represented
R:
- Godinez asserted that competence to waive counsel =/= competence to represent self
- Said both this and Godinez fell in gray area b/w Dusky and higher standard for legal purposes; constitution doesn’t require absolute right to self-representation for gray-area defs
- Cited Faretta which limited, such as when exhibits “mental derangement” that precludes right to fair trial
- Also noted dignity not affirmed if lacks capacity, could cause humiliating spectacle, and lead to unfair trial
- IN’s proposed standard where def “cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury” not endorsed, bc unclear how would work
- So vacated and remanded

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7
Q

Indiana v. Edwards (SCOTUS 2008) APA/AAPL Amicus Brief

A

Court agreed with this stating MI can impair certain capacities but not others

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8
Q

Indiana v. Edwards (SCOTUS 2008) Dissent

A

Argued new competence to represent self w/o clarifying definition of its components allows states to substitute own perception and strip MI defs of their right to pro se

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9
Q

Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (SCOTUS 1984) FOTC

A
  • Tatro 8F w/ spina bifida: ortho/speech impairments, but also neurogenic bladder req Q3-4h CIC
  • Can be performed by lay person in a few minutes w/ < 1h training
  • School district received fed funding under Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), requiring providing “free appropriate public education” w/ “related services”
  • School declined to provide, parents sued under EAHCA and S.504 R.A. for excluding benefits from program under federal aid
  • Fed Distr Co denied request for preliminary injunction
  • COA reversed, Distr Co found CIC was related service and ordered district to provide and pay compensatory damages/atty fees
  • COA affirmed
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10
Q

Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (SCOTUS 1984) 2 Issues

A
  1. Whether EAHCA requires district to provide CICs for Tatro
  2. Whether S. 504 R.A. creates such obligation
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11
Q

Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (SCOTUS 1984) H (2) & R (Gen, 4 Limitations on Related Services to Avoid Undue Burden)

A

H:
- CIC “related service” under EAHCA
- S504RA inapplicable when relief available under EAHCA to remedy denial of services, so couldn’t get atty fees & such
R:
- CIC qualify bc if not available, child can’t attend/benefit, so same as entering/exiting school etc
1. Child must be handicapped
2. Services must be “necessary” for child to benefit from education
3. If need to be provided by physician, school not required to provide
4. Services, not equipment?

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12
Q

Jackson v. Indiana (SCOTUS 1972) FOTC

A
  • Jackson severe ID deaf mute, mental level of preschooler
  • 27y/o charged with $9 robberies
  • IST, extremely unlikely to read/write/CST. Held in psych hospital
  • Appeal filed claiming amounted to life sentence w/o conviction, violating 14th A, 8th A
  • IN SC rejected
  • Appealed SCOTUS
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13
Q

Jackson v. Indiana (SCOTUS 1972) H & R 5 (EP(4), Other Case, DP, Famous Quote, Add’l Req)

A

H: Reversed. Committed to hospital solely bc IST can’t be held more than reasonable period of time necessary to determine if substantial probability that will attain CST in foreseeable future
R:
- EP denied bc if had not been charged w/ criminal offense, commitment standard would’ve been diff, release standards more lenient, maybe diff institution w/ better care, entitled to other privileges now not
- Cited Baxstrom v. Herold which had found EP violations for convicted, and Jackson only accused
- DP violated: w/o dangerousness, can only be held for period to determine reasonable likelihood of CST, otherwise, release or commitment hearing
- Famous quote: “Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commmitted”
- Also req’d periodic reports not < often than Q6m

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14
Q

Jaffee v. Redmond (SCOTUS 1996) FOTC

A
  • Redmond (LEO) shot/killed Allan on patrol; claimed chasing another man w/ knife and disregarded commands to drop
  • Jaffee, executor of Allan’s estate, filed suit alleging violated const rights w/ excessive force
  • Redmond received therapy following with LCSW. Both refused to provide access to tx notes, asserting psychotherapist-patient privilege
  • Trial judge rejected, instructed to jury that Redmond’s refusal had “no legal justification” and jury could therefore presume contents unfavorable to Redmond
  • Jury award 545k to Allan’s family
  • COA reversed, concluding “reason and experience” compelled recognition of this privilege
  • Appealed to SCOTUS
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15
Q

Jaffee v. Redmond (SCOTUS 1996) Issue

A

Is it appropriate to recognize “psychotherapist privilege” under R. 501 FRoE? “privilege of a witness shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the US courts in the light of reason and experience.”

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16
Q

Jaffee v. Redmond (SCOTUS 1996) H (2) & R (FRoE/Gen, Interests, Counter, Comparison, Applicability, More Specific Alternative)

A

H: Affirmed. Redmond/tpist conversations protected from compelled disclosure under R 501.
- Applies to psychiatrists, psychologists, confidential comms made to LSCWs only in course of psychotherapy
R:
- R 501s light of reason/experience encourages courts to “continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges”: said they apply when proposed privilege “promotes sufficient important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence
- Said private interest supports this privilege, bc effective psychotherapy depends on trust/confidentiality, and that privilege also serves public interests since MH of citizens is “a public good of transcendent importance”
- Said evidentiary benefit of denying privilege modest
- All 50 states and DC have enacted some form
- Also extended from psychiatrists/ologists to LCSW in psychotherapy for sort of equal access
- Rejected balancing on case-by-case bc wouldn’t know in advance, so effectively useless

17
Q

Jaffee v. Redmond (SCOTUS 1996) Dissent (3)

A
  • Majority failed to acknowledge occasional injustice where courts specifically don’t unearth the truth where available to be found
  • Also criticized LCSW extension bc lesser training/uncertainty about role
  • Questioned necessity of psychotherapeutic service for society
18
Q

Jones v. U.S. (SCOTUS 1983) FOTC

A
  • Jones charged DC for petit larceny (stealing jacket), md =< 1 yr
  • Successfully NGRI’d -> St. Elizabeth’s indefinite confinement until no longer MI or dangerous
  • After 1 yr, demanded on D.P. to be released or recommitted under applicable civil statute
  • Under Addington v. Texas, gen civil commitment would require gov’t to prove CACE MI and dangerous
19
Q

Jones v. U.S. (SCOTUS 1983) H (2) & R (4 - Gen, Nonviolent, Other Case, Consideration of Specific Sentence)

A

H: Rejected Jones. “When criminal defendant established NGRI, gov’t can, on that basis, confine to mental institution until regained sanity or is no longer danger to himself/society
- Also affirmed leaving BOP on acquittee to prove no longer MI/dangerous
R:
- Verdict establishes act was committed and enough MI/dangerousness to justify commitment
- Re: nonviolent. “Violence has never been prerequisite for commitment.”
- As in Jackson v. Indiana, confinement must bear some relation to purpose, but can be indefinite based on insanity acquittal alone
- No necessary correlation b/w severity of offense and length of time necessary for recovery

20
Q

Jones v. U.S. (SCOTUS 1983) Dissent (2)

A
  • NGRI acquittal not constitutionally adequate substitute for D.P. protections of Addington and O’Connor, especially since focuses on moment in the past/not present
  • Insanity acquittees not special class not deserving of D.P. protections
21
Q

Kaimowitz v. Michigan DMH (MI Cir Co, Wayne County, 1973) FOTC

A
  • Smith committed to Ionia State Hospital as “sexual psychopathy” after allegation (not convicted) that murdered/raped student nurse while confined to state psych hospital
  • Xferred to Lafayette clinic for research study to test limbic surgery vs. antiandrogen hormone to see better at controlling male aggression in these individuals
  • Smith and parents gave informed consent under 3-person review committee
  • Kaimowitz (MI atty), leaked experiment to newspapers, then filed petitioned alleging illegal detainment for experimental psychosurgery
22
Q

Kaimowitz v. Michigan DMH (MI Cir Co, Wayne County, 1973) H (2) & R (4 - Gen, Alternative Consent, Coercion, Consitutional)

A

H:
1. Smith’s detention unconstitutional bc had not had “sexual psychopath” hearing or determination of guilt.
2. Involuntarily detained can’t give adequate consent to experimental brain surgery w/ high/unknown risks
- If surgery was widely accepted in the field, then consent could be valid
R:
- Close scrutiny necessary for consent when experiment dangerous/intrusive/irreversible/uncertain benefit
- Guardians can’t give adequate consent to psychosurgery
- Invol pts live in inherently coercive environment, so can’t give voluntary informed consent
- 1st A protects freedom to generate ideas, which could be infringed upon w/ experimental psychosurgery

23
Q

Kaimowitz v. Michigan DMH (MI Cir Co, Wayne County, 1973) Other Case Similar

A

Rogers v. Commissioner bc 1st A right to generate ideas

24
Q

Kansas v. Hendricks (SCOTUS 1997) FOTC

A
  • Hendricks multiple convictions child sexual molestation
  • Testified himself of repeated molestations, that when “stressed..can’t control urge” to molest. Concurred w/ dx pedophilia
  • KS enacted Sexually Violent Predator Act 1994, allowing civil commitment after prisoner term of “SVPs”
  • Defined as person conv/charge sex-viol offense & suffers from mental abnormality or p.d. that makes likely to re-engage in acts
  • Defines “mental abnormality” as “congenital/acq’d condition affecting emotion/volitional capacity which prediposes person to commit SV offenses such that menace to health and safety of others”
  • Get annual review that state has to show BARD they remain SVP
  • As Hendricks completed, jury determined suffered pedophilia & that was mental abnormality
  • Appeal: KS SC invalidated bc mental abn. didn’t satisfy subs. D.P. bc invol civil commitment requires MI finding
  • KS appealed SCOTUS
25
Q

Kansas v. Hendricks (SCOTUS 1997) Issues (2)

A
  1. SVP Act’s def of “mental abn.” satisfy subs D.P.?
  2. Does Act violate constitutional ban on double jeopardy or ex post facto lawmaking?
26
Q

Kansas v. Hendricks (SCOTUS 1997) H & R (4 - 3 About Commitment, 1 Double Jeo/Post Facto)

A

H: SVP Act constitutional
R:
- SCOTUS consistently upheld invol commitment for people unable to ctrl/behavior -> danger to others
- KS Act requires both dangerousness and linked to mental abn/PD. Not required to use specific term MI for civil commitment
- Also requires more than predisposition: requires past behavior + current mental condition w/ likelihood
- Doesn’t violate double jeopardy bc criminal conviction not prerequisite, and not punitive: about treatment/avoidance of harm to others from mental abnormality

27
Q

Kansas v. Hendricks (SCOTUS 1997) Dissent (2 - Subs D.P. and ex post facto)

A
  • Most dissenters agreed w/ abn. meeting substantive D.P.
  • However said wasn’t just civil tx, was clearly to inflict further punishment, tx not even offered til the end of sentence
28
Q

Kansas v. Hendricks (SCOTUS 1997) 2 Similar Case Comparisons

A

Allen v. Illinois (1986) - sex offenders could be viewed as civil rather than criminal
Powell v. TX - alc’s urge to drink “not completely overpowering,” where as this focused on loss of volitional control

29
Q

Kansas v. Crane (SCOTUS 2002) FOTC & Issue

A
  • Crane pled G to agg sex battery, exposing self/grabbing clerk/threatening to rape
  • State pursued SVPA eval/designation
  • State psychiatrist dx’d w/ exhibitionism and ASPD, but no expert said couldn’t control impulses
  • KS DC ordered civil commitment
  • KS SC reversed, saying Kansas v. Hendricks requires finding that defendant can’t control behavior, and that unconstitutional when only applied to emotional rather than volitional impairment
  • KS appealed
    ISSUE: Does 14th A D.P. requrie State to prove that SVP CANNOT control his sexual behavior before State can civilly commit for residential care and tx?
30
Q

Kansas v. Crane (SCOTUS 2002) H & R (3)

A

H: Vacated and remanded. Hendricks ruling doesn’t require total or complete lack of control, but must be some lack-of-control determination.
R:
- Hendricks ruling noted abnormality makes it difficult to control behavior, indicates not absolute but must be serious difficulty
- Whatever the abnormality is must be severe to justify continued civil commitment, so as to avoid mechanism for continued punishment/indefinite incarceration
- Said didn’t really care to distinguish b/w volitional, emotional, cognitive impairments

31
Q

Kansas v. Crane (SCOTUS 2002) Dissent (3)

A
  • Said should be reversed instead of vacated bc court had already ruled on constitutionality in Hendricks
  • Said had previously considered emotional vs. volitional in Hendricks and had now re-opened closed questions
  • Also dismay about expanding requirement to find some inability to control behavior w/o guidance on how to judge/do so
32
Q

Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael (SCOTUS 1999) FOTC & Issue

A
  • Tire blew out on Carmichael’s car, injuring and killing passengers
  • Carmichael brought suit against tire’s maker, claiming defective
  • Based case on depositions of tire failure analyst who testified that defect caused blow out, based on visual/tactile inspection and expert’s personal theory of absence of specific signs to indicate abuse
  • Kumho moved to exclude saying failed FRoE 702, Distr Co granted summary judgment saying tire analyst’s methodology didn’t meet Daubert
  • Plaintiff’s motioned for reconsideration, Distr Co agreed Daubert factors flexible, but still insufficient reliability
  • COA reversed, saying court erred applying Daubert, saying Daubert limited to scientific context and didn’t apply to tire analyst’s testimony which was “skill or experience based”
    ISSUE: How does Daubert apply to testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists?
33
Q

Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael (SCOTUS 1999) H (3)

A

H: Daubert applies to both scientific but also technical/specialized/experience knowledge
- Daubert can help determine, but all specific factors might not apply to all experts, court should use its own discretion to determine reliability
- COAs should use “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing Dist Co’s reliability determination, and in this case, Distr Co’s decision not to admit was in its discretion

34
Q

Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael (SCOTUS 1999) R (4)

A
  • 1st, held that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony
  • FRoE 702 refers to knowledge, not just scientific. Daubert only discussed scientific bc that was relevant
  • Judge determining admissability of evidence could Daubert factors in consideration when determining
  • Reasonable not to admit, bc no indication other experts used, no references that validated, no general reliability, etc
35
Q

Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael (SCOTUS 1999) Main Point (2)

A

Under Daubert, testimony can be admissible even if derived from observations based on extensive/specialized experience, rather than just scientific principles
- Overall test under Daubert is whether expert has “sufficient specialized knowledge to assist jurors” in deciding the particular issue in the case