Game Theory Flashcards
Coalition
Set of players who chooses same strategies
Singleton
1 player coalition
| H | L | =================== H | -5,-5 | 0,20 | =================== L | -20,0 | -1,-1 | ===================Dominant? Nash? PD?
H Dominant
(H,H)
-5
| H | L | =================== H | 50,50 | 30,60 | =================== L | 60,30 | 40,40 | ===================Dominant? Nash? PD?
L
(L,L)
40
Tragedy of commons, 2 requirement?
Rivalry in consumption & Non-Excludability
Nash Equilibrium
Strategy combination where no player has the incentive to deviate from the current strategy, given strategies chosen by all other players.
| H | L | =================== H | 4,4 | -1,5 | =================== L | 5,-1 | -100,100 | ===================Dominant? Nash? PD?
No dom No nash (-1,5), (5,-1)
| H | L | =================== H | 1,-1 | -1,1 | =================== L | -1,1 | 1,-1 | ===================Dominant? Nash? PD?
No nash
Zero sum game
1
D H
D H D D
(4,4) (-1,5) (5,-1) (-100,-100)
(5,-1)
Husband
Wife B O
B O B O
(5,1) (0,0) (1,5) (0,0)
(5,1)
Smith
Jones H T
H T H T
(1,-1) (-1,1) (-1,1) (1,-1)
XXX
Grim-Trigger Strategy
Once mistake was chosen, dominant strategy is chosen forever
| H | L | =================== H | -5,-5 | -10,5 | =================== L | 5,-10 | 0,0 | ===================Dominant? Nash? PD?
(0,0)
NOT PD, 0 > -5
Club good
Non-rivalry in consumption
Excludable by payment
Club Good Game | H | L | =================== H | 5,5 | -5??,10?? | =================== L | 10??,-5?? | 0,0 | ===================
Club Good Game | H | L | =================== H | 5,5 | -5+X,10-X | =================== L | 10-X,-5+X | 0,0 | ===================