Final PS2255 Politics of the Middle East

Question 1

The Origins of the Muslim Brotherhood

Answer 1

1. Not a licensed party, organization at the popular level through a network of associations and activities in the 1930’s: work co-ops, clinics, youth organizations, student groups
2. Social outreach as a demonstration of ideological commitment to Islam. da’wa = religious outreach
3. Started by Hassan al-Banna a school teacher in Ismailiyaa (headquarters of British owed Suez Canal company, military camps and wealthy foreign population). Found receptive audience due to Ismailiyaa embodying the evils of foreign capital and cultural influence in the context of continued British control despite nominal independence, political paralysis, intraelite conflict and corruption between Wafd, British and Monarchy.
4. al-Banna wanted to cultivate pious Muslims by way of example through preaching and social services. thought of Islam as a comprehensive way of life against materialism and moral bankruptcy.
5. tight discipline among members. shura council, guidance bureau and general guide. gradualist transformation from the ground up, no interest in seizing power. first with preaching, then move to the official sphere then create Islamic state. pragmatism and compromise unlike other ideologs, al-Banna not averse to playing by the rules of Egyptian politics, ran for office twice. Critique of Ghobashy’s argument, this shows early commitment to democratic participation, so political participation in the 80’s back to origins rather than metamorphosis

Question 2

Nasser and el-Sisi Years for the Muslim Brotherhood

Answer 2

1. banned in 1948 and in 1954 dissolution after the attempted assassination of Mubarak. still don’t resort to regime delegitimizing. imprison leaders and followers. Similar in post 2014 el-Sisi years.
2. Limit political front but both Nasser and Mubarak continued to allow social outreach. post liberalization 70’s and 80’s rival state social programs which failed to deliver services effectively.
3. Different lessons to different leaders or general guides of the MB. Sayyid Qutb violent political action against coercive state, Hasan al-Hudaybi the GG after Banna exercised a greater judiciousness and caution and Umar Tilmisani, the GG after, denounced violence all together.

Question 3

Electoral Politicking by the Muslim Brotherhood

Answer 3

1. Under Sadat, support for MB against Left and Nasserists. free from prison and sustain interaction with political actors. Under Mubarak: religious parties were illegal but de facto toleration
2. 80’s run candidates for professional syndicates and parliament. act as junior partners to the Wafd (legal channel) under al-Tilmissany (popular base), collude or perish due to legal barriers to parliamentary access then move to independents, then become senior partners to the Labour Party.
3. entered political system to change it but changed by the system. ideological revisions, clarify stance regarding the status of women (able to vote and be candidates but not highest office), coptics, party pluralism, democracy, and human rights driven by a new generation of activists. statements made in the 94 in part because rivals demand it.
4. 1995-2000: the middle aged cadres are imprisoned, leads to organizational turmoil: new, inflexible general guide, factional splits, ideological reversals.
5. Kifaya movement (meaning enough) reformist wing under al-Wasat splits in 2004. Demanding more freedoms, an end to the Mubarak regime, mass mobilization paved the way for 2011 uprisings.

Question 4

Ghobashy and the Muslim Brotherhood

Answer 4

1. strategy for electoral participation cornerstone for self preservation. institutional rules of participation rather than ideology motivate political parties
2. dilute religion because popular sovereignty, mandate from people not necessarily god.
3. engage in daily negotiation and dialogue with other ideologies with different understandings and views. find common ground against authoritarian regime.
4. 1995-2000 organizational stresses familiar to other Egyptian parties: best minds imprisoned, factional disputes, public splits, ideological reversals (interview given by general guide in 1997 interview), end collaboration between old guard and new minds. similar splits in other parties

Question 5

Muslim Brotherhood the 2011 Uprisings

Answer 5

1. Intra and Inter generational fissures. Was never monolithic but more internal diversity over time. Major groups: 1. da’wa faction: ideologically conservative, representatives in guidance bureau. old guard. control bureaucratic operations, allocation of resources and new recruits. 2. pragmatic conservatives: mainstream wing, combine religion with a belief in value of political engagement. MB’s with legal experience. 3. reformists: progressive interpretation of Islam. not well represented in guidance bureau.
2. 2011 uprisings keep a low profile, unwilling to jeopardize reputation among Egyptians and invite the risk of military coup. strategy was self restraint but reneged on promise and fielded a candidate in the 2012 presidential elections: Morsi, justified as the only way. religious symbols as to not alienate the population, promise not to impose Sharia.

Question 6

The fall of Morsi MB

Answer 6

1. Morsi’s actions use office for partisan gain, impose Islamism. Put Islamists in key ministries, provincial governors, media, judiciary, arrest activists and propose new laws. method to evade checks and balances reinforces suspicion.
2. failure to make tangible progress in meeting public’s demands. ironic because used to provide social services.
3. praise police and give raises despite torture. more power and financial independence to military, exempt from civilian oversight. ignore explicit demands for reforms in military and ministry of the interior.
4. not entirely in control of state apparatus. don’t see the coup coming. complete faih in the military.
5. al-Anani attributes this to three internal factors: 1. conservatism and lack of revolutionary agenda. fail to adapt ideological outlook to the aspirations expressed during the uprising. gradualism not revolutionary. prefer to deal with deep state, alienate younger revolutionaries and activists 2. organizational inertia and stagnation from 2001-2011 . centralization of organizational structure and loyalty to leadership rather than personal merits in guidance bureau and Shura council. banish reformists after 2011. 3. lack of governmental experience. never trained as statesmen, skillful in oppositional tactics. ministry of the interior, judiciary and the military reject MB.
6. Under el-Sisi, denounced as terrorist organization. Not legal, not tolerated

Question 7

Ghobashy v.s al-Anani

Answer 7

Ghobashy:
1. rules of authoritarian electoral politics and the terms of participation lead to organization and ideological change within the group. move towards cautious reinterpretation of al-Banna, authenticating democracy with Islamic concepts
2. metamorphosis from highly secretive, hierarchical, anti-democratic religious mass movement to modern flexible political party. shed ideological baggage to woo median voter.
3. In electoral authoritarian regimes: vote maximizing not first priority if votes not primary political currency. electoral games and regime games. regime games: either steadily participate with the hope of democratic transition or undermine the auth regime.
4. Islamist parties no different than other parties. overestimate impact of ideology. common institutional and organizational variables
5.. institutional political environment shaped behavior. external institutional factors are key.
al-Anani
1. internal organizational factors impacted external behavior.
2. MB as a stagnant organization, not undergoing a grand metamorphosis

Question 8

Explaining MB Electoral Dominance Since 1987

Answer 8

1. innate religiosity of Egyptians? yes for the 2005 election, world values survey finds 2/3 strongly believe religious authority should interpret the law. no 2012 election, Morsi won but drew on secular votes
2. organizational prowess: well honed tight knit cells (families) group cohesion. member discipline. loyalty to leaders. help survive government repression. vast network of Islamic institutions (mosques, charities) with daily access to average voters.
3. success also attributed to cooperation between the old guard the more progressive members.

Question 9

Ideological Moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood

Answer 9

1. 1984-2005 religious or moral issues do not take up majority of parliamentary agenda. change in goals, ends adopt more flexible and liberal ideology. change in means. anti corruption, freedom and economic mismanagement on the agenda. According to Ghobashy, electoral participation and subsequent ideological changes are substantive indicators of democratic commitment.
2. inclusion-moderation hypothesis: advent of democratic competition, push MB to greater moderation or liberalization but with two caveats Ghobashy partly wrong: 1. competition from ultra orthodox salafists more conservative than the Brothers, pushed the brother more to the right. and 2. areas of jurisprudence were settled which left little room for revision. uneven record on sensitive topics such as minorities and gender relations as well as civil and political rights.

Question 10

MB Election Program

Answer 10

“Islam is the Solution”

1. copts as full citizens
2. apply and codify sharia to extend to entire legal infrastructure
3. close government liquor factories
4. ban night clubs and casinos
5. comprehensive government regulation and strategic planning of economy

Question 11

Islamic Revolution in Iran

Answer 11

1. Main actors: westernized urban professionals, students, bazaaris, theological seminary students.
2. Freedom Movement founded by Mehdi Bazargan, represent liberal oppositional forces and the militant wing of the ulema. Islamic oriented activism within the movement. shiism as an activist faith to oppose injustice and assert cultural heritage in the face of Western models. critique a-political character of ulema.
3. militant wing of ulema lead by Khomeini overthrow monarchy and institute state controlled by ulema. led the charge against government initiatives in the 1960s, exiled 1963. publicly accused shah of anti Islamic policies (women’s enfranchisement)
4. public support through network of former students who disseminate Khomeini’s ideas. sermons taped and circulated. tapped in to shared heritage of anti-imperial sentiments.
5. 1978 opposition transforms from moderate reformist professional middle class to a popular Islamic revolution led by Khomeini. Hastened by the Shah’s brutal response to protesters, government austerity measures, labour unrest, socially uprooted workers from countryside. Indecisive policies led to regime paralysis.

Question 12

How did the Islamic Republic in Iran Get Established From the Revolution and What Form did it Take

Answer 12

1. 1979-1982 struggle between secular and religious. existence of rival centers of power and para statal revolutionary organizations such as revolutionary tribunals and guards.
2. 1979 Referendum, replace monarchy with Islamic state. assembly of experts constitutionalized role of ulema in governance. legal social and political islamicization. popularly elected president, national assembly and municipal councils but ultimate authority in the hands of the ulema.
3. Veto by the council of guardians. vilayat-i-faqih governance of Islamic jurists: most powerful position, by appointment.
4. first defeat moderate secular challengers, then militant islamic left through reign of terror. mass arrests, executions, loyalty tests , university shut down to undergo islamization.

Question 13

Causes and Preconditions of the Islamic Revolution

Answer 13

1. internal breakdown: fragility and paralysis of Pahlavi regime, personalized, contradictory policies, carrot and stick.
2. state’s modernization and economic change leads to a coalition of the dispossessed and alienated: bazaaris, guilds, recent migrants to towns, middle class and the ulema. all hared desire for political enfranchisement and inclusion.
3. Shi’ite Islam. the struggle between Husayn and Umayyad Caliph Yazid as the archetype of the conflict between justice and tyranny.
4. Charismatic leadership of Khomeini, seen as the embodient of Iran’s authentic identity. radical break from ulema quietest views.

Question 14

Stages of Islamization of Iran

Answer 14

1. post revolutionary consolidation 79-88. islamization from above, elimination of enemies, institutionalized clerical power.
2. post war reconstruction 88-97. pragmatism, relative political liberalization, revolutionary slogans, commercial ads, new mixed social spaces.
3. reformation 97-present. cultural revival and a move towards moderation. revolutionary zeal coupled with pragmatism. relative political liberalization and strengthening of civil society.

Question 15

Post Islamist Movement in Iran

Answer 15

1. Since 1990’s fusion of Islam republicanism and democracy.
2. emerged in response to failures and contradictions of Islamist rule in Iran 1. political marginalization through repressive electoral regime, economic mismanagement, alienation and frustration among urban youth 2. paradox. islamization of state secularization of juris prudence. save Islam as faith by undoing Islam as politics.

Question 16

Tezcur Comparison of Islamic Politics in Iran and Turkey But…

Answer 16

1. Both the Justice and Development Part in Turkey and the Reform Front in Iran confirm the moderation theory expectations: participation and competition in a pluralistic political climate leads to moderate tendencies but with two caveats:
2. first caveat is that moderation that integrates Islamists is not necessarily conducive to democratization especially in consolidating democracies and semi competitive autocracies. integration leads to moderation which leads to domestication: pursue conciliatory policies vis-a-vis authoritarian state due to electoral calculations and fear of state repression.
3. second caveat is that ideological evolution is a precondition for behavioral change. integrations does not bring moderation if the party leaders lack the intellectual resources to revise their ideological world views.
4. despite ideological transformation, reformers do not function as vehicles for democratization because: characteristics of the ruling regime, organizational capacities of the radical party

Question 17

Arjomand Reading Significance of the Islamic Revolution: Pahlavi State and its Impact

Answer 17

1. spontaneous revolution. fundamental change in institution, agendas, overall nature
2. Pahlavi State four phases: chronic weakness couple with political centralization.
3. Royal absolutism in the third phase. Land Reform Law known as the White Revolution modernization. weaken classes that supported the traditional system, sale of some state owned factories, enfranchisement of women
4. Allowed some political discontent but reacted violently to riots and strikes that were not officially sanctioned. inconsistent.

Question 18

Asef Bayat Islamist Phase in Iran

Answer 18

1. Gradual Islamization enforced from above. systematic and aimed to produce and reproduce lslamic citizens. Islamic government after Islamic revolution, explians resistance of large segments of population
2. Creation of Islamic government based on valayat-i-faqih. ulema’s verdicts subject to approval, tarnished spiritual and social legitimacy of the clergy.
3. Council of Guardians with veto power.
4. 1980’s compulsory veil, polygamy is reinstated and there is a quota system that limits the number of women in university

Question 19

Asef Bayat Post Islamism

Answer 19

1. appeal energy and symbols of Islamism get exhausted. not anti-islamic, tendency to re secularize, limit the role of religion in politics. associated with democracy and modernity and the survival of Islam as a religion.
2. Three social phenomena: Redevelopment of the Tehran Municipality, Alternative Thought Movement, Islamic Feminism
3. Tehran Municipality: commercialization (bill boards, free ways, malls), cultural centre, spatial arrangement that facilitate mingling
4. Alternative Thought Movement: neither Islamist nor Secular. Led by Abdul-Karim Soroush. hermeneutic not true reading and interpretation of Quran. implicit critique of valayat-i-faqih. management of modern society not through religion but through scientific rationality in a democratic structure. reject Islam as the solution to all problems
5. Islamic Feminism: within the Alternative Thought Movement. equality of men and women in Islam. women active in all fields. lead to the restriction of polygamy, equal education, and the rejection of men’s unilateral right to divorce.

Question 20

Asef Bayat Causes of Post Islamism

Answer 20

1. shortcomings and contradictions of the Islamist experience.
2. post revolutionary political structure excluded many groups fro participation. restriction on party formation and disqualification of candidates by the Council of Guardians.
3. Islamic economy did not deliver. income distribution improved but national income dropped due to a drop in international oil prices, war with Iraq and economic blockades. fear people will associate social ills with Islam.
4. Iranian youth. morally outraged but where to turn if already experienced Islamism? Post-Islamism as a way to fill the ideological void.

Question 21

Tezcur Moderation Theory and Ideological Change

Answer 21

1. integration of radical political parties within political system leads to their moderation. trade ideological platforms for electoral viability. centrist > radical
2. Michels: lose radical orientation and are domesticated through the pursuit of votes and organizational survival.
3. ideological evolution as a precondition for behavioral change change behavior due to exposure to new ideas and experiences.

Question 22

Tezcur Four Hypothesis on Muslim Reformers

Answer 22

1. Behavioral moderation accompanied by ideological change however those who adhere to rigid Islamist views are unresponsive to institutional incentives.
2. Participation in relatively competitive and pluralistic political environment reinforces moderate tendencies at the expense of radical voices. competitive nature of politics in Iran and Turkey in contrast to other Arab countries influenced the e reformers. choose electoral contestatation over confrontation or violent struggle with the regime.
3. Greater threat of state repression leads to more cautious and risk averse reformers. recurrent concern for the Reform Front and Justice and Development Party. Iran: guardian council vetos bills and legislation enacted by reformist. disqualify candidates. Turkey: military had enormous leverage over the government and veto power over state regulation of Islam and Kurdish discontent. constitutional court banned Islamic parties and forced dissolution repeatedly.
4. Reformers are prisoners of their organizational resources. once commit to electoral strategy it is hard to produce alternates. Reform Front in Iran unable to build grassroots, JDP charismatic, personalized and patron-client links (function of political parties law and Turkish political culture)

Question 23

Tezcur Collapse of Reform Front in Iran

Answer 23

1. Failed to trigger democratization but made politics more pluralistic and open. Galvanized the participation of youth and women and increased the visibility of Kurds.
2. Reformers were former revolutionaries, democrats loyal to Islamic revolution and thus reluctant to form confrontational strategies
3. Ultimate power in the hands of unelected forces, did not put reformers in control of the sate. disadvantage in comparison to JDP
4. Lack organizational capacity to build links with public
5. took blame for public problems between 2000-2004 because they controlled the presidency and the parliament

Question 24

Maturation of JDP, Evolution, Obstacles to Democratization

Answer 24

1. National Order Party closed by constitutional court, replaced by National Salvation Party, closed, reorganized as the Welfare Party banned, became Virtue Party in 1997. Younger generation split to form JDP because military, civil society and media hostility, realized ideologically driven platforms had limited appeal.
2. Vote maximization and survival.
3. came to power at critical point in EU relations.
4. Obstacles to democratization: undemocratic nature of political parties (Turkish Political Parties Law 1983 similar organizational structure for all parties imposed by law) and the political representation of Kurds (dictate not deliberate) -their timid and inconsistent response.

Question 25

Discourse and Political Behavior of the AKP

Answer 25

1. self identify as moderate conservative democrats
2. liberalizing reforms in course of accession talks with EU. Copenhagen Criteria.
3. centre right rather than Islamist lineage
4. first term in office, international praise for party model but authoritarian backsliding

Question 26

AKP Party Formation

Answer 26

1. political Islam to conservative democrats to competitive authoritarianism.
2. Legal Islamist Party (v.s MB underground opposition in Egypt) put forth religious challenges to secularist hegemony closed by constitutional court, re-emerged four times since 1970’s under various names.

Question 27

Welfare Party to AKP

Answer 27

1. Islamist to conservative democrats. Welfare Part combination of religious and nonreligious appeal. democracy as a means (majoritarian). third worldist foreign policy and just order superior to capitalism and socialism.
2. In course of political engagement, develop policies that sought to attract broader electoral vase
3. capitalize on fragmented and volatile electoral system.
4. Tezcur: ideologically and organizationally more innovative and adaptive than predecessors. Democracy as a means. instrumentalist
5. More confrontational than the AKP in their first term. declare sympathy for Islamist regimes and orgs world wide, advocate for more clergy schools, acknolwege religious orders (banned under Ataturk. Protests by secular middle class, civil society. implicit call for military intervention.
6. Soft military coup by decree 1997 restrict Islamic schools and increase requirement for secular education from 5-8 years. Welfare Party resign and is closed down. Ideological split similar to post-Islamism in Iran.
   Innovationists: AKP under Erdogan (former mayor of Istanbul)
   Traditionalists: Felicity Party under Kutan (old leader of FP)

Question 28

AKP First Term in Office

Answer 28

1. Younger generation of WP that formed AKP were modernist, innovative, neo-liberal, pro-democratic and pro Western in outlook.
2. Dual strategy of 1.vote maximization by moving to the center and organizational survival by accommodating the secularist state. 2. powerful charismatic personality of the leader with a man of the people image (similar to MB in pre 2011 Egypt)
3. First single party government in a decade. heterogeneous cross class voter base: center right, moderate Islamist, nationalists, faction of the liberal intelligentsia, center left, new conservative middle class, urban poor.
4. Initial use of pragmatic self restrain to appease the secular media and military, show that it won’t use religion for political ends. Religion as most important institution of humanity and secularism as a condition for democracy and guarantee of freedom of religion.
5. Professional, dialogue with secularist media, integration with global capitalism and free market economy, emphasis on pluralist and participatory democracy, human and minority rights, rule of law, secularism, pro West foreign policy (ties with EU, Nato, US and Europe) and politics based on compromise and reconciliation. prove difference from Islamists

Question 29

Post 2011 Devolution of AKP

Answer 29

1. From conservative democrats to competitive authoritarianism. ideological factors: majoritarian and instrumentalist (party lineage as history). structural factors: bias to one man rule
2. Esen and Gumuscu tutelary democracy to competitive authoritarianism. weakening of political institutions, erosion of rule of law by leaders who initially come to power through the ballot box. instead of democratic consolidation as predicted by Ozbudun.
3. competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regime with universal suffrage and elected officials whose authority is unimpeded by veto players but has one or more of : unfair elections, violations of civil liberties, uneven playing field.
4. Third term in office, increase restrictions on freedom of political speech, association, use of legal action to harass government critics, rewards supporters in media and civil society, state institutions packed with loyalists. ultimately use public resources for partisan gain. uneven playing field for other parties (limit access to media and resources, limit campaign time) have to compete against entire state apparatus.
5. contextual factors: Came to power in an unconsolidated democracy where the military and judiciary had virtual vetos. From 2007-2011, legal (constitutional amendments) and extralegal measures to reduce the tutelary power of the military and judiciary. restructure courts and make military intervention in politics a crime. subordiation of the Judiciary started with Ergenekor and Sledgehammer cases. Increased its popular mandate by incorporating Kurds and Islamic conservatives.

Question 30

AKP’s Fourth Term in Office 2015-Present

Answer 30

1. Further devolution in to one man autocracy
2. end of tutelary democracy did not result in democratic consolidation.
3. Esen and Gumuscu > future still uncertain, fell short of number of seats to amend constitution to instate a presidential system. drift towards hegemonic authoritarianism, however in June 2018, Erdogan elected president with broad powers and no checks.
4. continuation of late Ottoman political legacy, monarchist constitutional rule.

Question 31

Women’s Participation in Jordan and Yemen

Answer 31

1. Schwedler and Clark. Formal arena
2. Existing explanations: 1. party strategy to increase votes 2. shift in ideology, moderates over hardliners. not accurate
3. but in reality: changing opportunity structures and the opening of intraparty fissures
4. Jordan: intra party debates around whether to boycott the elections in response to new electoral laws. however they decide to participate, Islamic Front loss of seats in relation to its religious sources after 1993 elections. legalist v.s contextualists, blame legalists for being too extremist.
5. unintentionally created space for women’s mobilization, women actively take advantage. lead to the election of the first women (Faouri in Turkey)
6. gains are reversible, increase in women’s participation can result in closing of windows of opportunity. when tensions within party dissipate ex) Jordan, 1999 legalists object to attendance of women at public meetings, asked to leave.

Question 32

Women’s Participation in Iran and Turkey

Answer 32

1. Formal arena
2. not just opportunity structures, increasing outspokenness of Islamic women’s rights. activism against gender discrimination within their parties. Tajali.
3. make it to representative level, access to candidacy and leadership. MP’s and potential cabinet members
4. Enabled by: close ties to male elites, presence of public sympathy for women’s political representation.
5. Mobilized by women’s rights groups such as Women’s Magazines in Iran and KA-DER in Turkey, a NGO to train and help women in politics
6. Bostan in Turkey, one of the founding members of the AKP, applies for candidacy and threatens party leadership that she would run as an independent if the party did not nominate head scarved women from within party ranks. opened the space for head scarved women. 2013 remove head scarf ban.

Question 33

Women’s Activism in the Informal Arena

Answer 33

1. Post revolutionary Iran. without organized collective action or leaders
2. Bayat: movement by implication: dispersed, fragmented, not deliberate, not self consciously political, against forced islamization through mundate and daily practices. impose selves as public actors.
3. make gains through increasing public presence which results in a shift in gender dynamics. mountain climbing, increased role in domestic chores outside the home increased confidence, improper wearing of the hijab, attend sporting events. do not incite state repression, allow women to gain ground. arguably more sustainable.
4. more egalitarian and women centered interpretation of the Quran. individual choice. post Islamist feminism, blend piety and choice.
5. Regain rights granted by shah prior to the revolution. remove quota system for education, increased employment opportunities, curtail polygamy and abolish men’s unilateral right to divorce.

Question 34

Clark and Shwedler Windows of Opportunity

Answer 34

1. gains when women seize windows of opportunity. include: support form male party leadership for women’s initiatives inside and outside the party as well as an increase in the number of women in formal decision making structures (consultative council).
2. issue areas that create space for women’s mobilization: how deeply to integrate in to pluralist political system and how strictly to adhere to written/traditional sources of Islamic learning
3. Moderate/Hardliner divide problematic. instead conceptualize along two axis:
   accommodationist: integration in to pluralist system provides means to promote and realize an Islamic way of life. increase chances of gaining power. in favor of coalitions with secular parties
   non accomodationist: Islam diluted by increased participation
   contextualists: religion in light of contemporary realities
   legalists: sharia strictly adhered to. words not interpretation.

Question 35

Tajali and Protesting Gender Discrimination

Answer 35

1. active acts of defiance and increasing outspokenness leads to internal criticism of the party and institutional reform.
2. Increase of political representation in Turkey and Iran due to : exceptional political experience and devotion of key activists, close ties to party leadership used to gain leverage, presence of public interest and discourse around women’s representation
3. internal criticism of party leadership generates reform with long lasting effects

Question 36

Democratic Prerequisite Argument for Resilience of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Answer 36

Bellin, but not explanation enough. not unique tot he region.

1. region lacks democratic prerequisities
2. lack strong civil society. it is either oppressed or not independent of the state.
3. lack market drive economy. history of statist ideologies.
4. inadequate income and literacy levels
5. lack democratic neighbors. no demonstration effect.
6. stunts development of collective deliberation and thus civic culture

Question 37

Cultural Theory Argument for Resilience of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Answer 37

Bellin, but not explanation enough.

1. intrinsic incompatibility of Islam and democracy
2. normative environment hostile to democracy:
3. Islam recognizes no division between church and state.
4. emphasis community over the individual.
5. Islamic law is fundamentally illiberal
6. Islam nurtures the status quo rather than contestation.
7. This hypothesis is disproved by the Arab Barometer Survey Project (2000-2006). found that more religious Muslims as likely as less religious to believe that democracy is the best political system despite its drawback. However democracy was defined by 50% in light of political rights and freedoms and the other half through economic considerations. as high or higher than other world regions. Middle East not unique.
8. Disproves democratic prerequisites, poverty not a limit to democratic commitment, seen as useful in addressing pressing economic needs.

Question 38

Rentier State Theory Argument for Resilience of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Answer 38

1. challenges Cultural Theory. Economic and fiscal reliance on gas, petroleum and other natural resources helps create and perpetuate authoritarian political regimes. not just the state itself, neighbors as well through aid and labourer migration.
2. Samuel Huntington: oil revenues increase the power of the state as they decrease the need to tax, less reasons for the public to demand greater representation.
3. Taxation Effect, Spending Effect (greater patronage spending. clientistic network and loyal citizens), Repression Effect (excessive spending on intelligence and coercive apparatus)
4. Critiques: resources as a blessing, increase income, increase in democracy. oil rich countries share historical legacies not $ and aren’t democracies. oil rich countries autocracies prior to the discovery of oil.

Question 39

Authoritarian Resilience School Argument for Resilience of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Answer 39

1. Importance of institutions: structure of military-state relations and structure of government-opposition relations.
2. Bellin: rather than the absence of prerequisties, it is the presence of conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a robust coercive apparatus. coercive deep state deeply opposed to democratic reform quashes initiatives. Theda Skocpol: revolutions outcome dictated by state strength and capacity. will and capacity to crush.
3. robust coercive apparatus: exceptionally willing or able to crush dissent:
   maintenance of fiscal health: enabled by rentier income
   international support networks: unique continued after Cold War due to reliable oil supply.
   inversely related level of institutionalization: high institutionalization leads to receptiveness to reform but coercive apparatus is patrimonially organized so resistance to reform. personally identify.
   level of popular mobilization: high costs of repression if high level of mobilization. weak in ME till Arab Spring so cost of repression low.

Question 40

What Shapes the Extent of Popular Mobilization

Answer 40

1. Lust-Okar: incumbents choice of institutional arrangements that govern parties
2. affect popular mobilization through incentives and costs.
3. where incumbent elites haven’t created divisions between opposition, opposition more likely to mobilize. 4.strategic calculations of political activists are constrained by institutional choices of ruling executives.
4. Bellin: role of human agency. strategic importance of military in crushing or allowing reform. influenced by institutional factors.

Question 41

Divided v.s Undivided Opposition

Answer 41

divided: less costly for included opposition to mobilize alone than with excluded. responsibility to maintain the state.
undivided: and excluded opponents in divided, mobilize in conjunction with legal opponents less costly than individual regime challenge.
1. Morocco: divided, illegal parties mostly religious, opposition party declines to continue mobilization despite prolonged economic crisis due to fear of rising popularity of Islamists. fear use this as a springboard and strengthen ties with people through provision of social services. inclusion in protest would radicalize the opposition, lead to greater repression and threaten loyalist position in relation to state and King.
2. Jordan: undivided, no loyalists: opponent groups united and press for political pluralism despite internal diversity. no opposition is disadvantaged because none are legal. fear state repression but not each other. leads to King Husayn giving every group to operate publicly but as demands increase over time, reversal in liberalization.

Question 42

Common Trends in the Region During the Arab Spring

Answer 42

Presence of uprisings.

1. eruption of non-violent mass protests over multiple days
2. spread to multiple geographic sites
3. seizure and control of public spaces (example: Tahrir Square in Cairo

Question 43

Variation in Outcome in the Region During the Arab Spring

Answer 43

1. domestically driven authoritarian breakdown in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen.
2. Involuntary replacement of incumbent rulers by an alternative set of elites, impelled by popular pressure.
3. does not necessarily lead to democratic transition, may be followed by another period of authoritarianism.
   V.S
4. authoritarian continuity: Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi, Algeria and UAE

Question 44

Do the Events of the Arab Spring Confirm or Challenge Resilient Authoritarianism Literature

Answer 44

According to Bellin Yes and No:
Yes: variation in outcome centers on the coercive apparatus’ varying wills to repress (will the military shoot at protesters or not) and whether the security forces defect. Confirms resilient authoritarianism literature.
No: additional factors that explain regime survival: effective co-optation of the citizenry via the Gulf Cooperation Council, division and co-optation of elites specifically in Morocco and Jordan.

Question 45

Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain Outcomes According to Bellin

Answer 45

Tunisia: institutionalized army and high levels of peaceful mobilization lead to military defection
Egypt: institutionalized army (crony capitalist links to regime), international factors and high levels of peaceful mobilization lead to military defection
Bahrain: patrimonially organized army of a different sect than protesters lead to no military defection.

Question 46

Explaining Massive Protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Bellin)

Answer 46

1. political and economic grievances: youth unemployment twice the global average, high levels of poverty, crony capitalism.
2. an emotional trigger (fear, anger outrage): in Tunisia, self immolation of street vendor. In Egypt, murder of Khaled Said, surge in basic food prices, denial of political representation to the opposition in the 2010 elections, euphoria generated by Tunisia.
3. sense of impunity. cost benefit analysis. (reassurance military won’t shoot)
4. access to social media to coordinate mobilization and evade authoritarian repression.
   * *can’t explain Yemen or Syria

Question 47

Explaining Divergent Regime Outcomes of Arab Spring Brownlee

Answer 47

1. shift from proximate variables (such as Bellin’s analysis) to historical and structural factors. structural theory of regime change and continuity based on two pre-existing regime traits (historical piece)
2. no structural preconditions for the emergence of uprisings. success of a domestic campaign to oust the ruler is structurally preconditioned by : oil wealth that gives the rulers resources to forestall challenges and precedent of hereditary succession which results in heightened loyalty of coercive agents to the executive. sultans rather than autocrats.
3. no oil revenue and/or not hereditary succession, succumb quickly to uprisings. regime change: ousting ruler and inner circle impelled by a mass movement not a coup. oil revenue and hereditary, elite cohesion.
4. critique initial theories: actor based theories have spurious causality. structural and historical explanations fail to explain the range of outcomes.

Question 48

Brownlee Why Variation in Outcome by Country According to His Mode of Analysis

Answer 48

1. Non hereditary regimes without oil (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen) uprisings lead to elite defection, breakdown of despotic power and regime change. Bellin fails to predict this outcome for Yemen (patrimonial but still elite defection)
2. hereditary regimes (Syria, Jordan, Morocco) or major oil exporters (Libya, Bahrain) uprisings lead to elite cohesion and crackdowns, regime continuity.

Question 49

Variation in Will of Military to Repress Uprisings

Answer 49

1. institutional character of the military
2. level of social mobilization. using lethal force undermines the military’s role as defender of the nation. if peaceful, reacting with lethal force undermines internal coherence morale and discipline.
3. increased level of social mobilization increases the cost of repression.
4. structural character of the military: can be institutionalized or patrimonial
   institutionalized: corporate identity separate from regime.
   patrimonial: leaders linked to regime through blood, sect or ethnicity. invested in regime. regime change perceived as ruin, prevents defection.

Question 50

Explanations Outside Egypt and Tunisia Bellin

Answer 50

power of diffusion

1. deliberate diffusion and sharing of tactics by activists linked trans-nationally
2. the demonstration effect. analogical thinking. also true for leaders who see examples of regimes being toppled and adjust their behavior accordingly.

Question 51

Authoritarian Upgrading Post Arab Spring

Answer 51

1. authoritarian restructuring enhances regime stability which leads to a more repressive, militarized and narrowly sectarian form of regime compared to pre-uprising.
2. regional trend to adapt to discontent
3. intra-regional variation in techniques of adaptation: accommodation/co-optation of resistive societies. for example, limited reform and re distributive policies in Jordan. analogical thinking, see what happened in Egypt and Tunisia.
4. domestic and external resources available to regime define its opportunity set and determine which specific strategies of adaptation will be used to contain popular unrest.

Question 52

Case Study Assads Syria Heydemann

Answer 52

Domestic adaptations:
1. exclusionary sectarian mobilization reinforce defensive solidarity among core social base (Alawites and Non Muslims).
2.reconfigure security sector to confront decentralized guerrilla insurgents.
3. reassert state as agent of redistribution and provider economic security.
4. state controlled internet and telecommunications to disrupt opponent communications.
Regional and International Adaptations:
1. exploit alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, direct military and financial support.
2. Russia and China military and financial aid and advocate on the international stage. insulate the Assad regime from UN backed sanctions. remove incentive to moderate.
Path dependent qualities/nature of adaptive strategies in context of Arab uprisings. opportunity set available to Assad use key resources: patrimonial sectarian and exclusionary pattern of recruitment, informal networks of non state actors: Shabiha (criminal network used to terrorize Sunnis and prevent defections). alliance with Hezbollah and Iran

Question 53

How Oppositions Affect Regime’s Strategies and Vice Versa

Answer 53

1. adaptations in interaction with changes undergone by opposition (internally divided, eventually dominated by Islamist extremists).
2. transformation of opposition helped validate regime narrative of dissidents as terrorists, boost regime support among Alawaites and Non Muslims and erode Western support for dissidents.
3. not entirely the oppositions doing, regime contributed to this shift from peaceful protesters to militarized, Islamist insurgency. immediate and disproportionate use of violence against protesters
4. significant interactions effects between regime’s adaptive strategies and internal transformation of opportunities.

Question 54

Saudi Led Counterrevolution

Answer 54

1. Saudi used it to reassert position and prominence and leadership within the Gulf Cooperation Council. historically ascribed itself the role of regional coordinator through proactive diplomacy but fears of Arab Spring contagion heightened this diplomatic activism: chief architect of counter revolution to reverse AS
2. Gulf Cooperation Council attempts to solidify its identity and mandate through inclusion of additional Sunni monarchies (Morocco and Jordan).
3. Address crisis internally through a combo of heightened repression and additional economic incentives.
4. Contain the Arab Spring regionally shore up alliances among authoritarian survivors and bolster failing states.

Question 55

Rise of Jihadism

Answer 55

1. Neumann: jihad nurtured and manipulated to serve the interests of the governments aims. Assad fighting enemy he helped create. Bashar co-opt and control Islamic revival,
2. Open up Syria as a transit point for foreign fighters headed for the Iraqi insurgency, start attracting jihadists. get rid of jihadists sent them to Iraq and destabilize the US occupation of Iraq. (2003 Iraqi War) after 2004 return and turn against regime. still manipulated by the regime today. adaptive strategy at work
3. Justify to international world, use as excuse.
4. assume jihadist fighters drive by religious beliefs and extremism but they were actually found to be ignorant about Islam and couldn’t answer questions about Sharia, militant jihad and caliphate. ISIS offers humiliated and enraged young men a way to defend their dignity, family and tribe.