Dispensa+- 5- Deterrence -New Developments Flashcards
Actions and Types
- Two countries: A and B
- Country B constituted by Leader (L) and Elite (E)
They both may be hawks or doves.
Timing
4steps
- L provokes a crisis (m=1) or not (m=0)
- E decides whether to support L (s = 1) or challenge L (s = 0)
- Country A decides whether to retaliate (r = 1) or not (r = 0)
- Ruler of country B decided whether to escalate (x = 1) or not (x = 0)
Political Instability
Leader needs support of elite to stay in power
- if Elite chooses support, Leader remains in power
- if Elite seizes power, it becomes Ruler
If Elite decides to seize power, domestic payoffs lose fraction (1−δ): internal conflict is inefficient
Stakes of the Conflict
For hawks in country B: - π1 from provocation - π2 from escalation For doves in country B: - provocation and escalation give payoff of 0 For country A: - −λ1 from provocation - −λ2 from escalation
Retaliation
- Costly for country to execute: c > 0
- Costly for members of country B to endure (deterrence by punishment; impose costs): k > 0
- retaliatory actions reduce the disutility associated with an escalated conflict by q ∈ (0, 1), where q represents the effectiveness of sanctions and military operations
• −λ2 becomes −(1−q)λ2
Domestic Payoffs
Leader and Elite disagree about domestic politics:
They care about the ideological type of ruler, θR.
Member i of B receives a domestic political payoff given by
u(θi;θR)=θi ·θR +(1−θi)(1−θR),
if θi = θR (ideological agreement), payoff equal to 1
if θi ̸= θR (ideological disagreement), payoff equal to 0
If Elite seizes power from Leader, domestic payoff becomes δ
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
- L: provocation strategy, given Θ (ideological composition of B)
- E: support strategy, given Θ and L’s decision
- A: retaliation strategy, given decisions of L and E, and system of beliefs considering the ideological composition of B
- Ruler: escalation strategy for the ruler, considering the previous choices.
Model of conventional deterrence scenario
Elite is removed (= fixing exogenously decision to support, s*=1)
L is a hawk (ΘL=1)
q is the effectiveness of sanctions (extent that retaliation reduces the influence of escalation on the status quo)
credibility constraint
When should country A retaliate?
Ua Not retaliate <= Ua retaliate
−λ1 −λ2 ≤ −λ1 −(1−q)λ2 −c
so when c ≤ qλ2 ≡ c∗
capability constraint
when does a threat deters provocation?
UL no prov ≥ UL prov
1 ≥ π1 + 1 + (1 − q)π2 − k
so when k ≥ π1 + (1 − q)π2 ≡ k∗
Key features of the adapted general model:
1- Incomplete information
2- Political instability
3- Ideological disagreement
Successful deterrence means
no provocation
Credibility Constraint: c ≤ c ∗
Capability Constraint: k ≥ k ∗
Necessary and jointly sufficient for deterrence success
Model with 1
incomplete information
- Probability that L is hawk is μ
- Standard costly signalling game: L is sender and A is receiver
- a dove wouldn’t provoke a crisis, so if L provoked a crisis, L is a hawkIf credibility constraint is satisfied → retaliation after provocation
If capability constraint is satisfied → successful deterrence
Model with 2
Political instability
- Political Instability: country B has L and E, they are both hawks
- No incomplete info - common knowledge that L and E are hawks
- E is a hawk, so if L provokes a crisis, even if E takes power, country A might retaliate
Since conflict is inefficient, E supports L → everything just like when E is absentIf credibility constraint is satisfied → retaliation after provocation
If capability constraint is satisfied → successful deterrence
Model with 2 and 3
Political instability and Ideological disagreement
salience constraint
L is a dove and E is a hawk
‘‘the threat of retaliation by country A can alter the relative salience of ideological disagreements within country B’’
- Country A retaliates if and only if L provoked a crisis and a hawkish ruler controls country B
If E’s decision does not affect whether A retaliates, the ideological disagreement between L and E is the only relevant dimension determining E’s choice
If E’s support prevents retaliation, then E will support a
dovish L if and only if
supporting> seizing power
π1 ≥π1 +δ+(1−q)π2 −k
which, after rearranging, holds as long as
k ≥δ+(1−q)π2(1)≡k∗∗
Salience constraint
Conventional Logic of Deterrence with 2 and 3
Political instability and Ideological disagreement
insights on salience constraint
salience constraint: When avoiding retaliation is more important than ideological disagreement
Salience constraint ̸= capability constraint
- salience constraint emerges from E’s decision calculus
- capability constraint emerges from L’s incentives when anticipating retaliationWith political insecurity, salience constraint generates the key strategic force in the modelIf the credibility constraint and the salience constraint are satisfied, then
(i) when country B is ideologically cohesive, E seizes power if and only if doing so prevents retaliation
(ii) when country B is ideologically divided, E supports L if and only if support prevents retaliation
Conventional Logic of Deterrence with 2 and 3
Political instability and Ideological disagreement
instability curse
L is hawkish and E is a dove
Credibility and capability constraints hold
Then
- Country A: retaliates if and only if L provoked a crisis and kept power
- Elite in Country B: seizes power from L regardless of
provocation choice
- Leader in Country B: provokes a crisis
Hawkish L cannot be prevented from provoking a crisis
The Instability Curse : Doves interrupt the direct connection between provocation and retaliation
The Instability Curse
further insights
(1) Alignment of interests between A and E
E will not escalate the conflict
⇒ not sequentially rational for A to strike when E gains power
(2) Breaks connection between L and terminal nodes where k is received
Conventional Logic of Deterrence with 2 and 3
Political instability and Ideological disagreement
The Deterrence Curse
L is dovish and E is a hawk
Credibility and salience constraints hold
Then
- Country A: retaliates if and only if L provoked a crisis and E takes power
- Elite in Country B: supports L if and only if L provokes a crisis
- Leader in Country B: provokes a crisis
E supports L only if doing so avoids a retaliation (only possible if L provokes a crisis)
The Deterrence Curse : Dove’s tactical provocation of an international crisis to prevent an internal challenge
The Deterrence Curse
further insights
(1) Ability to deter E from seizing power makes deterrence of provocation fail: Credibility constraint (c ≤ c ∗ ) Salience constraint (k ≥ k ∗∗ )
(2) Commitment problem:
country A would be better off if she could commit to protect the interests of a dovish L
Without provocation, A has no incentive to retaliate
Provocation forces A to have an interest in who controls B
Political instability and Ideological disagreement and incomplete information
The Instability Curse
Proposition—Part I
Suppose the credibility and salience constraints hold. Then, if π1 > 1 the strategy profile is
Country A: retaliates following provocation and support
Elite in Country B: supports only if cohesive and L does not provoke
Leader in Country B: provoke a crisis
it is an equilibrium if and only if c ≥ cˆ ≡ (μC / μC +μH)(1 − q)π2
The Deterrence Curse
Dove’s tactical provocation of an international crisis to prevent an internal challenge
A is better off in
the Instability Curse equilibrium than in the Deterrence Curse equilibrium
The Instability Curse
Doves interrupt the direct connection between provocation and retaliation
Political instability and Ideological disagreement and incomplete information
The Instability Curse
Proposition—Part I
implications
- Provocation reveals L is hawkish → A will strike if L keeps power
- Dovish E takes power from L to avoid retaliation
- When c ≥ cbarre, country A reluctant to retaliate
- Hawkish E mimiks dovish E
- After seeing provocation and a change in leadership in country B, country A does not know if it is facing a hawk or dove
- Reluctancy to retaliate means that this uncertainty is enough to discourage A from retaliating
But if π1 > 1 → hawkish leader in cohesive group is better off not provoking
Political instability and Ideological disagreement and incomplete information
The Deterrence Curse
Proposition—Part II
Suppose the credibility and capability constraints are satisfied, then the strategy profile
- Country A: strikes following provocation and nonsupport
- Elite in Country B: supports if L provokes a crisis and
challenges if L does not provoke a crisis, unless Θ = ΘC
- Leader in Country B: provoke a crisis
is an equilibrium
Political instability and ideological disagreement affect
deterrence
Under incomplete information, such failures mean some conflicts will escalate
Inaction Strategy: Never Strike
Instability Curse: A is at least as well off using a policy of inaction
Deterrence Curse: strictly better off using a policy of inaction
Inaction breaks the curses - country A ignores informational content of L’s and E’s actions
However, A must face some escalated threats
