1bis- Autocratic Stability under the shadow of Foreign Threats

Question 1

Autocrats manage threats from

Answer 1

• Domestic actors: Elites, military, opposition groups

- Foreign actors: Single countries, military alliances

Question 2

Domestic and Foreign threats are strategically linked

Answer 2

• Domestic opposition: needs to consider foreign reaction to regime change
• Foreign opposition: new domestic power after regime change
• Autocratic leader: boosting internal security can influence foreign threats

Question 3

The ‘benchmark’ model

Answer 3

Timing:

1. Leader chooses repression x ∈ [0, X ]
2. Opposition chooses whether to challenge, s ∈ {0, 1}

Challenge success:
Probability of Z seizing power= t/(x+t)

Question 4

Benefit of holding power B(x):

Answer 4

• B(x) >0
• B(x) is decreasing in repression x
• Being in power is always valuable, B(X) > c

Question 5

Opposition will challenge if

Answer 5

prob du benefit moins les coûts > 0
B(x) * t/(x+t) - c

rearranging:
cx/(B(x)- c)

Question 6

Repression and trade-off for the leader

Answer 6

• repression reduces the benefit of being in power: B′(x) < 0
• repression improves probability of survival: λ′0(x) > 0

so leader’s issue is max λ(x)B(x)

Question 7

Model with Foreign Actor

draw the graph!

Answer 7

• Foreign (F) moves after Opposition (Z)
• Leader (L) is misaligned
• Opposition is either aligned (A) with F or misaligned (M)
• F can intervene against ruler, w=1 or not w=0, successful in all cases

Question 8

Costs for F

Answer 8

• cost d(x) if H is controlled by a misaligned actor (repression influences prosperity) decreasing in x
• cost k(x) for intervening, increasing in x

Question 9

Optimal intervention for Foreign depends on:

mathematically

Answer 9

• the alignment of the Ruler
• the capacity of Home to affect Foreign’s interests
q+p(1-q)=k(x)/d(x)

Question 10

Compared to the benchmark, when Foreign is present and Opposition is Aligned

Answer 10

• repression x is higher
• the probability of Leader L survival is higher
• the expected payoff of Leader is at least as high

Question 11

This means that the presence of Foreign

aligned opposition

Answer 11

• benefits the autocratic leader

* leads to more repression against Oppositions that are allied with Foreign

Question 12

Compared to the benchmark, when F is present and Z is Misligned

Answer 12

• under some conditions, repression is lower
• the probability of Leader survival is higher
• the expected payoff of Leader is higher

Question 13

This means that the presence of Foreign

misaligned opposition

Answer 13

• benefits the autocratic leader

* can lead to less repression against Z that are de facto enemies of Foreign

Question 14

Effect of Repression on Domestic Challenges

Answer 14

Repression deters domestic challenges

Question 15

Effect of Repression on Probability of Survival

Answer 15

Repression improves Leader’s survival prospects

Question 16

Proposition for solving repression challenge

Answer 16

There exists a unique equilibrium, (x0∗,τ0∗(x)) where
- Opposition challenges the regime iff τ ≥ τ0∗(x)
- Leader’s choice of repression x0∗ solves
d ln(λ0(x))/dx = − (d ln(B(x)))/dx

Question 17

delegation and deterrence effects

Answer 17

• delegation if opposition is aligned and repression is low.

- deterrence if opposition is misaligned and repression is low