1bis- Autocratic Stability under the shadow of Foreign Threats Flashcards
Autocrats manage threats from
- Domestic actors: Elites, military, opposition groups
- Foreign actors: Single countries, military alliances
Domestic and Foreign threats are strategically linked
- Domestic opposition: needs to consider foreign reaction to regime change
- Foreign opposition: new domestic power after regime change
- Autocratic leader: boosting internal security can influence foreign threats
The ‘benchmark’ model
Timing:
- Leader chooses repression x ∈ [0, X ]
- Opposition chooses whether to challenge, s ∈ {0, 1}
Challenge success:
Probability of Z seizing power= t/(x+t)
Benefit of holding power B(x):
- B(x) >0
- B(x) is decreasing in repression x
- Being in power is always valuable, B(X) > c
Opposition will challenge if
prob du benefit moins les coûts > 0
B(x) * t/(x+t) - c
rearranging:
cx/(B(x)- c)
Repression and trade-off for the leader
- repression reduces the benefit of being in power: B′(x) < 0
- repression improves probability of survival: λ′0(x) > 0
so leader’s issue is max λ(x)B(x)
Model with Foreign Actor
draw the graph!
- Foreign (F) moves after Opposition (Z)
- Leader (L) is misaligned
- Opposition is either aligned (A) with F or misaligned (M)
- F can intervene against ruler, w=1 or not w=0, successful in all cases
Costs for F
- cost d(x) if H is controlled by a misaligned actor (repression influences prosperity) decreasing in x
- cost k(x) for intervening, increasing in x
Optimal intervention for Foreign depends on:
mathematically
• the alignment of the Ruler
• the capacity of Home to affect Foreign’s interests
q+p(1-q)=k(x)/d(x)
Compared to the benchmark, when Foreign is present and Opposition is Aligned
- repression x is higher
- the probability of Leader L survival is higher
- the expected payoff of Leader is at least as high
This means that the presence of Foreign
aligned opposition
- benefits the autocratic leader
* leads to more repression against Oppositions that are allied with Foreign
Compared to the benchmark, when F is present and Z is Misligned
- under some conditions, repression is lower
- the probability of Leader survival is higher
- the expected payoff of Leader is higher
This means that the presence of Foreign
misaligned opposition
- benefits the autocratic leader
* can lead to less repression against Z that are de facto enemies of Foreign
Effect of Repression on Domestic Challenges
Repression deters domestic challenges
Effect of Repression on Probability of Survival
Repression improves Leader’s survival prospects
Proposition for solving repression challenge
There exists a unique equilibrium, (x0∗,τ0∗(x)) where
- Opposition challenges the regime iff τ ≥ τ0∗(x)
- Leader’s choice of repression x0∗ solves
d ln(λ0(x))/dx = − (d ln(B(x)))/dx
delegation and deterrence effects
- delegation if opposition is aligned and repression is low.
- deterrence if opposition is misaligned and repression is low
