4bis -Terrorism Flashcards

1
Q

Definition

A

Premeditated use or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims

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2
Q

Reasons for use of terrorism

A
  • Not strong enough to conduct conventional war: ‘weapon of the weak’
  • Not enough public support/ no democratic means
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3
Q

Usual terrorist bargain

A
  1. Terrorist act
  2. Intimidation of target population
  3. Population favors some political decisions
  4. Concessions to terrorists
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4
Q

Unintended consequences of giving concessions

problems

A
  • Commitment problems:
    • Are concessions guaranties for the end of terrorism acts?
    • How can governments convince terrorists that they will stop conceding?
  • Selection problem:
    • If moderates are satisfied, what prevents the extremists to ask for more?
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5
Q

Goals of terrorism

A
  • Regime change
  • Territorial change
  • Policy change
  • Social control
  • Status Quo maintenance
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6
Q

Achieving goals through terrorism

A
  • Conflicts among different actors are often driven by uncertainty (which resolve is key to avoid conflict) about:
    • Relative power
    • Preferences
    • Resolve/ Willingness to fight
  • solving the uncertainty is key to avoid the conflict
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7
Q

Communicate with terrorists

A

worthless, they’ll announce they’re strong

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8
Q

Terrorist strategies as costly signals

matrixxx

A
Signaling:
-	Power/ capabilities 
-	Resolve/ willingness to fight
-	Trustworthiness/ preferences
To: 
-	Target government/ citizens
-	Own constituency
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9
Q

Attrition

How does it work?

A
  • Signalling strength/commitment to the cause (in some cases, weakness)
  • More costs inflicted today ⇒ clearer signal of strength ⇒more credible threat tomorrow
  • Use threat of future costs as a bargaining to obtain concessions
  • Directed at government and population, but audience is government
  • Mostly suited for policy goals and territorial change
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10
Q

Attrition

When does it work?

A
  • For governments to concede: Expected costs of continuing conflict > Costs of concessions
  • For terrorists: P(Conces) × Benefit of Concessions − P(No conces) × Expected costs of continuing conflict > Status quo
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11
Q

How to counter attrition?

A

Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:

  • make inessential concessions (but this could be signal of weakness of government)
  • targeted retaliation if issue disputed is important (i.e. lower P(Conces) via lower ability to recruit)
  • engage in target hardening to limit costs sustained (i.e. lower P(Conces) via lower Expected costs of continuing conflict)
  • deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction (i.e. same as above)
  • minimize probability of citizens’ overreaction (i.e. same as above)
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12
Q

Conditions favourable for attrition:

A
  • government does not have strong interest in the issue (i.e. lower Costs of concessions)
  • government is constrained in response to terrorist violence (i.e. lower Expected costs of continuing conflict for terrorists)
  • government has a low cost tolerance (i.e higher Expected costs of continuing conflict for government and thus higher P(Conces))
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13
Q

Intimidation

How does it work?

A
  • Signalling ability to punish who doesn’t support them & government inability to prevent it
  • Punish regime supporters ⇒ clearer signal of strength & government weakness ⇒ more support for terrorists (similar logic to deterrence)
  • Tactic: assassination, bombings, mass killings
  • Directed at population, that is also the audience
  • Mostly suited for social control and regime change
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14
Q

Intimidation

When does it work?

A
  • For citizens to abide: Expected costs of deviating > Benefit of deviating
  • For terrorists: P(No government punish) × Benefit of policy change
    − P(government punish) × Cost of punish > Status quo
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15
Q

Intimidation

How to counter it?

A

Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:
- If intimidation aimed at regime change:
• clear and hold — regain control of territory and strengthen state institutions (i.e. higher Pr(government punish))

  • If intimidation aimed at social control:
    • strengthen law enforcement (i.e. higher P(government punish))
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16
Q

Conditions favourable for intimidation:

A
  • If intimidation aimed at regime change:
    • government is weak (i.e. lower P(punish)+higher expected costs of deviating for citizens)
    • large territory (i.e. same as above)
  • If intimidation aimed at social control:
    • government is weak (i.e. same as above)
17
Q

Provocation

How does it work?

A
  • Force government to reveal information about itself and persuade domestic audience that government is untrustworthy
  • Induce government to respond with indiscriminate violence ⇒ domestic audience’s view of target government worsens ⇒ support for terrorists’ goals & violence against government
  • Directed at government but audience is population
  • Mostly suited for regime change and territorial change
18
Q

Provocation

When does it work?

A
  • For government to retaliate: Benefit for security > Cost of radicalization + Cost of inaction
  • For terrorists: P(retaliation)(Benefit of support − Cost of retaliation)
    + (1 − P(retaliation)) × Status quo > Status quo
19
Q

Provocation

How to counter it?

A

Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:

  • targeted interventions (e.g. lower benefit of higher support for terrorists)
  • investment in intelligence to improve efficiency of interventions
20
Q

Conditions favourable for provocation:

A
  • government not too willing and not too reluctant to retaliate harshly
    • too willing to retaliate ⇒ otherwise Cost of retaliation>Benefit of higher support
    • too reluctant to retaliate ⇒ Pr(retaliation) ≈ 0
  • democratic institutions (i.e. higher Cost of inaction thus higher Pr(retaliation))
21
Q

Spoiling

How does it work?

A
  • Instil mistrust between moderate factions of terrorist groups and government
  • Moderates appear unable to ensure security ⇒ induces government to distrust moderates ⇒ more support for terrorist group when no compromise has been reached
  • Directed at government, that is also the audience
  • Mostly suited for territorial change
22
Q

Spoiling

When does it work?

A
  • For the government to trust moderates, it has to think moderates are too weak to crack down on extremist and not that they are unwilling to do that
  • If moderates do not want to crack down on them, any agreement won’t last
23
Q

Spoiling

How to counter it?

A

Need for policies that improve trust between negotiating parts:

  • third-party monitoring and enforcement of the deal
  • deals should not alter too much balance of power
  • participation in international institutions that raise costs of deviations
    Selection problem is unavoidable — often after agreement violence increases
24
Q

Conditions favourable for spoiling:

A
  • moderates are weak

• if moderates have large support from their constituency, terrorism is sign they cannot be trusted

25
Q

Outbidding

How does it work?

A
  • Violence as a signal of commitment to the cause
  • When multiple groups compete for support of one constituency
  • Higher level of violence than competitors ⇒ population infers the group has higher commitment to the cause than its competitors ⇒ more support for terrorist group
  • Audience is population
  • Not directly related to a specific goal
26
Q

Outbidding

When does it work?

A

Supporting more extreme groups might produce several benefits to citizens:

  • if a deal is possible, they make tougher negotiators
  • if conflict is inevitable, they are more willing to fight
  • if they achieve some political goals, they are less likely to sell out afterwards
27
Q

Outbidding

How to counter it?

A

Need for policies that reduce competition among groups

  • promote unity into a united opposition — easier to bargain with unified (but stronger) actor
  • grant concession to nonviolent groups — but worsens the selection problem
28
Q

Three players of terrorism

A
  • Terrorists (Leaders and Operatives)
  • Target government
  • Citizens in target country