4bis -Terrorism Flashcards
Definition
Premeditated use or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims
Reasons for use of terrorism
- Not strong enough to conduct conventional war: ‘weapon of the weak’
- Not enough public support/ no democratic means
Usual terrorist bargain
- Terrorist act
- Intimidation of target population
- Population favors some political decisions
- Concessions to terrorists
Unintended consequences of giving concessions
problems
- Commitment problems:
• Are concessions guaranties for the end of terrorism acts?
• How can governments convince terrorists that they will stop conceding? - Selection problem:
• If moderates are satisfied, what prevents the extremists to ask for more?
Goals of terrorism
- Regime change
- Territorial change
- Policy change
- Social control
- Status Quo maintenance
Achieving goals through terrorism
- Conflicts among different actors are often driven by uncertainty (which resolve is key to avoid conflict) about:
• Relative power
• Preferences
• Resolve/ Willingness to fight - solving the uncertainty is key to avoid the conflict
Communicate with terrorists
worthless, they’ll announce they’re strong
Terrorist strategies as costly signals
matrixxx
Signaling: - Power/ capabilities - Resolve/ willingness to fight - Trustworthiness/ preferences To: - Target government/ citizens - Own constituency
Attrition
How does it work?
- Signalling strength/commitment to the cause (in some cases, weakness)
- More costs inflicted today ⇒ clearer signal of strength ⇒more credible threat tomorrow
- Use threat of future costs as a bargaining to obtain concessions
- Directed at government and population, but audience is government
- Mostly suited for policy goals and territorial change
Attrition
When does it work?
- For governments to concede: Expected costs of continuing conflict > Costs of concessions
- For terrorists: P(Conces) × Benefit of Concessions − P(No conces) × Expected costs of continuing conflict > Status quo
How to counter attrition?
Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:
- make inessential concessions (but this could be signal of weakness of government)
- targeted retaliation if issue disputed is important (i.e. lower P(Conces) via lower ability to recruit)
- engage in target hardening to limit costs sustained (i.e. lower P(Conces) via lower Expected costs of continuing conflict)
- deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction (i.e. same as above)
- minimize probability of citizens’ overreaction (i.e. same as above)
Conditions favourable for attrition:
- government does not have strong interest in the issue (i.e. lower Costs of concessions)
- government is constrained in response to terrorist violence (i.e. lower Expected costs of continuing conflict for terrorists)
- government has a low cost tolerance (i.e higher Expected costs of continuing conflict for government and thus higher P(Conces))
Intimidation
How does it work?
- Signalling ability to punish who doesn’t support them & government inability to prevent it
- Punish regime supporters ⇒ clearer signal of strength & government weakness ⇒ more support for terrorists (similar logic to deterrence)
- Tactic: assassination, bombings, mass killings
- Directed at population, that is also the audience
- Mostly suited for social control and regime change
Intimidation
When does it work?
- For citizens to abide: Expected costs of deviating > Benefit of deviating
- For terrorists: P(No government punish) × Benefit of policy change
− P(government punish) × Cost of punish > Status quo
Intimidation
How to counter it?
Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:
- If intimidation aimed at regime change:
• clear and hold — regain control of territory and strengthen state institutions (i.e. higher Pr(government punish))
- If intimidation aimed at social control:
• strengthen law enforcement (i.e. higher P(government punish))
Conditions favourable for intimidation:
- If intimidation aimed at regime change:
• government is weak (i.e. lower P(punish)+higher expected costs of deviating for citizens)
• large territory (i.e. same as above) - If intimidation aimed at social control:
• government is weak (i.e. same as above)
Provocation
How does it work?
- Force government to reveal information about itself and persuade domestic audience that government is untrustworthy
- Induce government to respond with indiscriminate violence ⇒ domestic audience’s view of target government worsens ⇒ support for terrorists’ goals & violence against government
- Directed at government but audience is population
- Mostly suited for regime change and territorial change
Provocation
When does it work?
- For government to retaliate: Benefit for security > Cost of radicalization + Cost of inaction
- For terrorists: P(retaliation)(Benefit of support − Cost of retaliation)
+ (1 − P(retaliation)) × Status quo > Status quo
Provocation
How to counter it?
Government should adopt policies that make LHS (of terrorists) smaller:
- targeted interventions (e.g. lower benefit of higher support for terrorists)
- investment in intelligence to improve efficiency of interventions
Conditions favourable for provocation:
- government not too willing and not too reluctant to retaliate harshly
• too willing to retaliate ⇒ otherwise Cost of retaliation>Benefit of higher support
• too reluctant to retaliate ⇒ Pr(retaliation) ≈ 0 - democratic institutions (i.e. higher Cost of inaction thus higher Pr(retaliation))
Spoiling
How does it work?
- Instil mistrust between moderate factions of terrorist groups and government
- Moderates appear unable to ensure security ⇒ induces government to distrust moderates ⇒ more support for terrorist group when no compromise has been reached
- Directed at government, that is also the audience
- Mostly suited for territorial change
Spoiling
When does it work?
- For the government to trust moderates, it has to think moderates are too weak to crack down on extremist and not that they are unwilling to do that
- If moderates do not want to crack down on them, any agreement won’t last
Spoiling
How to counter it?
Need for policies that improve trust between negotiating parts:
- third-party monitoring and enforcement of the deal
- deals should not alter too much balance of power
- participation in international institutions that raise costs of deviations
Selection problem is unavoidable — often after agreement violence increases
Conditions favourable for spoiling:
- moderates are weak
• if moderates have large support from their constituency, terrorism is sign they cannot be trusted
Outbidding
How does it work?
- Violence as a signal of commitment to the cause
- When multiple groups compete for support of one constituency
- Higher level of violence than competitors ⇒ population infers the group has higher commitment to the cause than its competitors ⇒ more support for terrorist group
- Audience is population
- Not directly related to a specific goal
Outbidding
When does it work?
Supporting more extreme groups might produce several benefits to citizens:
- if a deal is possible, they make tougher negotiators
- if conflict is inevitable, they are more willing to fight
- if they achieve some political goals, they are less likely to sell out afterwards
Outbidding
How to counter it?
Need for policies that reduce competition among groups
- promote unity into a united opposition — easier to bargain with unified (but stronger) actor
- grant concession to nonviolent groups — but worsens the selection problem
Three players of terrorism
- Terrorists (Leaders and Operatives)
- Target government
- Citizens in target country
