Dispensa- 1- Traditional debates: Realism reinterpreted

Question 1

Definition of Realism Theory
classical
neorealism

Answer 1

realism: in an archaic world
states rationally pursue their interests in a competitive and self-interested manner
primary goal of states in international relations is the attainment and protection of power in all contexts

neorealism: in addition to a universal human nature, what matter is the contingent situation of the international order and structure within which relations develop
security as a goal, power as a mean

Question 2

first example of realist analysis

Answer 2

Thucydides’ Peloponnesian war

o Unitary actors: Sparta and Athens;
o Security concern: declining power worried about rising power;
o Hegemony as goal;
o Interdependence: further source of fear for Sparta.

Question 3

Classic references

Answer 3

• Homo Homini Lupus, Hobbs: State of Nature favours conflict more than cooperation
• The Prince, Machiavelli: Independence from morality, commerce and cooperation acts described as functional to imperialistic goals.

Question 4

Neorealism

Defensive vs. Offensive

Answer 4

• Defensive:
Waltz: anarchy generally compels states to attain security through diplomacy
conflict is an exception; peace if all countries are equally powerful

• Offensive neorealism, Mearsheimer: States goal is hegemony (power grabbing)
peace is attainable if military power is developed enough to make war very costly;
the surplus of cooperation due to interdependence is a false cause of stability

Question 5

Clear preponderance (Blainey)

Answer 5

Peace requires clear preponderance of power
balance invites expectations and attempts to achieve preponderance (war)
+ conflicts resulting from balance may lead to inconclusive or non- decisive outcomes, which are likely to lead to new conflicts
- Important role of information: before a war outbreak, there is uncertainty about who is ahead, especially if power is roughly balanced

Question 6

Before vs. after war

Answer 6

• Relative strengths observable at the end of a war. When preponderance, peace last longer
• Pax Americana after WW2, but also periods of proportional economic and military powers

Question 7

game theory

Answer 7

Strategic interaction among players (individuals or states)

Question 8

Assumptions of game theory

Answer 8

• Completeness of preference (a player can order the choice, or be indifferent)
• Transitive preferences (if A>B and B>C then A>C)

Question 9

Components of game theory

Answer 9

• Set of relevant players N
• Set of strategies Si for each player i
• Set of utility functions, (ui(si,s_i)), one for every player i, where si denotes the strategy chosen by player i and s_i for the other player.

Question 10

Strictly dominant strategy:

Answer 10

eq: an utility function for a strategy of player i, superior to all others utility functions for strategies of player i, for all the strategies of other players

Question 11

Weakly dominant strategy:

Answer 11

eq: an utility function for a strategy of player i, superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player i, for all the strategies of other players

Question 12

equilibrium

Answer 12

if there exist dominant strategies for all players

Question 13

Prisoners’ dilemma game

Answer 13

matrix

Question 14

Realist interpretation of the Prisoners’ dilemma game

Answer 14

• The anarchy (Hobbes): dominant strategy to defect when no communication and no coordination.
• Security Dilemma (Waltz): Anarchy and lack of cooperation result of the situation; the two players act selfishly not because selfishness is an intrinsic feature of human nature

Question 15

Nash Equilibrium

Answer 15

when the payoffs of different combinations of actions are such that there does not exist any dominant strategy for some player
• at least one NE must exist for each finite game
• no player has the incentive to change their own strategy, as long as the other does not change it either
eq:
if and only if an utility function for strategies of players i and j is superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player i considering the strategy of player j, for all the strategies of player i
and for an utility function for strategies of players j and i is superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player j considering the strategy of player i, for all the strategies of player j

Question 16

Stag/ Assurance Hunt (Rousseau)

Answer 16

Matrix
In IR contexts in which attacks are not too attractive (no first-strike advantage)
the cooperative outcome is a Nash equilibrium.

Question 17

Questions (Jervis)

Answer 17

• Are States preferences similar to PD game or SH?
• How do we know that other players know our preferences?
• Problem of evaluation of intentions: War may occur because of fear that our cooperative acts can be misinterpreted?

Question 18

Answers to Jervis

Answer 18

• the security dilemma is particularly likely when there is balance of power, as it generates higher uncertainty
• repeated nature of the interaction: If major powers cooperate for a long time, either the ‘game’ resembles SH, either PD repeated, when gains of future cooperation outweigh the payoff for a one-time defection. The following strategy applies: Cooperate as long as the other cooperates, but Defect forever as soon as the other defects once.

Question 19

Time discounting

Where discounting factor δ ∈[0,1]

Answer 19

measure of impatience

measure of value of cooperation

Question 20

If a game is repeated and yields the same utility u every period to a player, then at time t the expected utility from that point on is:

Answer 20

Ut=u+du+dsq u+…

Question 21

discounting for PD

Answer 21

cooperating for ever: U(CC, CC, CC..)= 2(1+d+dsq+..)=2* (1/(1-d) )
if defecting today and forever after: U(DC,DD,DD..)=3+d(1+d+dsq..)= 3+d/(1-d)

Question 22

remaining cooperative is better as long as

Answer 22

gains from future cooperation outweighs gains from defecting once
2* (1/(1-d) )>3+d/(1-d)
Which holds if d>0.5

Question 23

Role of Technology (Jervis)

Answer 23

when war technology is such that the best defence involves offensive capabilities, the one-shot payoff structure is closer to a prisoner’s dilemma than a stag hunt. (security dilemma; as d required is very high)

Question 24

Security dilemma:

Answer 24

• states as unitary actors in anarchy
• the attempt by a state to increase their security increases insecurity of others
• downward spiral determines lower security equilibrium

Question 25

economic perks of stronger cooperation lead to

Realism and Liberalism

Answer 25

Realism: leads to an increase in shared wealth, so increases incentives of some countries to conquer the whole ‘pie’
Liberalism: returns from international cooperation increase the opportunity cost of war, making it less likely

Question 26

Hegemonic Stability Theory (Gilpin)

Answer 26

the world is more likely to remain peaceful if one state takes on the role of hegemon
‘approaching parity’ is the most dangerous situation (=Blainey)

Question 27

Dominant strategy

Answer 27

when one has only one best response, regardless of the other players’ choices

Question 28

Hawks and Doves components

Answer 28

c: cost of playing hawkishly and attacking another state (c > 0)
d: cost of cooperating while the other attacks (d > 0): defence costs
μ: a country’s offensive capabilities and respective military power (the first-strike advantage)
(μ - c): expected utility from attacking another state

Question 29

Hawks and Doves game, matrix and analysis

Answer 29

matrix
as μ increases, all else being equal, the game resembles more and more a prisoner’s dilemma, and therefore cooperation requires a higher d to be sustained

Question 30

Melian Dialogue

Answer 30

best exemplifies realist view:
interstate politics lack regulation and justice
(“The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” )