Dispensa- 1- Traditional debates: Realism reinterpreted Flashcards
Definition of Realism Theory
classical
neorealism
realism: in an archaic world
states rationally pursue their interests in a competitive and self-interested manner
primary goal of states in international relations is the attainment and protection of power in all contexts
neorealism: in addition to a universal human nature, what matter is the contingent situation of the international order and structure within which relations develop
security as a goal, power as a mean
first example of realist analysis
Thucydides’ Peloponnesian war
o Unitary actors: Sparta and Athens;
o Security concern: declining power worried about rising power;
o Hegemony as goal;
o Interdependence: further source of fear for Sparta.
Classic references
- Homo Homini Lupus, Hobbs: State of Nature favours conflict more than cooperation
- The Prince, Machiavelli: Independence from morality, commerce and cooperation acts described as functional to imperialistic goals.
Neorealism
Defensive vs. Offensive
• Defensive:
Waltz: anarchy generally compels states to attain security through diplomacy
conflict is an exception; peace if all countries are equally powerful
• Offensive neorealism, Mearsheimer: States goal is hegemony (power grabbing)
peace is attainable if military power is developed enough to make war very costly;
the surplus of cooperation due to interdependence is a false cause of stability
Clear preponderance (Blainey)
Peace requires clear preponderance of power
balance invites expectations and attempts to achieve preponderance (war)
+ conflicts resulting from balance may lead to inconclusive or non- decisive outcomes, which are likely to lead to new conflicts
- Important role of information: before a war outbreak, there is uncertainty about who is ahead, especially if power is roughly balanced
Before vs. after war
- Relative strengths observable at the end of a war. When preponderance, peace last longer
- Pax Americana after WW2, but also periods of proportional economic and military powers
game theory
Strategic interaction among players (individuals or states)
Assumptions of game theory
- Completeness of preference (a player can order the choice, or be indifferent)
- Transitive preferences (if A>B and B>C then A>C)
Components of game theory
- Set of relevant players N
- Set of strategies Si for each player i
- Set of utility functions, (ui(si,s_i)), one for every player i, where si denotes the strategy chosen by player i and s_i for the other player.
Strictly dominant strategy:
eq: an utility function for a strategy of player i, superior to all others utility functions for strategies of player i, for all the strategies of other players
Weakly dominant strategy:
eq: an utility function for a strategy of player i, superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player i, for all the strategies of other players
equilibrium
if there exist dominant strategies for all players
Prisoners’ dilemma game
matrix
Realist interpretation of the Prisoners’ dilemma game
- The anarchy (Hobbes): dominant strategy to defect when no communication and no coordination.
- Security Dilemma (Waltz): Anarchy and lack of cooperation result of the situation; the two players act selfishly not because selfishness is an intrinsic feature of human nature
Nash Equilibrium
when the payoffs of different combinations of actions are such that there does not exist any dominant strategy for some player
• at least one NE must exist for each finite game
• no player has the incentive to change their own strategy, as long as the other does not change it either
eq:
if and only if an utility function for strategies of players i and j is superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player i considering the strategy of player j, for all the strategies of player i
and for an utility function for strategies of players j and i is superior or equal to all others utility functions for strategies of player j considering the strategy of player i, for all the strategies of player j
Stag/ Assurance Hunt (Rousseau)
Matrix
In IR contexts in which attacks are not too attractive (no first-strike advantage)
the cooperative outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
Questions (Jervis)
- Are States preferences similar to PD game or SH?
- How do we know that other players know our preferences?
- Problem of evaluation of intentions: War may occur because of fear that our cooperative acts can be misinterpreted?
Answers to Jervis
- the security dilemma is particularly likely when there is balance of power, as it generates higher uncertainty
- repeated nature of the interaction: If major powers cooperate for a long time, either the ‘game’ resembles SH, either PD repeated, when gains of future cooperation outweigh the payoff for a one-time defection. The following strategy applies: Cooperate as long as the other cooperates, but Defect forever as soon as the other defects once.
Time discounting
Where discounting factor δ ∈[0,1]
measure of impatience
measure of value of cooperation
If a game is repeated and yields the same utility u every period to a player, then at time t the expected utility from that point on is:
Ut=u+du+dsq u+…
discounting for PD
cooperating for ever: U(CC, CC, CC..)= 2(1+d+dsq+..)=2* (1/(1-d) )
if defecting today and forever after: U(DC,DD,DD..)=3+d(1+d+dsq..)= 3+d/(1-d)
remaining cooperative is better as long as
gains from future cooperation outweighs gains from defecting once
2* (1/(1-d) )>3+d/(1-d)
Which holds if d>0.5
Role of Technology (Jervis)
when war technology is such that the best defence involves offensive capabilities, the one-shot payoff structure is closer to a prisoner’s dilemma than a stag hunt. (security dilemma; as d required is very high)
Security dilemma:
- states as unitary actors in anarchy
- the attempt by a state to increase their security increases insecurity of others
- downward spiral determines lower security equilibrium
economic perks of stronger cooperation lead to
Realism and Liberalism
Realism: leads to an increase in shared wealth, so increases incentives of some countries to conquer the whole ‘pie’
Liberalism: returns from international cooperation increase the opportunity cost of war, making it less likely
Hegemonic Stability Theory (Gilpin)
the world is more likely to remain peaceful if one state takes on the role of hegemon
‘approaching parity’ is the most dangerous situation (=Blainey)
Dominant strategy
when one has only one best response, regardless of the other players’ choices
Hawks and Doves components
c: cost of playing hawkishly and attacking another state (c > 0)
d: cost of cooperating while the other attacks (d > 0): defence costs
μ: a country’s offensive capabilities and respective military power (the first-strike advantage)
(μ - c): expected utility from attacking another state
Hawks and Doves game, matrix and analysis
matrix
as μ increases, all else being equal, the game resembles more and more a prisoner’s dilemma, and therefore cooperation requires a higher d to be sustained
Melian Dialogue
best exemplifies realist view:
interstate politics lack regulation and justice
(“The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” )
