Core theme 1 Consciousness

Question 1

Substance Dualist

Descartes

Answer 1

P: the mind and body are different substances
P: impressions of colour, smell, touch could not be included in scientific study.
C: If not part of Scientific study consciousness must be a non-physical substance.

Question 2

Descartes’s method of doubt

Descartes

Answer 2

P: If a evil demon controls all senses
P: My senses could all be false ie; smell, sight, body
C: Only thing that I know is true is myself, my consciousness - I Think Therefore I Am, Ergo Cogito Sum

What (with 100% certainty) do we know is true

Question 3

Plato & Descartes

PDR (Plato Descartes & Rationalism)

Answer 3

P: Plato & Descartes both believe the rational mind makes humans seperate from everything else
C: Plato & Descartes are rationalists

Question 4

On Plato

PDR

Answer 4

Plato argues that through intellectual engagement we have access to the Realm of Forms

This helps us understand the true, unchanging ideas behind things, instead of just their imperfect appearances on Earth.

Question 5

Plato’s Realm of Forms Example

PDR

Answer 5

If we apply our mind we can understand a perfect circle (that is, every point on a circle’s circumference is exactly the same distance away from the centre). However in the world of appearances (what we would call the real world) we only ever see imperfect circles.

Question 6

Allegory of the Cave

PDR

Answer 6

Plato’s allegory of the cave demonstrates that through thought we get to a conceptual, abstract understanding of the world.

Question 7

Power of the mind

PDR

Answer 7

For both Plato and Descartes, humans have a mind unlike anything else because purely through the act of thinking we can arrive at abstract, conceptual truth ABOUT THE WORLD

Question 8

Argument for the cave

PDR

Answer 8

1. Our ability to decide whether objects are more or less perfect
   shows that we already have the concepts of perfect objects in our
   minds.

2.Wecannot gain these concepts of perfect objects from any
experience, but had to have them before all experiences.

3.Sinceour experiences began with our birth, we had to have
these concepts before birth.

4.Knowledge, which is based on our having these concepts, is
prenatal.

5.Oursoul had to have these concepts before birth, so it had to
exist before birth.

6.Thesoul is capable of existing without the body, and so it is
immortal.

Question 9

Critics of Plato
(Third Man)

COP (Critics of Plato)

Answer 9

P1: When multiple things share a property (like redness), there must be a Form that explains this commonality (Principle of Commonality)

P2: The Form itself must possess the property it represents (Principle of Self-Predication)

P3: The Form must be separate from the particulars it explains (Principle of Non-Identity)

C1: Given X and Y are red, there must be a Form A that explains their redness (from P1)

C2: Form A must itself be red (from P2)

C3: Now we have three red things (X, Y, and A), which requires a new Form B to explain their shared redness (from P1)

C4: Form B must also be red (from P2)

C5: Now we have four red things (X, Y, A, and B), requiring yet another Form…

THEREFORE: Plato’s argument contradicts itself and goes on for infinity meaning there’s no real explanation of share properties

Posited by Aristotle

Question 10

Participation

COP

Answer 10

P1: Cookie cutters and cookies have fundamentally different properties
P2: To say cookies “participate in” the cutter, they need some common property
P3: A metal shape and edible dough share no relevant common properties
C: Therefore, we can’t explain how cookies truly “participate in” their cutter

Question 11

Cateogry Mistake

Gilber (Gilbert Ryle)

Answer 11

P1: Forms are supposed to be of a fundamentally different category than physical objects

P2: When we try to understand Forms, we often treat them as though they were just special cases of physical objects

P3: Treating something from one category as though it belonged to another category is a logical error (category mistake)

C1: Therefore, many of our attempts to understand Forms involve category mistakes

C2: These category mistakes lead to logical contradictions and confusion in the Theory of Forms

Final Conclusion: The Theory of Forms, as typically understood, may be fundamentally flawed because it encourages us to think about Forms in the wrong category of existence.

Question 12

Cateogry Mistake
(Analogy)

Gilber

Answer 12

Imagine a visitor to KGV who, after seeing all the colleges, libraries, and departments, asks “But where is the School?” The visitor has made a category mistake by expecting to see “the School” as a separate building, rather than understanding that “the SChool” is the concept that encompasses all these components.

Similarly, looking for Forms as some kind of “super-examples” of properties is a category mistake. When we look for “redness itself” as though it were just a special kind of red thing, we’re making the same kind of error as the School visitor.

Question 13

Ryle is a Behaviourist

Gilber

Answer 13

This is often taken to mean that we can understand people from their behaviour only, or that all mental life is reducible to actions.

Question 14

Philsophical Zombies

Gilber

Answer 14

For example take a footballer rolling around ‘in pain’ as though they have broken their leg during a world cup match, and someone who has actually broken their leg. Their behaviour may be very similar but the actual feeling the two people are experiencing will be very different. Behaviourism doesn’t account for this.

Question 15

functionalism

TN&FJ (Thomas Nagel & Frank Jackson)

Answer 15

Nagel’s argument

Fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism

This is a subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental [like Dennett’s], for all of them are logically compatible with its absence

Question 16

Nagel Basis

TNFJ

Answer 16

Necessary: you can’t be conscious if there is nothing it is like to be you

Sufficient: if there is something it is like to be you then you must be conscious

Question 17

Nagel analogy

TNFJ

Answer 17

P: Birds fly & hunt
P: If we can fly & hunt it’s like being a bird
C: birds are conscious

Question 18

Frank Jackson argument

TNFJ

Answer 18

P: Mary has never seen color before
P: Mary knows everything about color
P: Mary see’s color for the first time
C: Does Mary Learn more about color?

There is more to know than the physical explanation of color, so the claim that qualia do not add to our knowledge is false. There is something more than physical explanation can explain. That is: phenomenal experience - a non physical thing that adds to our understanding of the world. So physicalism is false

Question 19

Daniel Dennet Rejection of Descartes
(Caspar the Friendly Ghost)

DD (Fuck this guy)

Answer 19

Casper, can both move through walls and pick things up. How are both of these things possible? They can’t be since the ghost must either interact with the physical world or not. The ghost’s actions are logically and physically impossible. Yet this is what substance dualists require.

Question 20

The Cartesian Theatre

DD

Answer 20

You that hears when someone calls your name

Your self makes decisions and takes action, and lives in our brain. Something like this is typically assumed by people.

But how would this work? How does this self make decisions? What processes go on that make this happen? For this self to work as a self it needs to think and do things. But how could a self do this? It requires some kind of executive function, like say another self inside the first? That self requires… You can see the problem here.

Question 21

Functionalist Model

DD

Answer 21

The brain is viewed as a collection of modules, each performing different functions.

Conscious experience arises not from a singular self but from the interplay of these modules, competing for attention and centrality.

(mind is a living Phone with apps that make up different parts of our consciousness)

Question 22

The Hard Problem

DC

Answer 22

P: Critics argue that Dennett’s functionalism fails to address the subjective quality of experiences (qualia) and what it feels like to be conscious.

P: They claim that by focusing on brain functions, Dennett overlooks the intrinsic nature of conscious experience.

C: Dennett counters that this critique stems from misunderstanding consciousness as a singular phenomenon; instead, he posits that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation, shaped by the interplay of various brain functions.

Question 23

Philosphical Zombies

DC

Answer 23

P: Critics, such as David Chalmers, argue that it is conceivable to imagine a physically identical world that lacks consciousness (p-zombies), which challenges the notion of physicalism.

P: This thought experiment suggests that physical properties alone do not guarantee consciousness.

C: Dennett responds by asserting that p-zombies are not genuinely conceivable, arguing that they would lack the evolutionary basis for consciousness, and thus, consciousness cannot be separated from physical processes.