Cases (what Need Not Be Proved) Flashcards
FACTS:
Spouses Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19+ hectares of agricultural land situated in Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner Landbank valued the expropriated portion at P173,918.55. Unsatisfied with the Landbank valuation and the subsequent affirmance of such by PARAD, Respondents filed before the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. After the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Trial court computed the just compensation for a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. In concluding that the valuation of respondents property, RTC merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in another case pending before it and applied the same to instant case without conducting a hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the records of one case pending before it and apply the same to another case also pending with it without conducting trial and without the knowledge or consent of the parties
No. Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, to wit: SEC. 3.Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Appellants were charge with five (5) counts of kidnapping for ransom and three (3) counts of kidnapping before the RTC. Trial court convicted the seven accused positively identified by the victims. Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross- examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter’s testimony should not be used against him..
ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one witness in a case pending before it and use the same to another case also pending with it.
HELD: No. As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross- examinations conducted by appellant’s counsel
FACTS:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff is an expatriate employed by Respondent Singapore Airlines Limited on a contractual basis which is stipulated to last for five (5) years. However, due to recession, Respondent decided to terminate some of their pilots, included in the termination is herein plaintiff. Plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment “thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code” and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction
Whether or not courts may take judicial notice of foreign law.
answer is in the negative. The Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. T
FACTS:
Arnado filed herein Motion for Reconsideration assailing the previous decision of the Supreme Court as to his disqualification to run as mayor. Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts may consider applicability of foreign laws to a case upon reference to it by one of the parties
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.” Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
FACTS:
Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentines Day bombing. The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman - announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks. As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the conductor who identified the two accused to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb exploded. Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial may be admissible as evidence against a co- conspirator
Yes Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Distinction must be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former
FACTS: In 1993, SB ordered the consolidation cases related to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos Family and cronies. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion stating that petitioner wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them in another related case. This motion partly denied insofar as the adoption of testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud for the reason that said deponents are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the respondents. Petitioner then filed another motion asking SB to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. This was again denied by the SB, to wit: Judicial notice is found under Rule 129. This provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant. Petitioner’s 3rd motion was again denied by SB. Hence, petitioner filed the instant motion alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of SB’s refusal to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Petitioner asserts that the case where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence is but a “child” of the “parent” case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the “children” cases should be considered as evidence in the “parent” case.
ISSUE: Whether or not courts in trying consolidated cases may take judicial notice of testimony and evidence presented in one of the cases consolidated
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases
