Cases (hearsay Evidence Rule) Flashcards
FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa for failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company. During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where misappropriated by the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in the documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.
HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of the accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge, the same is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence
