Cases (Hierarchy of Evidence) Flashcards
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness attesting to identifying the perpetrator of a crime by merely seeing his back constitutes positive identification that warrants conviction
No. No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.
Accused was charged with forcible abduction with rape. During the trial, complainant testified that she was abducted by the accused and brought to the latter’s residence where the former was repeatedly rape for 8 days. However, in the course the complainant’s testimony, she testified that in between those 8 days, she was able to visit her grandmother. Furthermore, when prosecution presented Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations. On the other hand, the defense presented Wilma Enriquez, a friend of the complainant, who testified that after the dates wherein the latter was supposedly rape, the latter visited her and discussed plans about marrying the accused. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal with CA, conviction of the accused was confirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person accused of rape may be convicted based solely on the testimony of victim who positively identified him to be the perpetrator notwithstanding blatant inconsistencies therein.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles:
(1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent;
(2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.
The following inconsistencies in complainant’s testimony is found to be incompatible to human experience: (1) the admission that she during her abduction she was brought to accused’s house where 8 family members of the latter also resides; (2) that she was not able to ask for help from any of the family member nor any of them was able to realize that accused was keeping her against her will; (3) the discussion of wedding plans with her friend after her ordeal; (4) admission that she was able to visit her grandmother within the period of the alleged abduction when she was supposed to be kept inside accused’s house against her will; and (5) lastly, that she was repeated mauled by accused on their way to his to residence and within the duration of abduction but no physical injuries was seen during the medical examination conducted after the incident. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-SD). The said Agenda contain an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them.Thus, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy. Herein Respondents were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda without being authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Florendo. During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said pages from the agenda and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the initial investigation that they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda, they vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation of the OAS.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation warrants prevails against the contrary testimony of their co- respondent implicating them in the alleged deed.
No. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained unsullied.
petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. Initially, the petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo. On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to Branch presided by respondent judge. On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
ISSUE: What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant such bail to a potential extraditee.
Clear and convincing evidence. Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We further note that Section allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;” and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.” While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, Fontanilla was charged with murder. At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. Prosecution presented the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais. She attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing that he had “no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death” due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital. ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of accused alleging self-defense may be given credence amidst gravity of the injury sustained by the victim.
No. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self- defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
